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Foreword 
 
European research policy is at a critical juncture. In the face of challenges 
such as the economic crisis, global warming, depletion of resources, an 
ageing European population and competition in a multi-polar world, 
Europe needs to step up its effort to accelerate the transition to a smarter 
and greener economy where the key input will be knowledge. The 
contribution of research to cope with such challenges is potentially huge, 
but policy-makers need to act resolutely to unleash this potential. Ten 
years after the launch of the Lisbon strategy, the agenda for structural 
reforms in Europe will be revised to make it fit for the post-2010 period. 
Research policy, including the new possibilities offered by the Lisbon 
Treaty, is expected be a key component of this debate.   
 
Over the past ten years, Member States have been reforming their R&D 
systems at national and regional levels. At the EU level, the mix and 
nature of research policy actions has also progressively widened to 
previously uncovered topics, such as framework conditions for private 
investment, loan-financing, tax incentives, intellectual property rights, 
public-private partnerships, programme co-ordination, investigator-led 
basic research, and so on. However, in the post-2010 period, the pace of 
these changes – especially at national and regional levels – will need to 
increase dramatically. Maximizing transnational coherence, synergy and 
added value will need to be an increasingly important consideration in the 
design and implementation of research policies and measures at national 
and EU levels in the coming years. EU research policy will need to 
increase its leverage effect on national research policies, programmes and 
systems, so as to raise the effectiveness, efficiency and attractiveness of 
the whole European research system. This requires a new partnership 
mode of governance for the European Research Area (ERA) as is 
currently being developed under the "Ljubljana Process" launched in 
2008.  
 
At such a critical juncture, it has been both appropriate and timely for DG 
Research of the European Commission to seek expert views and 
recommendations on the development of the ERA policy, through three 
Expert Groups dealing with: 
 
- The role of Community Research Policy in the Knowledge-
based Economy (chaired by Prof Luc Soete), 
VI
- A knowledge intensive future for Europe (chaired by Dr. Bjorn 
von Sydow), 
- ERA indicators and  monitoring (chaired by Prof Remi Barré), 
each of which has produced its own report and which are published as a 
series. The preliminary outcomes of these three Expert Groups have been 
presented and discussed with various stakeholders at a conference 
"Working together to strengthen research in Europe" that took place in 
Brussels, on 21-23 October 20091.
This is the report of the Expert Group chaired by Prof Luc Soete. The 
group was asked to provide recommendations on the future of 
Community research policy in the post-2010 period based on an 
assessment of the development of the knowledge-based economy in 
Europe and globally, elaborating rationales for research policy 
interventions2.
I would like to thank the members of the Expert Groups for their efforts 
and commitment, which has resulted in three important contributions to 
the debate on the future of EU and national research policies. 
Isi Saragossi 
DG Research, Director 
1 http://ec.europa.eu/research/conferences/2009/era2009/index_en.htm
2 In this sense, it should be seen against the background of a previous expert group 
(chaired by Prof L. Georghiou) which produced its report "Challenging Europe's 
Research: Rationales for the ERA" in 2008 
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Executive Summary 
 
Asked to reflect on the role of Community research policy in the development 
of the knowledge-based economy, the Expert Group (EG) took stock of 
ongoing reflections and analyses of research and innovation systems in Europe 
in the context of global trends, and experience gained of addressing the Lisbon 
strategy, including issues of governance. Active at a time of the most severe 
global economic and financial crisis in decades, when furthermore major 
societal challenges such as the long-term implications of climate change have 
taken on growing importance, the EG also chose to focus on opportunities for 
more radical reforms in Community as well as Member States’ (MS) research 
and innovation policies.  
 
The opportunities explored involve capitalising upon performance-related 
developments in research and innovation, for example created by their 
increasing globalisation; the tendency for research and innovation activities to 
concentrate in particular locations; and the rise of open innovation and the 
interconnectedness of research and innovation activities around the world. They 
are also linked to what could be called policy-driven developments, including 
the evident need to align research activities more closely with the resolution of 
major societal challenges such as climate change, sustainable development, 
energy shortages; to ensure that the fruits of such research achieve lasting 
benefits for society as a whole; the need to reduce the fragmentation that exists 
between both policy making structures and research and innovation actors 
across the EU; and the drive to improve the delivery of policy itself via 
administrative streamlining and improved governance. 
 
These developments and the challenges they pose constituted the structuring 
device for this report of the EG. The Background Report in Part II describes in 
detail the main developments, challenges and policy responses that became the 
focus of discussions in the EG over the last ten months.  The Policy Report in 
Part I summarises along a similar structure the policy conclusions and 
recommendations that the EG wishes to make. The group chose to put forward 
a limited number of highly focused recommendations even if its analysis covers 
a much wider range of issues and considerations. The group hopes that these 
will be useful for future reflections and policy formulations.  
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1. Responding to Globalisation 
The globalisation of research activities is still a relatively recent phenomenon 
that will continue to dominate the research and innovation landscape over the 
decades to come.  It involves not only the entrance of new actors such as China 
and India and a possible relocation of footloose R&D capacity, but also the 
agglomeration of research and innovation activities at specific locational nodes. 
These globalization and agglomeration trends represent a real challenge for 
policies primarily designed within a national or European context.  
 
In addressing this challenge, the first recommendation of the EG is to call for a 
renewed public commitment to knowledge investments in the difficult fiscal 
years to come. It proposes a new 3% EU knowledge investment target, one that 
has a number of clear policy advantages over the previous Barcelona 3% target.  
Recommendation 1 
Set a new EU 3% knowledge investment target.  
Obtain Member States’ commitment to increase their investments in 
knowledge and set national targets so as to achieve that by 2020 1% of 
Europe’s GDP is spent from public funds on research and development and 
2% of Europe’s GDP on higher education. Implementation of national targets 
will be under the full control of governments and will not depend on private 
sector investment decisions. 
 
A strong case can be made that the extent of private sector investment in R&D 
and innovation activities relates to a region’s attractiveness for such investment, 
and this is linked directly to expected rates of return and cost of capital. The 
financial crisis makes the fragmentation of national markets for products and 
services an even bigger impediment to any increase in private investment into 
R&D, while regulatory differences in Europe further increase the uncertainty on 
the expected rate of return on such investments. It leads the EG to a second 
recommendation.  
Recommendation 2  
Reduce investment risk.  
Lower the uncertainty surrounding expected rates of return on private R&D 
investments by improving coordination between the policy domains 
responsible for nurturing research, stimulating innovation and regulating 
market development. 
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European research policies will also have to increasingly recognize the need to 
network, interact, and participate in the global research area. More explicit 
European policy responses are needed to forge links with other global centres of 
activity in order to create synergies and access complementary expertise.  
Recommendation 3 
Open up ERA.  
Make Europe more attractive to all researchers and innovative entrepreneurs 
by taking steps to integrate those who are based outside Europe. Participate 
more extensively in the global circulation of knowledge. 
 
2. Tackling Societal Challenges 
Currently the world faces a series of major societal challenges that call for 
urgent solutions. These include climate change, energy shortages, sustainable 
development, affordable high-quality healthcare and many others that cannot be 
solved in a reasonable time and/or with acceptable social conditions without a 
strong and, in the European case, coordinated input requiring technological and 
non-technological innovation, and (though not necessarily always) advances in 
scientific understanding. The central issue for the EG has been whether 
resources, not just research but also procurement and other investment and 
deployment resources, can be better allocated among European stakeholders to 
achieve more productive “societal use” i.e. to influence not only the rate but 
also the direction of technical change and innovation. The EG believes this to 
be the case.  
 
Recommendation 4 
Focus policies on the direction as well as the rate of technical 
change.  
Channel EU and national research funds towards the resolution of major 
societal challenges. 
 
Societal challenges of the form discussed here represent systemic challenges, 
which few – if any – countries have either the experience or resources, or 
indeed the possibility, to tackle successfully on their own. In Europe in 
particular, the current compartmentalisation of research resources hampers the 
development of the critical mass of effort needed. In the final analysis, orienting 
EU policies towards the resolution of societal problems holds the promise not 
only of successfully confronting these challenges but also of nurturing the 
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development of the ERA and creating a new growth engine for economic 
development. However, the EG believes that this can only happen when there is 
full international cooperation and a clear understanding of European strengths 
and ambitions. 
Recommendation 5 
Improve international cooperation,  
particularly for challenges of a global nature; build this cooperation on a 
clearer assessment of European strengths and ambitions. 
 
Societal challenges also raise grand policy challenges, such as how to achieve 
compatibility between these top-down initiatives and a more market-driven 
resource allocation logic that would allow for multiple decentralized 
experiments. A first basic principle is relatively straightforward: it is crucial to 
be non-neutral in identifying the broad agenda while being neutral vis-à-vis 
specific applications and approaches. Other principles, e.g. for mitigating the 
potential distortions created by demand-side measures designed to stimulate 
innovation towards societal challenges or for managing the overall progress of 
these complex initiatives involving many stakeholders, are far less 
straightforward. The EG proposes a staged approach.  
Recommendation 6  
Create a stronger coordination  
between all relevant policies in order to better align innovative activities with 
the needs of society. This should involve stronger coordination between R&D 
support and Lead Market instruments (such as regulation, standards and 
public procurement) and the use of staged approaches linking support for 
developing innovative solutions with their subsequent uptake in public 
procurement. 
 
3. Excellence in Public Research  
An obvious, yet until recently little exploited, advantage of the EU is the 
potential for achieving a much larger and more competitive, transparent and 
accountable allocation process of public resources to so-called frontier research. 
Such merit-based competition at the EU level is likely to create strong pressures 
that can drive improvements in the overall quality of public research activities 
in Europe. 
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Recommendation 7 
Introduce merit-based competition at EU level 
in support of individual institutions and in ways that enable stronger 
differentiation among universities and RTO’s. Greater autonomy and 
accountability are also needed to support increased diversity.  
 
Furthermore, in addition to pleas to MS to improve the governance and 
differentiation of universities, the EG makes a special plea to take all steps 
necessary to ensure that the new European institutions created in recent years 
can flourish and grow on their own merits.   
Recommendation 8 
Build truly European institutions.  
Strengthen and expand the remit of the ERC; and the Knowledge and 
Innovation Communities of the EIT; continue the Europeanization of research 
infrastructures including the exploitation of new legal frameworks for their 
establishment; and launch a new Joint Research Initiative scheme. 
 
4. Responding to Open Innovation 
One important function of the ERA is to underpin Europe’s capacity to take 
advantage of the available knowledge base through its industry and businesses. 
Complementing the arguments presented above, the emphasis here is on 
furthering the construction of the ERA as an integral part of an effective 
innovation ecosystem, which builds upon excellence and merit-based 
competition. The focus here should be on what drives business R&D, how 
contemporary innovation processes operate, and where opportunities exist for 
the EU to gain comparative advantage. The development of global innovation 
networks and their potential impact on local innovation performance suggest 
that EU policies should facilitate the diffusion and adoption of practices that 
prove effective in this context, which (currently) are those termed open 
innovation practices. 
 
Open innovation creates new opportunities for young innovative SMEs. Due to 
their flexibility and ability to operate in new areas of business that are uncertain 
but potentially highly promising, such firms are important for pursuing radical 
innovations and constitute an important avenue of specialization and knowledge 
growth in Europe. The enhanced cross-fertilisation that is taking place among 
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firms of different ages and sizes further enhances this capacity and helps 
channel innovation and knowledge flows to the benefit of the entire ecosystem. 
Unfortunately, the prevailing institutional conditions in partly fragmented 
European markets still raise formidable barriers which have limited the overall 
success of this process. The EG therefore recommends an EU-wide scheme that 
can strengthen links between high performers in research, innovation and 
entrepreneurship, and promote the evolution of EU specialization and the 
growth of young innovative firms. 
  
Recommendation 9 
Support young innovative companies beyond their start-up 
phase.  
Launch an EU-wide ‘excellence through competition’ scheme encouraging 
young innovative companies to undertake high-risk projects and pursue 
radical innovations.  
 
Companies’ practices stress the importance of market demand in the 
organisation of innovation processes and in the choice of location for R&D 
activities. In EU countries, these factors will depend partly on development 
perspectives of new markets. Cluster development also emphasizes the effects 
of agglomeration and local interactions between innovation actors. Those 
clusters that stimulate local cooperation can efficiently support incremental 
innovation, which typically represents a very significant share of the innovation 
activity. Those that promote research excellence and international visibility 
need to be connected to relevant EU and global networks. 
 
Recommendation 10 
Focus support to collaborative research.   
Use selection criteria that emphasise research excellence, the potential for 
radical innovation and the capacity to operate globally. 
 
While open innovation practices raise the need for more interconnectedness, 
they also imply complementarity among actors and open innovation (soft) 
infrastructures. The challenge is to put in place the appropriate incentives and 
research structures to enable exploitation of such complementarities. At the 
European level, one such structure could be the community patent. Researchers’ 
mobility (public-private, international) and its preconditions are another. 
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Recommendation 11 
Facilitate open innovation.  
Move quickly to the full implementation of a Community patent system and 
increase efforts to reduce the barriers to researcher mobility and reduce 
transaction costs in knowledge and technology exchanges. 
 
5. Adjusting for Regional Differences 
Developments such as globalisation, the relocation of R&D activities and the 
tendency for R&D and innovation actors to concentrate in specific locational 
clusters can all have highly variegated implications for different regions. So too 
can ‘spatially-blind’ policy-driven developments such as attempts to stimulate 
excellence irrespective of locational considerations, which can act to reward 
existing centres of excellence preferentially and appear to conflict with aspects 
of regional cohesion policy. The discussions of the Expert Group focused on 
policy thrusts such as ‘smart specialisation’ that should allow regions to 
identify niche development strategies that allow them to satisfy local needs and 
grow rather than fall behind during the evolution of knowledge-based societies. 
 
Recommendation 12 
Encourage the design of smart specialisation policy mixes 
 capable of nurturing and exploiting the capabilities of entrepreneurial 
entities within regions. 
 
The EU’s cohesion policies should incorporate this perspective, themselves be 
smart and use conditionality as powerful support to policy learning. Cohesion 
policies have an essential role to play in assisting regions to select the most 
appropriate smart specialisation patterns on which regional development will 
have to thrive. Doing so will shift the emphasis in regional policies away from 
the principle of subsidiarity in favour of the principle of shared responsibility. 
It thus will help to build up understanding of causal relations that can be 
replicated and take into account differences in context. 
Recommendation 13 
Allocate a greater proportion of structural funds to the 
development of research and innovation capacity.  
In particular, make the provision of structural funds conditional upon the 
development of smart specialisation strategies.  
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6. Improving Governance and Policy Delivery 
Although the EG focused primarily on the nature and orientation of the policies 
needed to deal with trends and developments affecting research and innovation 
communities, it also discussed ways in which the Commission could improve 
its own governance structures, processes and policy delivery. In the view of the 
EG, there is a demonstrable need for the Financial Regulation to be revised so 
as to take into account the fact that research and innovation are inherently risky 
activities, in the sense that outcomes cannot, by definition, be guaranteed. 
Progress in this regard is of particular importance since it conditions the 
efficiency of the funding system at European level. For the EG, if this is not 
addressed as an issue of absolute priority, the present crisis shock might 
ultimately well go the other way: questioning increasingly the value added of 
Community research and leading to a future in which individual MS’ efforts 
concentrate on improving attractiveness within their own borders and fail to 
achieve an effective ERA. 
 
Recommendation 14 
Revise the Financial Regulation  
in 2010 by making specific provisions for research that take into account the 
specificities and the risks associated with it. 
 
As fiscal pressures mount in each MS, the effectiveness and efficiency of the 
many national (and regional) research funding agencies and institutions is likely 
to become increasingly scrutinized. And similarly at the Community level, the 
new European instruments and tools will have to demonstrate not just their 
particular strategic advantage in terms of addressing common European goals 
but also the administrative and governance advantages obtained through a more 
effective pooling of resources. In short, might the future, post-crisis MS 
landscape of fiscal austerity actually offer new opportunities for a more truly 
European based “common” research policy? As analysed and argued here, we 
believe it will. Community research and innovation policy is indeed at a 
crossroad.  Time for a new era for the ERA.  
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Part I 
Policy Report  
 
Research and Innovation Policy in 
Europe:  
A New Era for the ERA 
 
Prologue 
 
This Expert Group (EG), set up by the European Commission (EC) at the end 
of 2008, was asked to review and interpret the evidence on the state of the 
knowledge-based economy in Europe; assess the effectiveness of existing 
research policy instruments and come up with recommendations on how to 
frame and articulate Community research policy in the post-2010 period. The 
Terms of Reference (ToR) referred to the need for an economic assessment, 
hence the dominance in this EG of experts from academic, business and policy 
making communities with a strong economic background1.  
 
 
 
                                                 
1 At the same time particular care was taken to include in the EG experts which were actively 
involved in existing European institutions such as the European Research Council (Mathias 
Dewatripont and Helga Nowotny, vice president), the Commissioner’s group of economic 
advisors, the so-called K4G (Knowledge for growth) group (Dominique Foray, vice chairman 
and Georg Licht), the European Institute on Innovation and Technology (João Caraça, member 
of the board of the EIT), the European Research Area Board (Jan van den Biesen) and European 
research associations such as the European Industrial Research Management Association 
(Andrew Dearing, secretary general of EIRMA) and Euroscience (Enric Banda, president). At 
the same time, the views and opinions expressed in this Report are those of the experts and do 
not necessarily correspond to the views and opinions of those respective institutions with which 
experts are affiliated.     
 10 
A strategic mandate: 2010 as a milestone year for Community research policy   
The EG was established with a clear strategic mandate: to assess at the end of 
the mandate of the first Barroso Commission the scope of research policy in the 
post-2010 Lisbon agenda2 and to discuss what the future role of Community 
research policy should be in relation to national, Member States (MS) research 
policy. In short, to revisit the so-called “rationale/ added-value/ intervention 
logic” premises of EU research policy as it has gradually emerged and taken 
form through a multitude of tools and instruments, and in particular the 
establishment of the European Research Area (ERA) in 2000. Furthermore, the 
EG was challenged within the limited time of its existence – January till 
October 2009 – to come up with practical, as well as quickly implementable 
policy recommendations which would take into account the complexity and full 
range of current Community and MS’ research policies.  
 
The crisis as breeding ground for new ideas   
But of course the ToR could not foresee the way the global financial crisis 
would affect the world, and the European economy in particular, in the fall of 
2008, nor the impact the crisis would have on European research, let alone on 
Community research policy. By historical accident, the EG met and carried out 
most of its analysis over the period during which the financial and economic 
crisis hit Europe hardest. To carry out its “evidence-based” assessment and 
evaluate the effectiveness of the main research policy instruments within this 
context appeared no easy undertaking for the EG. However, at the same time 
periods of crisis are also ideal moments for more profound reflections on 
existing policy tools and instruments. A crisis provides a good breeding ground 
for new ideas.  
 
 
                                                 
2 As the ToR document specified: “in 2010, 3 years after the relaunch of the ERA project with 
the Green Paper in 2007 and 2 years after the launch of the five ERA policy initiatives and of 
the Ljubljana process in 2008,... the Commission will report on the situation of ERA. Further, in 
the same year the Commission shall carry out, with the assistance of external experts, an 
evidence-based interim evaluation of both the EC and the Euratom Seventh Framework 
Programmes (FP) and their specific programmes building upon the ex-post evaluation of the EC 
and the Euratom Sixth Framework Programmes. 2010 will thus be a milestone year for 
Community research policy. Moreover, as the debate on the future of the Community Budget 
("Budget review") will start to impinge upon the preparation of the next EU financial 
perspectives and of the 8th Framework Programme, both to be implemented from 2014 onwards, 
a space will be open for a serious re-examination of the way the Community research budget 
is/should be used.” 
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An opportunity for designing the contours of a European common research 
policy?   
The implications of the crisis for the intervention logic, the rationale for 
Community research policy, or for the balance in Community research policy 
between competition and coordination in allocating resources, points to new, 
challenging questions. Given the fragmented responses to the financial crisis by 
and large dominated by MS’ own interests, how can Community research 
policy play an effective catalyst role with respect to MS’s national research 
policies? Might some of the new instruments such as the ERC and the EIT, 
introduced as new Community research policy tools well before the crisis, take 
on a different meaning and role over the years to come, providing the EU with 
direct instruments to restructure in a much more effective way the fragmented 
European research landscape? As fiscal pressures mount in each MS, the 
effectiveness and efficiency of the many national (and regional) research 
funding agencies and institutions is also likely to be increasingly scrutinized. 
And similarly at the Community level, the new European instruments and tools 
will have to demonstrate not just their particular strategic advantage in terms of 
addressing common European goals but also the administrative and governance 
advantages obtained through a more effective pooling of resources. In short, 
might the future, post-crisis MS landscape of fiscal austerity actually offer new 
opportunities for a more truly European based “common” research policy?  
 
The global sustainability challenge   
Despite its unexpected, sudden impact, particularly in Europe, the financial 
crisis was in many ways also illustrative of the underlying unsustainable nature 
of world growth over the last decade. Viewed in retrospect, that growth, at the 
highest level ever in the history of human kind, was unsustainable not just in 
terms of the global financial imbalances it created, but also in terms of the 
underlying technological knowledge base it relied upon. As the “World in 
2025” foresight project illustrated, while world population would increase by 
2025 with some 23% to some 8 billion people and world production with some 
98% – resulting in a dramatic improvement in the average income per capita at 
the global level (Fontagné, 2009) – such growth path would, given current 
technologies, by and large be unsustainable in terms of increased green-house 
gas (GHG) emissions, long term availability of natural resources, access to 
water, available world food production3.  
 
At the same time, the economic crisis itself has tended to undermine the 
momentum that had developed particularly in Europe to address as an absolute 
                                                 
3 See also Soete (2009).  
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priority issues such as climate change4. As David et al. (2009) recently argued: 
“The biggest threat of the process of global warming is precisely the lack of 
long term policy commitment to minimize the likelihood that delays in 
checking the growth of GHG concentration levels could allow the warming 
process to run irreversibly out of control”.   
 
European research and innovation policy at a crossroad   
There is little doubt that the urgent need to address global challenges such as 
climate change calls for a radical restructuring of a wide spectrum of MS 
policies. While the focus of the EG is on research and innovation policies, it is 
clear, as we discuss at greater length in Chapter 2, that many other policy areas 
(energy policy and procurement, public transport, environmental regulation, 
etc.) will also have to be involved. With respect to research and innovation, it is 
clear that addressing such societal challenges will require large, broad and 
diversified research and innovation efforts. A good example is the European 
Strategic Energy Technology Plan (SET-Plan)5: a large, broad and diversified 
plan of action aimed at mobilizing national and European research and 
innovation efforts. Diversity in research and innovation is particularly important 
here from the perspective of avoiding committing resources too early in the face 
of ongoing knowledge creation, as well as from the perspective of reducing the 
risk of betting on the wrong technology horse. While Europe could be said to 
have a natural advantage in diversity, translating it into a competitive advantage 
will require major transformations in the way research and innovation is 
organized, funded and managed in Europe. In this sense research and 
innovation policy in Europe is truly at a crossroad.  
 
Structure of the Report   
The EG started its reflections from a series of brainstorming discussions on the 
major challenges the European Union would be likely to face over the next ten 
to fifteen years6, taking into account both the immediate, short term and the 
                                                 
4 See in particular the EU Member Countries’ endorsement in December 2008 of the package of 
EC Directives designed to activate its “20-20-20” integrated energy and climate strategy – a 
20% reduction of green-house gas (GHG) emissions by 2020, 20% reduction in energy 
consumption and 20% of energy production from renewable sources. 
5 The Strategic Energy Technology Plan (SET Plan, COM (2007) 723, 22 November 2007, see 
http://ec.europa.eu/energy/technology/set_plan/set_plan_en.htm) sets the agenda for an EU 
energy technology policy, which should enhance the coordination of national and European 
research and innovation efforts to position the EU in the forefront of the low-carbon 
technologies market.  
6 Within this framework see also the EU project “Europe 2025” many insights of which were 
picked up by the Swedish presidency (see the so-called Lund declaration). 
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likely longer term impact of the crisis. These challenges represent on the one 
hand external developments such as the trend towards globalization and spatial 
agglomeration of research and innovation, and on the other hand internal 
responses at different levels – at the level of society, at the level of research and 
knowledge institutions, at the level of firms, at the level of regions. They 
formed the main thread of the EG’s Background Report, presented below in 
Part II. They have also been at the centre of discussions within the EG and with 
representatives of the Commission.  
 
The EG chose to put forward only a limited number of highly focused 
recommendations even if its analysis covers a much wider range of issues and 
considerations. The group hopes that these will be useful for future reflections 
and policy formulations, relevant to Member States as well as at the 
Community level. In line with the remit of the EG, which was to help frame and 
articulate Community research policy in the post-2010 period, these policy 
recommendations can be used as guiding principles for the formulation of 
future research policy in Europe7.  
.  
 
                                                 
7 The EG is aware that in some cases it was much easier to define what is the priority for policy 
action (for example recommendations 2 and 12) rather than 'how' specific policy action should 
be designed. In such cases there is obvious need for further policy analysis, expert work and 
research. 
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Challenge 1: Globalization and agglomeration of research and 
innovation: emerging tensions 
 
 
The first challenge the EG believes has affected European research substantially 
over the last decade, and is likely to affect it even more over the next ten years, 
is the trend towards globalization and spatial agglomeration of research. 
Globalization includes the entry of new players in new countries in knowledge 
production as well as an increase in the circulation of knowledge and the 
mobility of skilled people at the international level among existing and new 
players. In this sense globalization refers to the increasing multiplicity of global 
linkages and interconnections between companies, research organisations, 
universities and countries, which make up the present globalized R&D system. 
This definition fits well with the idea of global networks of open innovation, 
discussed below as the fourth Challenge8.  
 
At the same time, there is evidence of a persistence of an uneven spatial 
distribution of research and innovative activities, where research investments 
are often concentrated in a relatively small number of locations. The 
globalization of R&D, combined with the phenomenon of open innovation, has 
undoubtedly led to a reduction in the concentration of R&D and innovative 
capabilities amongst countries at the world level. New Asian players such as 
China and India have entered the global research world. However, the trend 
towards the physical and spatial agglomeration of research activities within 
countries has remained a characteristic feature of research. This holds even for 
new areas such as green technologies. Within Europe such geographical 
agglomeration challenges local development policies, and even more so 
European cohesion policies, an issue discussed as the fifth Challenge9. 
 
These globalization and agglomeration trends represent a real challenge for 
public policies, exacerbating some of the classical tensions and trade-offs that 
policymakers have traditionally been able to manage. To summarize some of 
these tensions: 
 
(a) Research and innovation policies are still developed within a national 
context, and in the case of the EU, a European context, while knowledge 
and investment flows are driven by firms’ and individuals’ motives 
which increasingly take place at a global level. By 2025, the EU will 
represent just over 6.5% of world population; 30% of world production 
                                                 
8 See also Chapter 4 in the Background Report.  
9 Described in detail in Chapter 5 in the Background Report. 
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will be produced in Asia, compared to 20% in Europe; and Asia will 
also have become the first world exporter10. 
 
(b) In so far as Lisbon was rooted in the idea that the EU’s productivity 
problems were of an internal structural nature11, such European 
competitiveness vision has become increasingly challenged by the way 
ICT, as a general purpose technology (GPT), has broken down 
nationally and internationally the distinctions between high and low tech 
sectors12. The new challenge is how to deal with the increasing 
fragmentation of value chains and the increasing heterogeneity of 
required knowledge inputs. This requires stronger cooperation in R&D 
with third countries and a stronger focus on the deployment of ICT 
based technologies.  
 
(c) Within Europe the drive towards excellence in research undoubtedly 
benefits from Europe’s regional cultural diversity and autonomy. 
Excellence assessments often demand that no consideration is given to 
the country or region of origin of the researcher. However, for countries 
and regions that are in need of qualified human capital for their own 
catching up effort and which are in no position to match the working 
conditions and real income levels of richer countries or regions, this 
might represent a major problem.  
 
(d) The financial and economic crisis is likely to further exacerbate some of 
the structural problems the globalisation and spatial agglomeration of 
research raise with respect to Europe. Compared to other regions in the 
world, the remaining fragmentation of European national markets e.g., 
in high-tech services, is likely to increase the uncertainty of the expected 
rate of return to R&D investments in Europe, and might well represent 
today an impediment to an increase of private investment in R&D in 
Europe.  
 
Because of these growing tensions, it is important that European research and 
innovation policies, and Community policies in particular, fully take on board 
the implications of globalization and spatial agglomeration, and develop 
institutional solutions addressing some of those tensions. Chapter 1 of the EG’s 
Background Report spells out the evidence for some of these trends, reviews 
the challenges and suggests a few solutions.  
                                                 
10 See Fontagné, L. (2009). 
11 In short: the EU was lagging behind in R&D because of the failure to strongly develop high-
tech sectors and knowledge-intensive services. 
12 See Snower, D.J., AJG Brown, and C. Merkel (2009).  
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A renewed commitment from all Member States to knowledge investment  
 
The first recommendation of the EG addresses these growing tensions. It calls 
for a renewed commitment to knowledge investments from Member States in 
the difficult fiscal years to come. Not just in basic or business R&D but in all 
components of knowledge investments including higher education and lifelong 
learning, and the deployment of ICT-based innovations and applications in 
services13.  
 
While public commitment and financial efforts can indeed be translated into 
clear targets, such as the 2010 Barcelona 1% public R&D funding target or the 
2% higher education target14, business investment should rather be considered 
as the result of such efforts: ultimately the reflection of the success of a 
persistent public effort that makes the country or region attractive (and visible) 
to private knowledge investment.  
 
In short, the EG proposes a new 3% EU knowledge investment target that has a 
number of clear policy advantages over the previous Barcelona 3% target.  
 
First, it focuses directly on what governments and policy makers are directly 
responsible for. Clearly the EU 3% Barcelona target has had a significant 
impact on MS’ research and innovation policies. Over the years, a growing 
number of policies were introduced aimed at increasing private R&D spending 
and at promoting public-private R&D partnerships and technology transfer. But 
ultimately the influence of such policies on Europe’s business R&D deficit is 
only indirect. As an input target, it has therefore major drawbacks. By contrast 
the proposed new 3% knowledge investment target is directly under the control 
of governments, whether in terms of funding or setting funding rules such as in 
the case of tuition fees with respect to higher education. This is a target for 
which governments and policy makers in MS can hence be held both 
responsible and accountable for.  
 
Second, and as illustrated in Figure 1. 9 in Chapter 1, none of the EU MS is 
near, or likely to come near, this target in the years to come. In political terms 
the target thus offers credibility. All countries are being challenged to either 
find own public resources to increase such knowledge investments, 
alternatively to call upon private resources to invest in individual’s future 
human capital. By leaving the latter to the individual choices of MS, the target 
                                                 
13 While US and European firms are more or less similar in R&D intensity “within sectors”, 
they are not similar in the service sector. In services European firms appear particularly R&D 
adverse. See in more detail Chapter 1.  
14 In the latter case based on public or private contributions.   
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provides also sufficiently political freedom to MS to decide how they intend to 
try to achieve the target by 2020.  
Recommendation 1 
Set a new EU 3% knowledge investment target.  
Obtain Member States’ commitment to increase their 
investments in knowledge and set national targets so as to 
achieve that by 2020 1% of EU’s GDP is spent from public funds 
on research and development and 2% of EU’s GDP on higher 
education. Implementation of national targets will be under the 
full control of governments and will not depend on private sector 
investment decisions. 
 
Private research and Europe’s fragmented markets  
 
At the same time, there remains a significant deficit in private research funding 
in Europe compared to the US and the rest of the developed world, and today 
even compared to China. As argued in Chapter 1, the European business R&D 
deficit should be viewed as an outcome: a reflection of Europe’s attractiveness 
to private research investment. Europe’s apparent limited attractiveness reflects 
not only the existence of other global opportunities; it also reflects a poor 
capacity to support the growth of significant new businesses. Compared to 
other regions in the world, the remaining fragmentation of European national 
markets e.g., in high-tech services, is likely to increase the uncertainty of the 
expected rate of return to R&D investments and represents an impediment to an 
increase in Europe of private investment into R&D.  
 
In short, increasing private research in Europe will depend on better 
coordination between research and innovation policies and competition and 
other internal market policies. The institutional separation at the level of the 
European Commission between research and innovation and between research 
and progress on the internal market particularly in services made the Lisbon 
strategy less credible for the private sector. As argued above, the financial crisis 
makes the fragmentation of national markets for final products and in particular 
for services, an even bigger impediment to any increase in private investment 
into R&D, regulatory differences in Europe increasing the uncertainty on the 
expected rate of return on such investments. It leads the EG to a second 
recommendation:  
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Recommendation 2  
Reduce investment risk.  
Lower the uncertainty surrounding expected rates of return on 
private R&D investments by improving coordination between the 
policy domains responsible for nurturing research, stimulating 
innovation and regulating market development. 
 
Opening up the European Research Area  
 
From a historical point of view the globalization of research activities is still a 
recent phenomenon that will continue to dominate the research landscape in the 
years to come.  It involves not only the entrance of strong new actors (e.g. 
China and India) and the consequences posed by the relocation of footloose 
R&D capacity, but also the continued concentration of research activities at 
specific locational nodes within an expanding global framework for research 
activities. European research policies will have to increasingly recognize the 
need to network, interact, and participate in this global research area. More 
explicit European policy responses are needed to forge links with other global 
centres of activity in order to create synergies and access complementary 
expertise.  
Recommendation 3 
Open up the European Research Area  
Make Europe more attractive to all researchers and innovative 
entrepreneurs by taking steps to integrate those who are based 
outside Europe. Participate more extensively in the global 
circulation of knowledge. 
 
 20 
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Challenge 2: Addressing Societal Challenges 
 
 
The second challenge the EG considered in more detail was the notion of 
Societal Challenges (often referred to as “Grand” Challenges in European 
documents). The notion of Societal Challenges, applies to major societal 
problems that cannot be solved in a reasonable time and/or with acceptable 
social conditions, without a large scale and, in the European case, coordinated 
input requiring both technological and non-technological innovation, and at 
times, though not necessarily always, advances in scientific understanding. 
These include climate change, energy shortages, sustainable development, 
affordable high-quality healthcare and many others. In a way the central issue 
here is at the opposite end of the spectrum of the previous one. Can resources, 
not just research but also procurement and other investment and deployment 
resources, be shifted across European stakeholders to more productive “societal 
use” i.e. to influence not only the rate but also the direction of technical change 
and innovation? 
 
 
Societal Challenges do raise “grand” policy challenges  
 
For one, a Societal Challenge dimension adds a new objective to public policy 
whereby research and innovation are seen not as ends in themselves but as a 
means to a wider goal, defined as a societal benefit. In other words, in contrast 
to existing policies, this approach implies a focus which is neither horizontal 
nor sectoral, but defined by the societal challenge, i.e. involving a mix of 
different sectors, markets and other actors that can bring about the changes 
needed to achieve the challenge. Relevant actors include public service delivery 
organisations, private companies from various sectors, as well as various (semi-
) public institutions involved in shaping the demand side and the regulatory and 
market frameworks that support innovation. Second, such policies aimed at 
influencing the direction of technical change will automatically imply a non-
neutral allocation process with respect to the selected areas and sectors to focus 
on. However, departing from neutrality is dangerous since it implies guessing 
future technological and market developments. So the grand policy question, 
addressed in more detail in Chapter 2 of the EG’s Background Report, is one of 
policy “programme design”: i.e. how to make such large programmes, 
somewhat reminiscent of the old mission-oriented programmes, less vulnerable 
to government failures linked to wrong choices and winner-picking. 
 
The scope, scale and immediacy of many of the most pressing societal 
challenges will demand the rapid mobilisation of considerable human and 
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financial resources across many fields in order to confront them and resolve the 
problems they pose to mankind.  There is also little doubt that science and 
technology, research and innovation, can contribute greatly not only to the 
mitigation of existing problems but also to their prevention in the future.  
Research is needed, for example, to understand the nature of the problems 
facing us; to begin to develop the tools and techniques needed to mitigate their 
impacts; and to underpin the subsequent development and widespread 
deployment and diffusion of the innovative technologies and approaches needed 
to prevent their reoccurrence. 
 
Recommendation 4 
Focus policies on the direction as well as the rate of technical 
change.  
Channel EU and national research funds towards the resolution 
of major societal challenges. 
 
Europe’s call  
 
This is the strongest argument for investing in the research needed to confront 
societal challenges, but there are others that complement the primary argument 
and make the case for greater investment in research and innovation irresistible.  
The first of these concerns the size of the latent demand for innovative goods 
and services that offer the hope of new solutions in fields as diverse as health, 
energy and environment.  If this demand can be successfully stimulated, the 
potential returns on investment in research – both commercial and societal – are 
likely to be huge as the resolution of societal challenges provides a new 
dynamic for innovation and becomes a new motor for economic growth and 
prosperity in a classic win-win situation. 
 
A second supportive argument of particular relevance in an EU context stems 
from the fact that successfully confronting major societal challenges will 
require the mobilisation of research and innovation-related resources and the 
stimulation of demand along an extremely broad geo-political and institutional 
front.  These are systemic challenges and few countries in the world, if any, 
have either the experience or resources to successfully tackle any of the major 
challenges confronting society on their own.  In Europe in particular, the 
current compartmentalisation of research resources hampers the development of 
the critical mass of effort needed to tackle these problems.   
 
In the final analysis, orienting EU policies towards the resolution of societal 
problems holds the promise not only of successfully confronting these 
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challenges but also of nurturing the development of the ERA and creating a new 
growth engine for economic development – an especially timely prospect in the 
context of the current recession. 
Recommendation 5 
Improve international cooperation,  
particularly for challenges of a global nature; build this 
cooperation on a clearer assessment of European strengths and 
ambitions. 
 
 
Combining top-down and market-driven initiatives  
 
The case for mobilising research in the fight against societal challenges may be 
strong, but how can it best be done?  The dilemma for policymakers is that it 
requires policies on the supply side affecting not only the amount of research 
that is being conducted but also dictating or influencing the direction or 
orientation of the research itself; plus policies on the demand side stimulating 
the formation and rapid growth of new markets and the widespread diffusion of 
innovative products, processes and services within them; plus a degree of 
coordination between diverse governance systems that is on a scale unparalleled 
in the field of European research and innovation policy. In the Appendix to 
Chapter 2 in the Background Report, we propose one possible approach to 
some of the governance and managements issues that result from this 
complexity. 
 
The recommendations of the EG deal therefore with the question of how to 
achieve compatibility between these “grand” societal top-down initiatives and 
the more market-driven resource allocation logic that would allow for “multiple 
decentralized experiments”. A first principle is relatively straightforward: it is 
crucial to be non-neutral in identifying a very broad agenda while being neutral 
vis-à-vis specific applications and approaches. Other principles for mitigating 
distortions created by the provision of subsidies to favoured industries, firms 
and other organized interests are less ambiguous. In practice, the EG follows 
the direction set out in the Lund declaration. Meeting the Societal Challenges 
will, by definition, require strengthening of frontier research initiated by the 
research community itself and the need to take a lead in the development and 
combination of a range of key technologies as well as the creation of favourable 
market conditions for their deployment through demand-side measures 
(regulations, standards, public procurement) in particular along the lines of 
lead-market initiatives such as on “green technologies”. Particular attention 
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should here be given to measures that can enhance experimentation, increase 
the effectiveness of public/private research collaboration and a policy focus on 
knowledge sharing, adaptation and diffusion of innovations, rather than just 
knowledge accumulation. The launch of the first Knowledge and Innovation 
Communities (KIC's) by the EIT should be carefully monitored and assessed as 
their operation encompasses the three pillars of the knowledge triangle and the 
multiple interactions between these.  
   
Recommendation 6  
Create a stronger coordination  
between all relevant policies in order to better align innovative 
activities with the needs of society. This should involve stronger 
coordination between R&D support and Lead Market 
instruments (such as regulation, standards and public 
procurement) and the use of staged approaches linking support 
for developing innovative solutions with their subsequent uptake 
in public procurement. 
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Challenge 3: Excellence in research in Europe: towards merit-
based competition 
 
 
The most obvious, yet until recently least exploited, advantage of the EU is the 
potential for a much larger and more competitive, transparent and accountable 
allocation process of public resources to so-called frontier research. As we 
discuss in Chapter 3 of the Background Report, such merit-based competition at 
the EU level is likely to create strong pressures on the overall quality of 
research. However, at the same time, great care must be taken to ensure that 
such new allocation systems provide solutions to the societal problems that 
have been identified. For example, targeted support for institutions (rather than 
projects) is certainly an idea whose time may have come, though there are many 
potential pitfalls at a more detailed level. Thus, before setting up further new 
instruments or agencies the experience with those that already exist should be 
carefully scrutinised. 
 
Towards a strategic reconfiguration of European vs. MS research 
responsibilities   
 
A clear setting of priorities at EU level and a strategic reconfiguration of what 
is predominantly left to MS is urgently recommended. The ‘one size fits all’ has 
never been a valid or good principle. In order to enable universities to test and 
improve their governance and to foster their strategic capabilities in university 
management in a professional way, we recommend setting up merit-based 
competitive schemes at EU level for universities which can provide funding 
with considerable European added value for those institutions that excel on a 
number of clearly defined dimensions. MS may want to join forces in preparing 
their universities by including criteria that will enable universities to better 
compete at EU level, e.g. within the pluri-annual performance-based contracts 
now negotiated between universities and their governments or intermediate 
bodies. Many of the issues discussed specifically for universities are applicable 
to Research and Technology Organisations (RTO’s) as well. While it is more 
straightforward to urge for reinforced public-private partnerships for RTO’s, 
there also exist plenty of unfulfilled and potentially favourable opportunities for 
RTO’s to collaborate more closely with universities. The concrete form under 
which specialisation and collaboration might be developed needs to be worked 
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out based on an understanding of the specific strengths and opportunities that 
pertain to each institution15.  
 
Recommendation 7 
Introduce merit-based competition at EU level 
in support of individual institutions and in ways that enable 
stronger differentiation among universities and RTO’s. Greater 
autonomy and accountability are also needed to support 
increased diversity.  
 
 
Getting incentives and the governance of universities right 
 
Incentives should include measures to support high quality recruitment at 
universities and RTOs, encouraging them to introduce a more proactive, 
international recruitment policy. One of the keys to raising the overall quality of 
research at universities is the improvement of their Ph.D. training through a 
mechanism of competitive funding for Ph.D. programmes. It could include both 
individual grants for Ph.D. students and institutional funding for the best PhD 
programmes. It must include criteria aiming for improvement of the career 
prospects of the future generation of researchers in Europe as well as their 
working conditions. A second option is to develop specific funding mechanisms 
for PhD programmes oriented towards market needs, and therefore knowledge 
production which is particularly relevant for the industry and service sectors in 
Europe. 
 
With respect to the governance of universities, the EG is critical of the current 
higher education governance systems across the EU which do not sufficiently 
allow for specialization and diversity. While the autonomy of universities is not 
a panacea to overcome all problems, European universities need to evolve 
towards improved abilities to, and responsibility for, crafting their own quality 
assurance mechanisms, rather than relying on centralized and standardized 
governments control systems. Despite recent deregulation in several countries, 
legal structures and prevailing funding policies still tend to severely limit the 
autonomy of universities, including the selection of students, the financing of 
education, the usage of funds for different purposes within research and 
education fields, the recruitment and compensation of professors. In the 21st 
                                                 
15 An interesting case is provided by the Forschungszentrum Karlsruhe that recently merged 
with the University Karlsruhe in the wake of the German Excellence Initiative. It has now been 
established as the Karlsruhe Institute of Technology, KIT. 
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century, universities need to act with greater speed in transforming themselves 
into modern, professional organizations, based on an understanding of their 
core skills. Differentiation inevitably requires room for specialisation in 
multiple directions. Students must be able to select what suits their needs and 
aspirations the most and universities must be able to select the students that fit 
their profile. Universities also need to be able to define, and choose between 
various options of how to define their core business and how to develop unique 
combinations of higher education, research and particular relations and outputs 
that are of relevance to society, as laid out in the concept of the “Knowledge 
Triangle”. 
 
Building European knowledge institutions 
 
The focus of the EG’s policy recommendations, in addition to pleas to MS to 
improve the governance and differentiation of universities, is on the measures 
needed at EU level in order to improve the quality of research in Europe in 
relation to its impact (including economic and wider social impact), its 
awareness and measurement. The further strengthening of some of the new 
institutions which have been created over the last years is central here.   
 
Recommendation 8 
Build truly European institutions.  
Strengthen and expand the remit of the ERC; and the Knowledge 
and Innovation Communities of the EIT; continue the 
Europeanization of research infrastructures including the 
exploitation of new legal frameworks for their establishment; 
and launch a new Joint Research Initiative scheme.  
 
Let us briefly specify what we mean by “strengthen and expand” in each of the 
cases we wish to emphasize here.  
 
a) The new central role of the ERC 
 
The generation of frontier knowledge is an indispensable precondition for the 
value chain and the future well-being of our societies and this has been 
reinforced at European level through the radical policy initiative taken by the 
EC in setting up the European Research Council (ERC). Its success, within a 
very short period of time, has been widely acknowledged, both within the 
scientific community, as well as by MS and the EC. In order to build upon this 
success and to guarantee its sustainability, the Final Report to review the ERC’s 
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structures and mechanisms “Towards a world class Frontier Research 
Organisation” issued on 23 July 2009 has made a number of 
recommendations16. 
 
The response of the Commission has been published on 20 October 2009. 
Among the immediate and short term recommended actions, the legal base will 
be clarified and reinforced. The Director of the ERCEA (merging the functions 
of the Secretary General and the Director of the EA) to be appointed will have 
the appropriate profile (“a distinguished scientist with robust administrative 
experience”) and will be selected following an open call. Administrative 
procedures that have hampered the efficient operation of the ERC will be 
improved and a consolidation of all activities is promised. Among medium term 
actions, the Commission will use the forthcoming review of the Financial 
Regulation as an opportunity to assess the situation and formulate possible 
responses to the specific administrative and financial shortcomings concerning 
research, technological development and innovation in general and frontier 
research in particular.  
 
The EG urges the Commission to implement these recommendations and, in 
particular, to guarantee the independence and efficient operation of the ERC 
beyond 2013 in an optimal and sustained way. To this end, the ERC has to 
receive a higher overall budget and should become an operationally integrated, 
autonomous European institution sui generis, making it a truly world class 
frontier research funding organisation. 
 
b) The Europeanization of research infrastructures 
 
Research Infrastructures (RI) attract peer review selected researchers with 
world-level outreach by virtue of their scientific, technical, educational and 
managerial excellence, and are a backbone of the research system: they do not 
necessarily need to be “large” but they must be able to offer an excellent 
research service. While Community policy on research infrastructures aims to 
an improved coordination leading to possible integration, so far the EU 
contribution to national research infrastructure resources has been limited to 
contributing a few percent of the cost of opening up access to all researchers. 
ESFRI is a purely advisory body set up at the request of the Council bringing 
together the representatives of research ministers and a representative of the 
Commission; it has a mixed intergovernmental / Community approach to 
develop and support a coherent and strategy–led approach to policy making on 
                                                 
16 See http://erc.europa.eu/PDF/final_report_230709.pdf 
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research infrastructures in Europe and to facilitate multilateral initiatives 
leading to better use and development of research infrastructures, and on whose 
advice the Commission and Member States may act. The development by 
ESFRI of a European Roadmap for RI has induced several countries to develop 
coherent national roadmaps mutually connected through the ESFRI roadmap, 
thus producing a growing trend towards integration and upgrade of national 
resources, including existing potentially relevant infrastructures. Stimulated 
also by Community actions, the development of multi-site RI as required in 
several science fields (e.g. environment, biomedicine, etc.) is, in turn, helping to 
evolve all countries to converge in the choice of the siting also of larger, single 
RI, while developing longer-term joint resources. 
 
Recently, moreover, an agreement has been reached in the Council on setting 
up a specific legislation at Community level (ERIC)17 that would allow greater 
institutional integration of national resources, as well as some exemptions 
already available for international research organisations. This is a very 
welcome initiative since a mechanism to deal with European research 
infrastructures is definitely needed. Again, lessons learnt should be used in 
designing a truly European approach that goes beyond the predominant national 
approach and develop an institutional integration of the national and EU 
support of the relevant RI on a merit-based selection at EU level. 
 
The initiative on research infrastructures is a positive recent development of EU 
research policy although the decision making process is still far from efficient. 
In order to be able to attract the best researchers, research infrastructures must 
be international and develop both the highest scientific-technological 
competence and adequate management capabilities in a competitive 
environment. Supporting transnational infrastructures and granting international 
access to national facilities is important. It should be reinforced, and attracting 
the best researchers to and from infrastructures on a competitive basis should 
become a key indicator. 
 
c) Joint Research Initiatives, EIT. 
 
Another expert group, the “Expert Group on the Future of Networks of 
Excellence” has recommended that the Networks of Excellence scheme should 
be discontinued. The group proposed a revised concept of “Joint Research 
Initiatives” (JRIs) oriented towards long-term academic research of ‘slim-lined’ 
alliances between universities and research organisations. The objective of JRIs 
                                                 
17 Council Regulation n° 723/2009 on the Community legal framework for a European 
Research Infrastructure (ERIC). 
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should be the creation of ‘virtual institutes’ of a manageable size of 3 to 7 
partners. These virtual institutes would be committed to joint long-term 
research planning and activities, with a typical duration of 7-9 years. The EG 
welcomes this proposal which it sees as complementary to the new instruments 
set up over the last years such as the industry-led Joint Technology Initiatives 
(JTIs) and the ‘individual excellence’ supported by the ERC. It is also 
complementary to the EIT mission of creating so-called KICs in particular 
priority areas to engage in world-leading innovations producing highly 
qualified people with the right entrepreneurial and proactive skills and values. 
 
For the EG, the difficulty to coordinate national policies and undertake joint 
actions is a major weakness in EU research policy. The JRI scheme should 
therefore be implemented in a ‘bottom-up’ competitive mode and committed 
first and foremost to enhancing ‘institutional excellence’. In addition, not all 
research institutions are large and have physical embodiment. Increasingly, 
scientific communities build up forms of coordination that concern sharing 
equipment, pooling datasets, setting up a shared research vision, establishing 
experimental protocols, validating laboratory procedures and developing 
Standard Operational Protocols (SOPs). These activities do not directly produce 
scientific output, but produce intermediate collective research goods, i.e. goods 
that are used by other researchers to improve research productivity. In most 
cases these goods are intangible.  
 
The importance of research technologies, i.e. research instrumentation and new 
methods that have been invented or set up for purposes of research, mostly in 
the lab, that carry an inherent potential for wider use outside the lab, is not 
sufficiently recognized. In order to realize their cross-cutting, integrative 
potential, either for other research fields or, perhaps even more importantly, for 
industry/services in innovative ways, flexible opportunities need to be created 
that allow industry, academia and RTO’s to jointly explore, at an early stage, 
how basic research, applied research and innovation as well as entrepreneurial 
activities in general might be transformed into ‘experimental innovation’. This 
includes the search for new forms of practice, e.g. how to use, adapt and 
transform research technologies for purposes and objectives outside the 
laboratory. Research technologies come with the skills and knowledge of those 
who have been trained to use them, hence the importance of well-trained 
graduates. It leads us quite naturally to the next major challenge of particular 
relevance to Community research policy in the Knowledge Based Economy.  
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Challenge 4: Global networks and open innovation 
 
 
As we discuss in more detail in Chapter 4 in the Background Report, innovation 
processes involve today a wide range of actors: firms including start-ups, 
universities, RTO’s, private or public in nature, as well as other parts of civil 
society such as customers and opinion formers. Open innovation marks a 
departure from previous mainstream approaches to innovation. Although the 
basic objective (“take advantage of resources other than your own”) is not new, 
approaches to this objective have changed considerably and have become more 
diverse, thereby shifting the balance from in-house activities towards the use of 
external resources in response to the growing complexity at the intersection of 
products and services as well as to increased competition. Moreover, open 
innovation networks tend to have a global reach, especially when firms have 
radical innovation strategies.  
 
The relevance of the open innovation paradigm for the Knowledge Based 
Economy derives from a widespread belief that openness accelerates and 
broadens innovation processes by offering firms the potential to access a much 
broader variety of knowledge and ideas than could be generated by its in-house 
R&D capabilities alone. It can therefore substantially reduce the cost of 
innovation, whilst accelerating the process. It can also enable companies with 
mature markets and technologies to successfully introduce more radical 
technological and organisational innovations. As a result, the contribution of the 
different actors tends to benefit from complementary contributions whereby 
interactions between actors become crucial. In particular, high tech start ups, 
despite being small and few, can (to the extent that the local environment 
permits) play a fundamental role in technology transfer, market pioneering and 
growth. Similarly, technology transfer and public-private partnerships, while 
representing only a small share of R&D budgets, can constitute a major 
stimulus for radical innovation. 
 
From the construction of the ERA towards a focus on Europe’s innovation 
performance   
 
This leads the EG to a first reflection on the future of the ERA. Complementing 
the arguments presented above, the emphasis is on furthering the construction 
of ERA as an effective innovation ecosystem, based on research excellence and 
merit-based competition. The focus here is on what ultimately drives business 
R&D, how contemporary innovation processes operate and where the 
opportunities for the EU to gain comparative advantage are. The development 
of open innovation networks is from this perspective also a reflection on the 
 32 
significant changes taking place as a result of globalization, as reviewed above 
under Challenge 1 and analyzed in Chapter 1 of the Background Report.  
 
A number of challenges are visible through the lens of open innovation: 
1. Open innovation practices require variety in terms of small 
entrepreneurial activities and their avenues for growth, combined with 
the structures and activities of more established firms. The challenge is 
to put in place structures, networks and markets capable of supporting 
the development of such entrepreneurial activities. 
2. The need for more interconnectedness of actors, activities and 
knowledge implies corresponding complementarity among actors and 
open innovation infrastructures. The challenge is to put in place the 
appropriate incentives and (soft) infrastructures to enable the 
exploitation of complementarities and reduce transaction costs. 
3. As firms develop global innovation networks, a primary challenge is to 
stimulate demand and develop local environments that are attractive to 
the players that perform innovation activities and deliver commensurate 
benefits to the community. Local environments may be attractive in 
various scientific and technological areas for re-localization of R&D and 
innovation activities. 
 
The good news is that considerable impact may be achieved by focusing on a 
few key areas. These include improving the possibility for actors to collaborate 
according to the different logic of their situations; improving the attractiveness 
of local environments within the EU in support of innovation-oriented goals; 
addressing the excellence of public research infrastructures and the international 
perspective of its institutions (as discussed in Chapter 3); identifying the EU’s 
strategic priorities for R&D and other aspects of innovation in the face of 
international competition; and improving the connection between R&D and 
innovation policies and other public policy priorities. 
 
Open innovation practices within an ERA ecosystem  
 
The development of global innovation networks and their potential impact on 
local innovation performance suggest that EU policies should facilitate the 
diffusion and adoption of open innovation practices within the ERA ecosystem, 
without de-emphasising the importance of the specialised skills of individual 
actors and public authorities’ overall responsibilities. ERA’s current, and new, 
instruments can be examined in this perspective, taking into account the need 
for simplicity and risk-tolerance. Logically, an overall examination of ERA 
instruments is required including the alignment of instruments with policy 
 33 
objectives, and the possibility to manage the instruments effectively, including, 
where appropriate, across policy boundaries.  
 
The open innovation paradigm has many policy implications for European 
research, such as for the Cooperation programme within the Framework 
Programme. They complement many of the recommendations made above. 
Thus, the new perspective will not just lead to a greater role for the ERC based 
on truly competitive criteria (see Recommendation 7), it will also require 
policies promoting young innovating companies and their growth at the EU 
level; new reflections on the role of the EIT alongside the JTIs, new forms of 
integrating the lead market initiative, the Eureka programme, etc. Most of all, 
however, it points to the importance of effective policy integration beyond 
R&D.  
 
EU policies should be designed to have a direct impact on research and 
innovation performance, as opposed to the construction of ERA per se. 
Currently, most ERA initiatives are institutional in nature, and seem to take for 
granted that their successful implementation will eventually support the 
development of the knowledge economy in Europe. A new perspective requires 
that policy makers fully understand what drives business R&D, how 
contemporary innovation processes operate, and where there is opportunity for 
the EU to gain a comparative advantage. 
 
This change in focus has many implications, for example for the Co-operation 
programme within the Framework Programme. In particular, the EG stress the 
importance of revamping the Framework programme to become attuned to the 
particular challenges a more open innovation paradigm requires. 
 
Debates on the stagnation of R&D intensity in Europe suggest that R&D 
spending depends primarily on the sectors in which Europe’s mature firms 
operate. But open innovation can, and does, challenge established companies’ 
routines and thereby stimulate more radical developments which can permit 
entry into new markets. There are many recent examples of radical and high-
performing innovations on the market that have come from successful start-ups 
and also of the enhanced cross-fertilisation that is taking place among firms of 
different ages and sizes. Yet many European countries have experienced limited 
growth of such start-ups, preventing these firms from taking a key role as an 
efficient channel for innovation and knowledge flows to the benefit of the entire 
eco-system. Since innovative start-ups can, despite their limited size and 
number, be a source of new activities, they constitute an important avenue for 
the evolution of specialisation and knowledge growth in Europe. The EG 
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therefore recommends to promote the evolution of EU specialisation through 
the growth of young innovative firms. 
 
Recommendation 9 
Support young innovative companies beyond their start-up 
phase.  
Launch an EU-wide ‘excellence through competition’ scheme 
encouraging young innovative companies to undertake high-risk 
projects and pursue radical innovations.  
 
The challenge is to put in place structures, networks and markets capable of 
supporting the development of such entrepreneurial activities. This will depend 
on local initiatives such as improved knowledge and technology transfer, but 
there are also broader issues, including the promotion of demand for 
innovation, the relationships between large and small companies, standard IPR 
issues, including the community patent and a European court linked with the 
European Patent Litigation Agreement (EPLA). It is likely that such actions 
will not be the primary responsibilities of research ministries and DG Research, 
but their active support will be needed for such initiatives to be well-targeted 
and successful. 
 
SME-related policies in Europe have not been as successful as was hoped, for 
example when measured in terms of these firms’ survival and growth compared 
to other parts of the world (Guellec and Sachwald, 2008). The difficulties faced 
by young innovative companies are largely due to characteristics of national 
economies; nevertheless the Co-operation programme within the FP has not 
assisted in supporting these, but was instead targeted towards achieving a 
particular level of participation by SMEs. The specific new EU instrument 
recommended by the EG could be designed so as to support the growth of 
innovative start ups and their evolution, in order to help overcome what Chapter 
4 of the Background Report refers to as the EU’s “growth paradox”. 
 
But the take-up of these developments depends also on having successful new 
and innovative firms, for which access to markets is vital and to a large extent 
comes from trading with other (larger) companies. A more integrated ERA and 
common EU market would contribute to a more dynamic growth of new firms 
within their global networks as well as the continued success at global level of 
established players. Lead markets are one example of instruments that could be 
at the intersection of ERA and the Single market. A specific instrument to 
stimulate demand for innovation is Pre-Commercial Procurement of R&D 
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services, a very promising scheme that was modelled upon successful US 
examples and put forward by the Commission at the end of 200718. 
 
Companies’ practices stress the importance of market demand in the 
organisation of innovation processes as well as in the choice of location for 
R&D activities. In EU countries, companies’ R&D activities will partly depend 
on the development perspectives of new markets, for example to face the 
challenges of ageing and environment: such markets must provide the prospect 
of sustainable profitability. Cluster development also emphasizes the effects of 
agglomeration and local interactions between innovation actors. Those clusters 
that stimulate local cooperation can efficiently support incremental innovation, 
which typically represents a very significant share of the innovation activity. 
Those that promote research excellence and international visibility need to be 
connected to relevant EU and global networks. The Knowledge and Innovation 
Communities (KIC) of the EIT could play a role in this context.  
 
Recommendation 10 
Focus support to collaborative research.   
Use selection criteria that emphasise research excellence, the 
potential for radical innovation and the capacity to operate 
globally. 
 
Open innovation practices raise the need for more interconnectedness of actors, 
activities and knowledge implying complementarity among actors and open 
innovation (soft) infrastructures. The challenge is to put in place the appropriate 
incentives and research structures to enable the exploitation of 
complementarities. At the European level, one such infrastructure could be the 
community patent, which should be complemented with EPLA. The full 
implementation of the community patent would be an important step to promote 
efficient open innovation practices but also to support the development of 
innovative young companies in the EU. Researchers’ mobility (public-private, 
international) is another such infrastructure. The European Institute of 
Innovation and Technology (EIT) and its Knowledge and Innovation 
Communities provides a specific example of such mobility measures. A third 
infrastructure could be supported by focusing on stimulating the development 
of knowledge exchanges. In this perspective, public policies should ensure 
transparency in the development of innovation intermediaries and markets for 
knowledge. These infrastructures would enable enhanced connectivity between 
                                                 
18 See http://cordis.europa.eu/fp7/ict/pcp/home_en.html and Chapter 2 on societal challenges. 
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small and large firms and between young and more established companies in 
international and open innovation networks. 
Recommendation 11 
Facilitate open innovation.  
Move quickly to the full implementation of a Community patent 
system and increase efforts to reduce the barriers to researcher 
mobility and reduce transaction costs in knowledge and 
technology exchanges. 
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Challenge 5:  Towards a spatially blind, yet cohesive ERA? 
 
A central question of the analysis of the EG set out in Chapter 5 of the 
Background Report is whether a spatially-blind ERA can still be a “cohesive” 
ERA. Positive local effects of the ERA are indeed not always guaranteed: there 
are likely to be strong interdependencies between places resulting in positive or 
negative direct and indirect effects – precisely the interdependencies which can 
lead to the spatial agglomeration discussed in Chapter 1. Ignoring these local 
effects can lead to a number of unintended negative consequences, including 
local irrelevance: investment may be favoured in activities which are 
inappropriate and not in line with the actual or potential comparative advantage 
of regions/places. The trade off between excellence and cohesion is context 
specific and can only be addressed by taking local relevance into account.  
 
As analysed in Chapter 5, a number of concepts have been introduced or 
rediscovered in the policy debate at the European level, which appear 
particularly relevant in order to design a better policy trade-off. They are place-
based policies, smart specialization and conditionality.  
 
Combining merit-based and place-based policies 
 
The recent debate on European cohesion policies19 sees the main purpose of 
such policies less in terms of redistribution than in terms of triggering 
institutional change and breaking up inefficiencies and social exclusion traps 
through the provision of public goods and services. This triggering of 
institutional change can come about only through an exogenous public 
intervention which can improve things by upsetting the existing balance. 
However, for this intervention to be ultimately effective, it will need to be 
accompanied by increased local involvement and sufficient local involvement 
can only be achieved through locally relevant activities.  
 
There is of course a large literature on policies aimed at technology catching up 
particularly with respect to emerging and developing countries20. That literature 
has emphasized the particular role of “new industrial policy” in fostering 
restructuring and technological dynamism, going beyond the traditional focus 
on background conditions and improvements in the investment climate. From 
an innovation perspective, it is important to understand the policy implications 
                                                 
19 Following the publication of the influential Barca Report (2009). 
20See e.g. World Bank report (2005).  
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of the ‘binding constraints’ view of economic growth21. Thus policy should 
indeed rely on ‘islands of excellence’ that exist in (almost) every country to 
reform less successful areas. Yet unlike the old ‘picking winners’ industrial 
policy model, the key assumption is now that no one, government included, can 
have  a panoramic view of the economy – all views are necessarily partial. 
Mechanisms for creating new opportunities are likely to be search networks – 
private-public partnerships and programmes that could bring together the better 
performing segments of the public sector and the better performing segments of 
the private sector in an attempt to relax and unblock binding constraints. The 
focus of policy is thus on missing connections, which, when established, should 
have synergistic and increasing effects.22 
 
This new perspective recognizes that growth constraints are never general or 
generic, but are most often specific. It resonates well with the Barca Report 
(2009) which argues that the ‘design of integrated interventions must be 
tailored to places, since it largely depends on the knowledge and preferences of 
people living in it’ (p. 6). For example, and as argued in the case of the New 
Member States, ways of increasing the industrial relevance of their science base 
by linking centres of excellence in science to areas of industrial strength will 
have to be found. In addition, policies will need to differentiate between 
research and non-research based activities as the latter are particularly relevant 
to catching up countries and regions. In general, there is little implementation of 
policies that differentiate in any operational way between non-research-based 
activities that lead to innovation, and research based activities – in particular 
R&D – that do lead to innovation. In particular, the evaluation criteria for the 
use of the EU structural funds are fitted to traditional industry and 
infrastructures (roads, railways etc.) and – in practice at least - strongly impede 
the use of these funds for research activities and infrastructure. 
 
A further integration of regional R&D into EU R&D networks is likely to lead 
to an improved R&D system in terms of quality and international excellence, 
but not necessarily in terms of local relevance. In fact, the gap between supply 
and demand in terms of local R&D may even widen. However, one can expect 
that over time, as cohesion regions’ R&D systems become integrated into the 
ERA, this will have positive effects in terms of dynamism and excellence in 
R&D, with countries and regions’ R&D and innovation expertise becoming 
‘plugged’ into EU R&D and innovation networks. There will also be positive 
                                                 
21 The ‘binding constraints’ view of growth is an idea of Rodrik’s which was fully taken on 
board in the World Bank (2005) study. This is a targeted approach which requires an in-depth 
understanding of country specificities, rather than the application of best practice solutions.  
22 In that respect, the New Industrial Policy is quite similar to the so-called second generation 
innovation policies (see EU, 2002). 
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effects on higher education systems through the reorganization of universities 
and increased R&D levels which in turn should lead to higher quality teaching. 
To achieve this, policies are needed that extend beyond ERA and stretch into 
development, engineering and knowledge intensive services as these are 
particularly important for innovation in cohesion regions. 
 
Designing smart specialization policies  
 
Most European regions still appear characterized in their research and 
technology specialisation by imitation and regional subsidy (European or 
national) competition. This has led to the new concept of designing smart 
specialisation23 policies. The argument goes as follows. So-called General 
Purpose Technologies or Tools (GPTs) have properties which appear to define 
a particular useful framework to clarify the logic of smart specialisation for 
both regions that are at the technological frontier and those that are less 
advanced. While the leader regions will invest in the invention of a GPT 
(biotechnology, information technology) or the combination of different GPTs 
(bioinformatics), followers might then invest more in the “co-invention of 
applications”, that is the development of the applications of a GPT in one or 
several important domains of the regional economy. Doing so, these regions 
will likely enter into a more realistic and practical competition logic by defining 
a competition arena composed of a much smaller number of players. In other 
words, while certain European regions might be well placed to play their 
specialisation cards in the GPT production domain, most others will be in a 
much better position to develop applications of these general purpose 
technologies in domains that are important for the region in question24. In short, 
there are strategies for everyone. 
 
                                                 
23 See in particular Foray, 2008; and David, Foray and Hall, 2009 
24 A general purpose technology is in fact distinguished by its characteristics of horizontal 
propagation throughout the economy and the complementarity between invention and 
application development. These complementarities are fundamental. Expressed in the words of 
the economist, the invention of the general technology extends the frontier of invention 
possibilities for the whole economy, while application development changes the production 
function of a particular sector. Application co-invention increases the size of the general 
technology market and improves the economic return on invention activities relating to it. There 
are therefore dynamic feedback loops in accordance with which inventions give rise to the co-
invention of applications, which in their turn increase the return on subsequent inventions. 
When things evolve favourably, a long-term dynamic develops, consisting of large-scale 
investments in research and innovation whose social and private marginal rates of return attain 
high levels. This dynamic may be spatially distributed between regions specialised in the basic 
inventions and regions investing in specific application domains.   
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The search for such smart specialization patterns does, however, not involve a 
bureaucratic process (plan) or a foresight exercise. Rather it concerns an 
essentially entrepreneurial-driven discovery process in which the new 
knowledge produced relates to what appears to be the pertinent specialisations 
of the region. One might consider this as first and foremost a learning process, 
which is primarily the responsibility of entrepreneurs in private and public 
sectors (universities, RTO’s, more broadly higher technical education) that are 
best placed to discover the right specialisations. At the same time, the discovery 
of such pertinent specialisation domains has high social value since this 
knowledge is going to define the direction of company investments and 
research organisation projects. Yet these entrepreneurial entities will only be 
able to capture a limited part of his investment’s social value since other 
entrepreneurs will swiftly move into the identified domain. There is 
consequently a risk of not seeing enough entrepreneurs invest in this particular 
smart specialisation discovery process. Public policies will thus have an 
essential role to play: a more modest one than what regional policy makers 
often like to do by selecting themselves the right specializations, but one of 
encouraging entrepreneurial entities to find their own way and help them to 
coordinate and be connected to each other in this discovery process. One may 
also think of providing incentives to (encourage) entrepreneurs; identifying 
complementary investments (educational and training institutions for example); 
and the pruning of investments which turn out to be inappropriate ex post.  
 
Recommendation 12 
Encourage the design of smart specialisation policy mixes 
 capable of nurturing and exploiting the capabilities of 
entrepreneurial entities within regions. 
 
Implementing specialisation using conditionality 
 
By itself, however, the notion of smart specialisation is of little help if it is not 
articulated into a clear European policy framework and implementation plan. If 
it were to be realized by MS, it would perhaps take a long time before a 
European set of regional smart specialisation patterns would emerge, but it 
would ultimately need little European policy input; if it is a guiding concept for 
European social cohesion policy, implementation becomes critical. 
 
For the EG the appropriate policy tool to implement European smart 
specialisation appears to be conditionality. Conditionality has two main levels: 
at the macro-level and at the micro-level. At the macro-level the European 
Commission might apply conditionality in the planning phase and in the 
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relations with national and regional governments over Structural Funds. The 
object of conditionality should be focused on specialisation. Countries and 
regions should give evidence of a strategic learning process in which they have 
the ability to assist entrepreneurs, both from the private and public sector in the 
identification of areas in which the goal to compete at international level is 
realistic and feasible, although with risks. As argued above one might also think 
of private-public partnerships and programmes that could bring together the 
better performing segments of the public sector and the better performing 
segments of the productive sector in an attempt to relax and unblock binding 
constraints. At the micro-level national and regional governments may apply 
extensively policy tools based on conditionality on intermediate and final 
results.  
 
Promoting GPT networks is an important policy issue at the EU level. Such 
networks are not the ones which only involve the population of the “superstars” 
of a given field. These are networks between very heterogeneous agents – from 
the leading knowledge centres and from the more peripheral regions aiming at 
co-inventing applications. Many incentive and coordination problems arise in 
such situations, because working with “an old industry” in a remote region is 
not likely to hold great attractions as a career move for the scientists, engineers 
and business managers that are in the “lead regions”, yet access to their 
knowledge may be vital in the early stages of the “application enterprise.” How 
does one help solve this problem in a “generic” fashion that does not turn into a 
government subsidy for the development of a particular industry in a specific 
region? This is one instance of a class of difficult issues that frequently occupy 
the attentions of economists and experts from international organizations like 
the World Bank that work in developing regions. The resolution in this case lies 
in the idea that there are phases in smart specialization where temporary 
“industrial policy” measures, such as infant industry policies, are warranted. 
 
Smart cohesion policies need however to use conditionality as a powerful 
support to policy learning because it helps to build up the causal relations that 
can be replicated, taking into account differences in context. Cohesion policies 
have an essential role to play in assisting regions to select the right, smart 
specialisation patterns on which regional development will have to thrive. 
Doing so will shift the emphasis in regional policies away from the principle of 
subsidiarity in favour of the principle of shared responsibility25.  
 
                                                 
25 Slavo Radosevic, Michael White, Aleardo Furlani (2008). 
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Recommendation 13 
Allocate a greater proportion of structural funds to the 
development of research and innovation capacity. In particular, 
make the provision of structural funds conditional upon the 
development of smart specialisation strategies.  
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Concluding reflections: crises opportunities for an augmented 
ERA 
 
 
The global financial crisis represents in many ways a window of opportunity for 
more radical reflections on the relationship between Community and national 
research policies. The new instruments such as the ERC and the EIT introduced 
as new Community research policy tools well before the crisis, can take on a 
new meaning over the years to come in providing direct instruments to 
restructure the fragmented European landscape, what the EG called an 
augmented ERA. The EG’s report suggests to continue in this direction and 
conceive this augmented ERA as a research and innovation ecosystem with new 
direct instruments and/or the refocusing of existing instruments.   
 
As the fiscal pressures in each MS increase, the question of improving the 
efficiency of national research funding agencies, of higher education and public 
research funding are likely to be raised in many countries. It is in other words 
now that the various European Technology Platforms, Joint Technology 
Initiatives, ERA-nets, etc, just as in the case of SET plan will have to illustrate 
not just their particular strategic advantages in terms of common European 
goals but also their financing advantages through an effective pooling of 
resources.  
 
 
But also under conditionality: one of a better governance of European 
agencies  
 
But for those opportunities to be realized it will be essential that the key 
governance issues are not just discussed but also solved so as to allow these 
approaches to flourish26.  For the EG, the opportunity for the further 
deployment of those new instruments, including the use of articles 169 and 171 
of the Treaty, will only be successful if they illustrate their particular European 
valued added, also through their administrative flexibility and best practice 
governance. Only then will they play a central structuring role for a new, post-
crisis augmented ERA: possibly a meaner and leaner one given the dramatic 
financial constraints in some countries, but more effective and truly European 
than ever before. This raises crucial challenges with respect to the governance 
                                                 
26 See for instance de Graca Carvalho, M & R. Marimon (2009), in the framework of the 
Knowledge for Growth expert group). This report analyses the current major trends in the 
governance of ERA, notably the new importance of EU stakeholders-led bodies such as JTIs, 
the EIT and the ERC, and the issues linked to this. 
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of the implementation structures (as in the case of Article 169) and of 
Community bodies related to those instruments (as in the case of Article 171). 
Given the scale and complexity of the R&D and innovation-related tasks now 
being pursued at EU level, it is clearly desirable to move towards agency 
management in some situations. However, there is a real risk that this will lead 
to more risk intolerance, for example if agency staff find themselves facing 
personal liabilities for administrative errors. To avoid a further increase in FP 
transaction costs, “agentification” only makes sense if the new agencies will not 
be subject to the Financial Regulation or if the Financial Regulation is adapted 
to allow agency staff to adopt a more risk-tolerant and trust-based approach. 
The advantages of the “arms-length” approach include the obligation on the part 
of the Commission to be much clearer in its statements of objectives than at 
present. 
 
There is within this context far too little of a learning culture in the EC. When 
combined with the growing and widespread trend towards risk-aversion on the 
part of officials (linked to personal liability in the Financial Regulation) 
organisational and strategic innovation tends to become stifled. Regardless of 
why they exist and who is responsible for them, the overly ‘bureaucratic’ ways 
of the Commission must hence be genuinely reformed and simplified, and not 
just ‘outsourced’ under the guise of Executive Agencies. For the EG it is clear 
that one of the main obstacles, currently determining the ways in which the 
Commission operates, are the financial rules imposed on the Commission. 
These results have introduced a management culture which is largely based on 
mistrust. This leads to the question of whether research should be treated 
differently in order to stimulate more innovation. This question can best be 
addressed by examining the broader objectives and the longer-term 
consequences of different approaches. There is in the view of the EG an evident 
need to account for the certain degree of risk that is inherent to research and 
innovation. Consequently the only way to create a break-through towards a 
more risk-tolerant and trust-based approach as a general and long term priority 
will have to be to revise the Financial Regulation, with the full backing of 
European Parliament and Council. For the EG though, the need for this change 
must also, and much more strongly than is currently the case, be argued by the 
Commission itself based on its clear understanding of objectives and the 
consequences of failing to achieve them.  
 
 
A final recommendation: towards a more risk-tolerant and trust-based ERA  
 
The EG therefore recommends that the revision of the Financial Regulation 
planned for 2010 should include an explicit derogation for research, whose 
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management culture rests on trust. Progress in this regard is of great importance 
since it conditions the efficiency of the funding system at European level. 
Indeed for the EG, if  not addressed as an issue of absolute priority, the crisis 
shock might well go the other way: questioning increasingly the valued added 
of Community research and enabling a future ERA based much more on MS’ 
national efforts of attracting research talent within their own borders. 
 
Recommendation 14 
Revise the Financial Regulation  
in 2010 by making specific provisions for research that take into 
account the specificities and the risks associated with it. 
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Epilogue: On society’s need for research 
 
 
As an EG composed primarily of economists, we felt it important to emphasize 
at this concluding end of the Policy part and as introduction to the Background 
Report, to explore how the major trends and challenges that currently affect 
European and global research policy will also be confronted with explanatory 
factors that differ, sometimes radically, from those commonly used and 
accepted by the economics community.  
 
Concepts and terms used 
 
Before doing so, it might be appropriate to spend some time on concepts and 
terms used. Since the critical publication of Stiglitz, Sen and Fitoussi’s report 
on the Measurement of Economic Performance and Social Progress (September 
2009), it seems natural to pay also some attention to the many measurement 
problems involved in analysing research and innovation. As the reader will 
have noticed, the term “research” is usually and quite deliberately joined with 
“development”, as in R&D, although the two activities clearly differ, with a 
high proportion of private investment directed more towards “D” than “R”. The 
term “innovation” is also often joined with “research”, while again there is not 
necessarily a connection. For the purposes of the discussions in this Policy 
Report as well as in the Background Report that follows it is useful to highlight 
that whatever terminology is employed – basic, fundamental, frontier, scientific, 
blue sky, curiosity-driven, etc. – all these activities aim at or involve the 
production of new knowledge: research explicitly so and development and 
innovation through the continuous processes of learning that drive progress 
down technological and other cost curves The new knowledge may concern 
new phenomena or entities that do not exist in nature or are an artifice or an 
imitation of how nature works, and of ways to make use of the phenomena and 
entities. New knowledge is also embodied in research tools and technologies 
that constitute the experimental system through which further new knowledge is 
produced.  
 
A particular and inherent uncertainty in research arises from the fact that basic 
research itself is not goal-directed in a strict sense. The outcomes are not known 
in advance, since what is looked for are new properties, mechanisms and 
phenomena. Basic research therefore is an open and an open-ended process in 
which serendipity, the accidental finding of interesting and relevant phenomena 
that one was not looking for, is often decisive.  
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This inherent uncertainty is a characteristic feature that basic research activities 
share with the uncertainties that are inherent in the process of innovation. 
Certain preconditions, like adequate funding, institutional and organizational 
structures, scientific networks and technological configurations, scientific and 
entrepreneurial leadership, team size and composition, can play a crucial role. 
With the benefit of hindsight from contemporary and historical case studies, 
favourable and disadvantaging configurations can be identified, but no 
prescriptive guidelines can be deduced that will predict when breakthroughs 
will be achieved or what form these will take. Human creativity as expressed in 
basic, curiosity-driven research – as distinguished from applied research and 
development where already available knowledge is further used or developed 
towards specific ends – avoids such prediction and planning. It nonetheless 
remains dependent upon a favourable environment and other enabling 
conditions, among which adequate investment is a sine qua non. In many 
frontier research fields, it has become impossible to delineate what constitutes 
basic or curiosity-driven research and what constitutes application. In the life 
sciences, for instance “to know life is to (re)make life”, meaning that new 
knowledge is gained using (novel) technologies to intervene and manipulate 
living organisms (Nowotny and Testa, 2009). For the biomedical field the term 
‘translational research’ has been introduced to designate the processes through 
which new knowledge is brought closer to patients and their needs. Clearly, 
continuous feed-back and the inclusion of users and patients has become an 
important feature in interlinking basic research with the uses to which new 
knowledge is put. 
 
Arguments and rhetoric  
 
The political commitment in a period of financial crisis to investment in basic 
research has probably been recognized most explicitly by the US Obama 
administration, which has included a major boost for basic research in its 
Economic Stimulus Plan. It was preceded, among other things, by an argument 
put forth by 49 American Nobel-prize laureates and other distinguished 
American scientists: “Funding scientific research serves dual purposes: it is an 
immediate stimulus to the economy and an investment in US leadership in 
science, engineering, technology and education. This leadership is vital to the 
US’s economy and prestige, as well as to success in such goals as achieving 
energy independence, mitigating global warming and treating and curing 
disease. In addition to the immediate multiplier effect of research spending, the 
intellectual property created by publicly funded research leads to the creation of 
innumerable small companies and, ultimately, many large companies in 
biotechnology, energy, computer technology and other scientific and 
engineering fields. Federal seed money is multiplied by inflows of private 
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capital. Federal funds also support virtually all research training and much of 
the academic training of those earning their PhDs in science and engineering in 
US institutions and so train the personnel who staff, as well as create, US 
scientific and engineering companies” (Letter to Obama, 2009)27 
 
These are clearly more goal-oriented arguments, evoking a ‘multiplier effect’, 
than one usually hears in the European context. Common to all arguments are 
two salient issues that reoccur in public discourse. First, investing in basic 
research is in need of political justification. Second, whatever arguments are 
used, they reveal – often unintentionally – the inherent tension between 
investing into frontier, curiosity-driven research and the desired, economically 
profitable outcome. 
 
The problem of finding the right justification for public policy action has 
become even more crucial in recent years particularly after it became evident 
that the expansion of State intervention was, and is likely to continue in the 
future even more so, to be in contradiction with the upper limits to public 
expenditure (the so-called fiscal crisis of the State). Since public policy 
involves the allocation of scarce resources, it has become standard practice to 
invoke an economic justification, usually associated with theories that predict a 
relation between expenditure and desirable outcomes. 
 
In the case of research and innovation, the economic rationale for public policy 
has traditionally been found in the economics of information and in particular 
the path breaking contributions from Kenneth Arrow and Richard Nelson at the 
end of the 50’s when the “cold war” debate was at its height and the debate 
raged in the US about the much stronger commitment of the USSR to space 
research. Arrow and Nelson each on their side proved that the supply of new 
information by private agents would inevitably be lower than the societal 
optimal level. In other words, if the public sector would not fund research 
and/or did not protect innovation (for example, through the granting of 
intellectual property rights such as patents), society would suffer from a lack of 
investment in basic research. Historically, this rationale was often used jointly 
with another argument, first associated with Vannevar Bush’s “Science - The 
Endless Frontier” in 1945. It stipulated that if a country invests heavily in basic 
research, then a steady flow of applications, inventions, products, and 
ultimately opportunities for growth and societal benefits would accrue to that 
country. Implicit in this argument was the view that uncertainty would be 
reduced stepwise, so that public investment in the upper stages would be of 
larger social value. Hence, the risk for private investors that operate 
                                                 
27 Similar arguments can be found in the new Japanese government’s commitment to research.   
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downstream, closer to the market would be lower. Underlying this logic is the 
so-called ‘linear model’, stipulating a more or less straightforward progression 
from basic research to applications which would eventually end up as 
commercially viable products on the market. This model, although still beloved 
by policy-makers, has come under increasing attack over the last twenty years, 
both by economic historians such as Nathan Rosenberg and scholars of history 
and social studies of science. It is considered today as being outdated, no longer 
capturing the complexities of research and innovation in a globalizing world. 
 
In order to better understand current developments in science, technology and 
innovation as well as the vagaries of political – often rhetorical – justifications 
for investing into R&D and into basic research in particular, it is necessary to 
probe the broader societal context. Inevitably, this includes empirical evidence 
of what has and has not worked under given historical circumstances. But one 
also needs to take into account an important democratic component. Today, the 
role of science in society is fully accepted in modern liberal democracies. The 
sometimes uneasy relationship that arises around the imagined or real risks 
associated with scientific-technological developments is acknowledged and 
serious efforts are undertaken to include citizens’ participation in deliberative 
ways. In a pluralistic society in which differences in values cannot be simply 
reduced to those held by a majority and where public discourse often juxtaposes 
‘values’ to ‘science’, one should not forget that science itself is based on a 
deeply held, societal value: that of free inquiry into what is yet unknown. In this 
sense, science and democracy are completely aligned today. Investing into 
research is itself based on a profound societal value.  
The place for visions  
 
Why, we may ask, is the economic argument tilted in such a way to become a 
justification for public policy, if its foundations are so problematic? The first 
answer comes from the fact that economists are asked to produce a rationale for 
policy making, which intrinsically has a short term view as it is bound to the 
electoral cycle. It is difficult for politicians to justify to taxpayers an increase in 
public funding for research by invoking long term effects, particularly if these 
effects are uncertain. A second answer results from the fact that the benefits of 
nationally funded research can benefit other countries, thus creating an 
externality. This adds a difficulty to the political process: taxpayers may ask 
why they should pay when others will benefit. In this context we may recall that 
funding R&D within the EU still remains overwhelmingly in the responsibility 
of Member States, with only approximately 6% coming from the EU budget 
(leaving aside funding of intergovernmental programmes and institutions, like 
CERN, EMBO etc.). 
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Does this mean that the entire process of political justification is flawed? Of 
course not: citizens have a right – and are expected – to be involved in the 
crucial decisions of what their futures will look like and how science and 
technology can contribute to its betterment.  
 
In our view policy makers build up a rhetorical argument for the short term, 
while they keep economically valid arguments for the long term. They promise 
short term results for an increase in funding, although they may believe it is not 
possible to deliver. A quick glance at the US system shows its extraordinary 
ability to develop strong rhetorical arguments to increase federal support for 
basic research. Vannevar Buch’s manifesto “Science - The Endless Frontier” 
opened the way for the establishment of the National Science Foundation; 
President Kennedy’s speech to Congress promising a man on the moon led to a 
large increase in mission-oriented funding; President Nixon’s War on Cancer 
created the political support for a massive increase of funding in NIH. 
Interestingly, President Obama’s stimulus plan promises new and better jobs in 
the green economy, energy and environment, by appealing to the freedom 
vision of the Fathers of the Nation. In all these cases the rhetorical arguments 
have been firmly linked to national goals to be achieved through mission-
oriented action (with national security figuring as one of the primary goals). 
The mission-orientation is backed by the structure of the major US funding 
institutions, including the Department of Energy and Department of Defence.  
 
Europe has yet to develop a strategy on the rhetorical level which is sufficiently 
convincing to mobilise the mass of citizens to devote large resources to a long 
term scientific vision that transcends electoral cycles. This, despite the fact that 
Europe has already been successful in developing such rhetorical strategies that 
have driven the provision of advanced public services such as healthcare that 
require a strong science base. Economic arguments alone, even if politicians 
become more sophisticated in their uptake and use, might not be sufficient to 
elicit and guarantee public support, even if the promises made will exclusively 
benefit citizens. In the political arena, the results promised as the outcome of 
investment into research will always have to compete with other, more near 
term promises that may be felt more urgently or have greater emotional appeal. 
Therefore, a convincing argument for public support of research must include a 
visionary narrative, with goals that can be specified and credible mechanisms in 
place, showing how they can be achieved. 
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Part II  
Background Report 
 
Introduction 
 
Summary 
 
This Background Report contains the detailed analysis and findings of the 
Expert Group on “The Role of Community Research Policy in the Knowledge-
Based Economy”. Its five core chapters explore 1) the globalization and spatial 
agglomeration of research and innovation; 2) research and research policy in 
respect of addressing societal challenges; 3) public research in Europe; 4) 
global networks of open innovation and the ERA; and 5) regionalisation and the 
future of European research policy. The analyses lead to a consistent set of 
policy recommendations, which are given in detail in the individual chapters 
and pulled together in the accompanying Part 1, the Expert Group’s Policy 
Report.   
 
The Expert Group’s Terms of Reference 
 
This Expert Group (EG) was set up by the European Commission (EC) at the 
end of 2008 to deliver a report on “The Role of Community Research Policy in 
the Knowledge-Based Economy”. Its members were asked to review, assess and 
interpret the existing evidence on the state of the knowledge-based economy in 
Europe as well as the effectiveness in terms of role, objectives and rationales of 
the existing main research policy instruments, and to come up with 
recommendations on how to frame and articulate Community research policy in 
the post-2010 period.  
The EG’s Terms of Reference (ToR) explicitly referred to the need for an 
economic assessment coming up with new ideas, analyses and so-called 
“evidence-based recommendations for actions”. For this reason, the group 
included a preponderance of experts with strong backgrounds in economics, 
drawn from the academic, business and policy making communities.  
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At the time these ToR were written, the policy context was very much 
dominated by what could be called the “available time-slot” for a re-
examination of the intervention logic of Community research policy. The 
intention was to present the EG’s report at the end of the mandate of the first 
Barroso Commission and at the start of the debate on the post-2010 Community 
policy agenda. At the same time, the EG would be in a position to reflect on 
some of the new instruments introduced in Community research policy over the 
last decade. One may think of the European Research Council (ERC) with its 
research funding allocation based purely on excellence competition, and also of 
other new, and at first sight successful, top-down EC initiatives such as the 
Strategic Energy Technology Plan (SET) aimed at the mobilization of research 
across the EU in some key so-called “societal challenges” areas such as (in this 
case) energy technology policy; or the more active, “non-financial” role the EC 
hopes to play as catalyst for reform at member states level with the launch of 
the so-called Ljubljana process. As the ToR document put it: “How to develop 
a Community research policy which can have leverage effect on national 
research policies, programmes and systems”.  
 
Responding to a Changing Debate and the Global Financial Crisis 
 
From the outset, it is important to highlight the self-imposed constraints to 
which the EG has adhered, brought about by the rapid changes in the context 
for its work. For example, the EG’s terms of reference did not foresee the way 
the global financial and economic crisis starting in late 2008 would affect the 
world’s and, in particular, the European economy. Consequently, they did not 
anticipate the need to examine the potential short and long term impact of the 
crisis on European research and on Community research policy.  
 
By historical fluke, the EG met, and carried out most of its analysis, over the 
period when this crisis hit Europe hardest. To carry out its “evidence-based” 
assessment on “the state of the knowledge-based economy in Europe” and 
evaluate “the effectiveness of the main research policy instruments” within this 
rather extraordinary context appeared an extreme challenge, given the timeslot 
constraints imposed.  
 
First, given the exceptional historical context, no attempt has been made to 
provide a systematic overview of the current state of the knowledge economy in 
Europe. The EG decided instead to rely on prior work and sources.  
Nonetheless, individual chapters do contain extensive data and evidence-based 
analysis where these are considered relevant to the key trends explored in this 
report. 
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There are many indicator reports available from the EC, OECD and individual 
Member States providing statistical information on the knowledge economy in 
Europe up to 200728. Numerous other analytical reports, including some carried 
out by members of the EG for the so-called Knowledge for Growth (K4G) 
group29, others for the World in 2025 foresight project coordinated by DG 
Research and BEPA30, provide detailed insights on key issues such as the 
underlying reasons for the EU-US gap in knowledge investments and in 
scientific performance over the last twenty years, and assess Europe’s future 
outlook. Only very limited indicator data were available covering the period of 
the financial crisis, the fall of 2008 and the first semester of 2009, so the EG 
considered that analysis of the state of the European knowledge economy anno 
2009 would be difficult and potentially unreliable31.  
 
Second, periods of crisis can be ideal moments for more radical reflections on 
reforms of existing policy tools and instruments. A crisis provides a good 
breeding ground for “new ideas”; very quickly though it appears that 
implementation is problematic and, as the impact of the crisis appears to soften 
and the first signs of recovery become visible, the policy discussion shifts back 
to the old debates and the security of existing policy tools. This is why it was 
felt it would be a good idea that the present EG report would accompany the 
independent report “Preparing Europe for a New Renaissance” written by 
members of the European Research Area Board. The latter report provides an 
outside, particularly useful long-term and visionary framework, which this EG 
could also integrate in its own formulation of new ideas and policy 
recommendations.  
 
Third, it appeared necessary to make a more thorough examination of the 
changing policy context within which the so-called “emerging debates” 
described in the original ToR would now take place. For example, what will be 
the implications of the crisis for the intervention logic of Community research 
policy, e.g. for the balance between competition and coordination as so-called 
“rationales” for Community research policy? Given the fragmented responses to 
the financial crisis dominated first and foremost by Members States’ self-
interest, how can Community research policy and the Commission play its 
catalyst role with respect to MS’s national policies?   
                                                 
28 See also the latest EC Science, Technology and Competitiveness 2008/9 key figures report: 
http://ec.europa.eu/research/era/pdf/key-figures-report2008-2009_en.pdf  
29 See http://ec.europa.eu/invest-in-research/monitoring/knowledge_en.htm 
30 See http://ec.europa.eu/research/social-sciences/pdf/the-world-in-2025-report_en.pdf.  
31 For preliminary data see Archibugi, D., M. Denni and A. Filippetti, (2009) and European 
Commission (2009).  
 56 
 
To achieve this, the EG started its reflections from an internal brainstorming 
discussion on the major challenges the European Union is likely to face over 
the next ten to fifteen years,32 taking into account both the short and long term 
likely impact of the financial crisis. These major challenges, some representing 
forceful external developments such as the trend towards globalization of 
research and innovation capabilities, others representing internal potential 
responses at different levels – the broad societal level, the level of research and 
knowledge institutions, the level of firms and regions – have formed the 
guiding thread (le “fil conducteur”) of the EG’s report, and provide the basis 
for the analyses set out in the following five chapters.  
                                                 
32 Within this framework see also the EU project “Europe 2025” many insights of which were 
picked up by the Swedish presidency (see the so-called Lund declaration, July 2009). 
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Chapter 1: 
Globalization and spatial 
agglomeration of research and 
innovation 
 
 
1.1 Introduction: general setting of the policy challenge 
 
Over the last decade it has become clear that research policies face a radically 
new landscape in which their territorial focus is being put under severe 
pressure. On the one hand, the dramatic decrease in the marginal cost of 
reproduction and diffusion of information has led to a world in which 
geographical borders are less and less relevant for research and innovation. 
Knowledge accumulation and knowledge diffusion may take place at a faster 
pace, involving an increasing number of new entrants and providing a threat to 
established institutions and positions. This is the globalization trend, which 
affects research and innovation in a variety of ways. 
 
On the other hand, contrary to a possibly, somewhat simplistic reasoning, 
globalization does not really lead to a flat world: one in which differences in 
research and innovation capabilities across countries and regions would be 
constantly reduced. Quite to the contrary, one sees evidence of spatial or 
geographic concentration of knowledge production and innovative activities at 
the international level across countries, as well as a highly differentiated pace 
of growth of these activities within countries, i.e. across regions and territories. 
This is the tendency towards spatial agglomeration, which also has a strong 
impact on the way in which research and innovation activities are carried out. 
 
The globalization and spatial agglomeration trends present a real challenge for 
public policies, exacerbating some of the classical tensions and trade-offs that 
policymakers have traditionally been able to manage. To summarize some of 
these tensions: 
(e) research and innovation policies are still developed largely within a 
national, or in the case of the EU, a European context, while knowledge 
and investment flows are driven by innovative motives taking place at 
the global level; 
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(f) the globalization of knowledge increases the incentives for talented 
people to move internationally and while this improves career 
opportunities, it might at least in the short term be considered harmful 
for countries that are in need of qualified human capital for their own 
national catching up effort and cannot match working conditions and 
real income levels of richer countries;  
(g) the drive towards excellence in research demands that ultimately no 
consideration is given to the country (or region) of origin of the 
researcher, but this creates tensions for those countries or regions with a 
weaker scientific and technological base, due to historical reasons and 
low levels of development. 
 
Because of these tensions, it is important that European research policies, and 
Community policies in particular, fully take on board the implications of 
globalization and spatial agglomeration, and develop the institutional solutions 
addressing some of those tensions.  
 
This first Chapter is devoted to spelling out the evidence for these trends, 
review the challenges, and suggest a few solutions. In the first two sections of 
the Chapter, we set out the scene both with respect to trends in the globalization 
of research (section 1.2) and its spatial agglomeration (section 1.3). We then 
draw some first conclusions from this analysis on the rationale for European 
integration in research and in particular on the relevance of the European 
Research Area concept (section 1.4). We then review the empirical evidence 
since Lisbon on investments in Europe both with respect to research (section 
1.5) and with respect to higher education (section 1.6) and draw in a final 
section (section 1.7) some policy conclusions on the implications for the Lisbon 
agenda.  
 
 
1.2 The globalization trend 
Since the end of the XX century and the beginning of the new Millennium, it is 
probably fair to say that the largest part of world wide economic growth has 
been associated with an acceleration in the diffusion of technological change 
and world wide access to knowledge, as opposed to individual countries’ 
domestic efforts in knowledge accumulation.  
The emerging digital technologies, in particular the easy and cheap access to 
broadband, the world wide dissemination of Internet and of mobile 
communication, have been instrumental in bringing about a more rapid 
diffusion of best practice technologies. With the advent of digital information 
and communication technologies over the last two decades, the international 
 59 
exchange of knowledge in various forms and formats has drastically altered for 
example, (but not exclusively): 
- the internal and external organisation of research;  
- the scope of national versus international knowledge spill-over effects;  
- the locational advantages of knowledge agglomeration. 
 
It is not only the emergence of digital information and communication 
technologies that has shifted the balance in the direction of a more transparent, 
globally-level playing field, but also the development of global institutional 
frameworks governing the “rules of the game” of international knowledge flows 
(trade, investment, IPR). In particular, many capital- and organisation- 
embedded forms of technology transfer such as licences, foreign direct 
investment and other forms of formal and informal knowledge diffusion have 
contributed to speeding up access to critical knowledge.  
A remarkable consequence of the globalization trend is the emergence and 
multiplication of world class knowledge centres in emerging economies. It is no 
longer true that emerging economies are laggard in technological development. 
Due to massive investment in higher education and research, favourable 
demographic dynamics, and outsourcing of manufacturing activities, but also 
increasingly of product development from rich countries, there has been the 
emergence of several hotspots of innovation in emerging countries. As 
documented in a recent Harvard Business Review article which interestingly 
calls for a complete turnaround of US manufacturing industry from the current 
trend towards outsourcing, a large part of high tech components of many mass 
consumer products are now not only manufactured but also designed in China, 
South Korea and India (Pisano and Shih, 2009). It is true that this global shift is 
mainly concerned with the D of R&D, that is, with the somewhat more 
routinized segments of Development which do not need to be tightly integrated 
or co-located with other (more fundamental) research capacities but also benefit 
from agglomeration effects. One can still stay that the less routinized and most 
science based segments of inventive activity remain extremely concentrated in 
USA and the other developed countries – what counts here is the proximity to 
leading edge academic research, the advantages of co-location with other firms 
and thick local markets for specialized inputs, services and human capital, so-
called knowledge agglomeration externalities. So, whereas one can expect a 
substantial increase in Indian and Chinese research it will be many years before 
the share of inventive capacities changes significantly.   
At the same time, emerging countries have shown a remarkable capacity in 
moving upstream in the value chain, from outsourcing of manufacturing 
activities to autonomous process technology development, then to product 
development, design, and applied research. For example, together with a 
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national targeted technology policy, Eastern Asian countries have successfully 
and aggressively pursued the goal of a rapid increase in the scientific quality of 
their universities, using both monetary and non-monetary incentives as well as 
institutional reforms. Although data are not easily available, it is well known 
that many academic leaders in European universities have in the last five years 
been offered positions and large research budgets in fast growing universities in 
Eastern Asian countries.  
The major questions are hence whether participation in these D-types of 
activities will ultimately have spill-over effects in the sense of building local 
capacities to expand further and more basic research, and the extent to which 
this will be magnified by the new approaches to innovation, which are leading 
to the development of global, open networks of activity (see Chapter 4). In any 
case, we see more countries with the potential to compete for global knowledge 
hubs in certain fields: 
* they have pockets of academic excellence; 
* they have strong educational programs; 
* they can fund major programs to create research infrastructures and attract 
leading academic researchers;  
* they have already strong entrepreneurial activities that respond to market 
incentives;  
* they can benefit from sophisticated users. 
While European research policy has been concerned for many years (and is to a 
large extent still today) with the issue of head-to-head competition with the 
United States in science and technology, it is clear that there are today a series 
of new entrants in the international knowledge competition, that have ambitions 
and resources to play a primary role in the not too distant future. 
 
1.3 The spatial agglomeration pattern 
The spatial agglomeration pattern represents the other side of the coin. While 
new countries enter international knowledge competition and hence reduce the 
dominance of established countries and the concentration across countries, 
there is at the same time a persistent pattern of agglomeration within countries. 
There is a large amount of evidence that innovative activities tend to 
concentrate spatially, in a few regions and cities (see for instance figure 1.1). 
This is true for both scientific production and technology. This agglomeration 
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of innovative activities is mainly centred around large metropolitan areas, or 
city-regions, often including large capital cities. The agglomeration of 
innovative activities is part of a larger long term phenomenon of concentration 
of population in urban areas, and is one of the determinants of it (Hall, 2006). 
Within urban areas on a global scale, there is a strong hierarchy effect, with 
most innovative urban areas attracting more and more innovative investments. 
This is particularly true at European level. 
It is important to note that globalization and spatial agglomeration are mutually 
compatible. While the entry of new countries following globalization clearly 
means a reduction in the overall worldwide concentration of research and 
innovative activities33, still these activities agglomerate locally in a few areas 
within countries and regions, producing a spatial hierarchy which is persistent 
over time. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.1: Concentration of scientific output at the global level 
Source: Wagner (2008).  
 
                                                 
33 As the Key Figures report 2008/2009 clearly notes, the share of EU-27 over global activities 
moved down from 2000 to 2005, from 23% to 22.5% for full time equivalent researchers, from 
26.4% to 24.4% for GERD, and from 36% to 30.9% for patent applications. The corresponding 
figures for the US are even sharper: from 26.8% to 24%, from 38.6% to 34.6% and from 39.7% 
to 33.1%, respectively. The complementary increasing shares are owned by Developed Asian 
economies (JP+KR+SG+TW) and the Rest of the world. These trends imply a global reduction 
of concentration. 
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Spatial agglomeration depends on several factors: access to large pools of 
qualified human capital, proximity to research centres, urban environments, 
active presence of financial intermediaries, knowledge spillovers. Recent 
empirical analysis on the US shows that productivity is larger in large cities: 
“Bigger cities certainly attract more skilled workers, and there is some evidence 
suggesting that human capital accumulates more quickly in urban areas” 
(Glaeser and Resseger, 2009).  
It is also recognized that the main causal relation does not flow from location to 
innovation, but the other way round. It is because a pool of competences is 
created at a local or regional level, whatever the source (large companies, high 
quality public research etc.), that other innovation actors decide to co-locate in 
the same place. 
In a certain sense, agglomeration exploits localized dynamic economies of 
scale, i.e. larger dynamic efficiency is achieved if the supply of skilled factors 
of production at local level exceeds some threshold. Interestingly, this concept 
applies to both mobile and immobile production factors.  
Mobile factors in the knowledge economy refer to highly skilled and talented 
people, who move in search of good places to work: i.e. attractive, creative, 
challenging locations. The attractiveness of a particular location, e.g., when it 
comes to attracting the best national and also foreign scientists and engineers, 
matters greatly for enabling local knowledge agglomeration. It is essential that 
qualified human resources are on the move; internationalization brings the 
potential for win-win through dynamic exchange processes involving 
movements of people between complementary locations and knowledge 
domains (Andersson et al, 2009), making the “brain gain” to prevail largely 
over “brain drain”. This benefits larger and already integrated countries with 
large job markets, such as the United States, where the effect is clearly visible. 
In the EU, this is a much more difficult process: witness the still enormous 
difficulties in creating a unique job market for researchers based on the 
portability of welfare rights. The international mobility of human resources, 
therefore, leads to the agglomeration in highly attractive locations on an 
international basis. 
 
There are also immobile factors, however. Despite the advance of 
internationalization, increased mobility will co-exist with immobility in other 
respects, as some factors are inherently fixed geographically. In fact, specific 
local assets give rise to rents which help generate precious value added and 
which may be the key in attracting mobile factors, or serve as “glue” retaining 
what would otherwise be footloose. The availability of certain skills at a 
particular site may, in other words, form a critical complementary resource for 
others. Not all knowledge exchange is codified, but there are critical tacit 
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elements that may have to do with human understanding and trust, for which 
geographical proximity matters greatly. Social infrastructure, including arenas 
and meeting places where informal and more or less unplanned exchanges take 
place, may be important for what synergies will materialize between different 
assets.  
 
The knowledge resources that complement each other in a particular site may 
reside within a certain scientific discipline or other knowledge domain, where 
they form a critical mass of knowledge generation. Again, however, there may 
also be critical interaction between different kinds of competencies. The 
attractiveness of research in a particular location may be boosted by unique 
linkages between researchers, innovators, entrepreneurs, financiers, and other 
actors and institutions that matter for knowledge accumulation and use. Further, 
what represents a critical mass of focused and/or complementary knowledge 
resources, is not a given. 
 
Immobile factors contribute to spatial agglomeration of innovative activities 
because of path dependence at the local level. Regions and cities with a large 
endowment of highly skilled human resources, research centres and top quality 
universities, urban innovative environments and large companies, may increase 
their own attractiveness for mobile workers. In a certain sense, therefore, spatial 
agglomeration is favoured by the dynamic interplay of mobility and immobility. 
 
So far these agglomeration dynamics hold in general but also in particular 
scientific or technological fields. In the former case, indicators based on 
publications, patents or R&D expenditure at regional level shows a clear 
hierarchy in innovative activity. In the latter, one might imagine that more 
recent fields could escape from a rapid concentration dynamics, spreading over 
countries and regions, at least in the infant stage. Quite to the contrary, spatial 
agglomeration reproduces itself even in new fields. As an example, recent 
worldwide data on nanoscience and nanotechnology show an impressive pattern 
(www.nanotrendchart.com). Almost 20% of total scientific production 
worldwide in 2005 took place within only 12 districts, 40% within only 35 
districts and more than 70% of production in 200 districts. Among the top 12, 
only two are Europeans (Paris, ranked 6th with 11550 articles, Berlin, ranked 
12th with 7662 articles). The leading European areas invariably include capital 
cities (London, Zurich, Madrid). The first non-capital areas in Europe are 
Louvain (23rd with 5782 articles), then Grenoble, Aachen and Delft. The four 
largest areas are from Asia (Tokyo, Beijing, Kyoto, Seoul). This impressive 
concentration took place in less than 20 years, if we date back nano S&T to the 
invention of the Atomic Force Microscope, or in less than 15 years, if we 
consider the take-off of scientific production in the early 1990s. While this 
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might at first sight appear remarkable, because nano S&T, differently from 
biotech, has many scientific origins, not just one (e.g. matter physics, 
chemistry, electronics, biology, materials science) and could thus be expected to 
be based on a more diffused pattern, one might also argue that precisely 
because nanotechnology needs to build on so many existing strengths, it would 
link naturally to existing concentrations particularly when there is the local 
interest/will to apply these resources in the new field. 
 
The tendency towards spatial agglomeration creates the need of pursuing 
measures which can help underpin the development, based on immobile factors, 
of unique local assets and arenas capable of attracting the most productive 
relevant mobile production factors. Crucial reforms may be those that 
strengthen research infrastructure, social infrastructure for immigrants, free up 
incentive structures for creative reflection and the launching and testing of new 
ideas. Some such measures can be instigated at European levels, others require 
national action, yet others have to do with what measures are taken by 
individual universities and other knowledge institutions, to upgrade and sharpen 
their specific capabilities. 
 
In adopting such measures, the established position of a current industrial giant 
or leading industrial site cannot be taken for granted. History is marked by the 
gradual rise and often rather sudden demise of dominant economic and societal 
interests. A too dominant position or excessive sunk costs tends to lead to a lack 
of openness and increasing reliance on defensive action that will eventually hurt 
the strongest of firms, regions and nations. For such reasons, research policies 
should not give priority or privilege to established institutions, and the EU, 
precisely because of its traditional industrial and institutional strengths, must 
guard carefully against this situation. All positions needs to be constantly 
tested: they have to excel out of continued strong performance. Furthermore, 
with the information society, the advantages of flexibility and niche strategies 
are on the advance. There must always be the chance for newcomers to 
challenge the incumbents. The globalization driver continuously challenges the 
established agglomerations. 
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1.4 Challenges for current thinking on European research 
policies 
European internal competitiveness or cooperation within global flows of 
knowledge? 
As argued above, most of the evidence of the last ten years points to the 
particular importance of the international dimensions of knowledge 
accumulation in having brought about growth. The geographically bounded 
nature of the way knowledge accumulation and diffusion was thought to 
operate has fundamentally changed, leading to arguments on the one hand that 
the world is flat (the globalization trend) and on the other hand that the world 
consists of local knowledge peaks (the spatial agglomeration trend).  
The distinction between knowledge creation and accumulation on the one hand 
with its accompanying policy emphasis on the need for support for (frontier) 
research efforts aiming at strengthening the knowledge creation capacity of 
countries and regions; and on the other hand the global spill-overs and diffusion 
of such knowledge as a result of formal and informal knowledge flows, 
knowledge sharing and diffusion, has always been recognized. It has sometimes 
been defined in terms of the difference between knowledge stocks and 
knowledge flows. The international balance between the two has, however, 
shifted over time. 
What are the implications of this shift for European research policy? 
It is probably fair to say that the focus of much of European (both national 
Members States and Community) research policy has been on strengthening the 
domestic, European knowledge accumulation process starting with the original 
Lisbon agenda, subsequently made explicit in the 3% R&D Barcelona target: 
raising the stock of knowledge in Europe. Europe’s internal competitiveness 
weakness became linked to Europe’s apparent technological and research 
weaknesses and thereby attracted the political attention of European policy 
makers who elevated research to one of the central foci for policy making. 
Surprisingly if there was one emerging trend the Lisbon strategy did not 
address, it was the global spreading of knowledge to new, emerging economies 
and the implications that this would have for Europe’s future position in the 
emerging global knowledge economy. In this sense, Lisbon was rooted in the 
idea that the EU productivity problems were of a structural nature, i.e. the EU 
was lagging behind in e.g. R&D because of the failure in developing sunrise 
sectors. In essence, it is the old idea of structural change towards high-tech 
sectors (Soete, 2009).  
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However, in the new stage of globalization and deployment of ICT the link 
between the economic prospects of a sector and the economic prospects for 
local employment in that sector is also progressively breaking. As ICT has 
become a truly general purpose technology the distinction between high and 
low tech sectors breaks up, and knowledge intensity becomes embedded in all 
economic activities. The stock and flow distinction becomes by and large 
irrelevant. Thus, it becomes increasingly inappropriate to rely on education and 
training policies that aim to move workers from identifiable insecure jobs in 
declining sectors to identifiable secure jobs in expanding sectors – as suggested 
prominently in the Lisbon strategy – as all sectors require adaptability and 
knowledge upgrading (Snower, Brown and Merkel, 2009).  The new challenge 
appears today to deal with the increasing fragmentation of value chains and the 
increasing heterogeneity of skills and required knowledge inputs. This requires 
by definition a much stronger cooperation in R&D with third countries and 
stronger focus on deployment of ICT based technologies.  
In many emerging areas of intensive global social and societal change, 
including also rapidly evolving market opportunities, the central concern today 
is more linked to the sharing of existing knowledge, than just to the 
accumulation of new knowledge. One obvious example is the array of “green” 
technologies whereby the global climate challenge represents one of the most 
formidable global policy challenges for a more rapid diffusion of knowledge, 
knowledge absorption and the implementation of eco-innovations across the 
globe. Global sustainability is unlikely to emerge as a consequence of policies 
aimed at strengthening national (or European) research/knowledge 
accumulation, it will ultimately be dependent on the extent to which such 
knowledge concentration peaks are actively flattened out to the rest of the 
globe. As Paul David (2009) has argued, such policies actually require a lot of 
experimental applied research. To the extent that the ERA can concentrate 
resources more effectively, create stronger research networks, and foster 
mobility within the Union, it will undoubtedly reinforce the Lisbon process and 
enhance research concentration across the EU. But as illustrated in the case of 
energy research, such policies, as in the case of current FP7 energy funding, 
often appear devoted only to one particular technology, in this case fusion 
research: a technology that will not be able to help meet the European climate 
and energy objectives until well beyond 2050. The Commission’s SET 
initiative is from this perspective a particularly insightful illustration of the need 
to broaden research and knowledge policies to include much more research 
experimentation as well the global societal demand side.  
In short, there is a need for policies to go beyond the current ERA into an 
augmented ERA. By this we mean that the current concerns with the scale, 
duplication of R&D and Fifth freedom issues should be re-examined in view of 
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the advanced production and technology integration, the global nature of R&D 
challenges and the urgency of global diffusion-deployment. Specifically, this 
would mean a stronger third country dimension in all ERA related activities. 
The relevant Research Area: European or Global? 
Another very important implication of the shift towards global knowledge flows 
regards the institutional process of construction of the European Research Area. 
The notion of a European Research Area, as it took shape and became probably 
the most successful “add-on” to the Lisbon 2000 summit agenda, was based on 
the argument about scale as the basis of European integration. An argument 
which had already become gradually eroded by then, since the international 
knowledge diffusion and worldwide mobility of researchers had become the 
norm in many scientific fields in the 90’s.  
Also at the industrial level, as in the case of the semi-conductors industry, the 
sector which had been at the centre of many of the European research 
framework programmes, the growing competition from Asian countries such as 
China with even bigger scale advantages than the US, challenged also the 
European integration focus on scale. The semiconductors scale advantage 
which had been greatly enhanced by GSM mobile phone demand, effectively 
the killer applications for semiconductor producing firms in Europe, had 
quickly become challenged. Similarly, in the case of services, Europe appeared 
confronted with major difficulties in reaping scale gains of harmonisation and 
integration. The consensus agreement on a revised and limited services 
directive was only achieved in 2006. Actually in service sectors, most strongly 
characterized by increasing returns to network scale advantages, associated 
with the delivery of services, reaping European scale advantage always 
appeared difficult if not impossible in the context of 27 member countries with 
differences not just in regulatory regimes, but also in languages, cultures, tastes 
and habits.  
From a broader historical perspective, there is of course little doubt that the 
economic integration process in Europe, as it became gradually and step-wise 
enlarged to include a broader set of European policies in areas such as 
precompetitive research, had a major effect on intra-European research 
cooperation and networking. Higher education and research had been left out of 
the European treaties and remained the prerogative of national member states’ 
policies (Caracostas and Soete, 1998). However, with the gradual increase in 
size and scope of the FPs, researchers in different EU member states found 
themselves gradually pulled into closer European networking and cooperation. 
In some European countries, national funding of research was actually reduced 
with the amount of European funding obtained by national researchers. In a 
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similar way to trade theories on economic integration, it could be argued that 
this European research integration process had strong positive but also some 
negative effects. The strong positive effects came in the form of new European 
research “creation” through the additional amount of joint EU research projects 
initiated and the new insights such research would provide into specifically 
European problems. However, there were also potentially negative effects 
through what could be called research “diversion”, i.e. a redirection of 
nationally funded research activities with an international, non-European focus 
towards European research issues.  From this perspective, the creation of the 
FPs and the new European inducement mechanisms towards researchers in 
Europe to collaborate more intensively with each other, was never considered a 
purely zero sum game. The diversion effects of knowledge with researchers 
preferring to network with other European colleagues primarily for the sake of 
European financial support, may lead “to a cocooning of knowledge inside a 
region’s physical borders, precisely at the moment that knowledge is 
internationalising” (Soete 1997).  
 
As discussed in the previous section, the FPs were designed at a time when 
strengthening the international competitiveness of particular European high-
tech firms and sectors was considered essential for Europe’s long term welfare, 
and they did undoubtedly help to achieve this outcome in parts. Some of the 
industrial firms/sectors concerned became successful at the world level, but 
others failed dramatically. Today most of those EU sponsored programmes 
benefit as much firms of European as of foreign origin, as long as they are 
located in Europe.  
 
At the same time, the international accessibility to what has been called 
“codified knowledge” of direct relevance to most of the research communities 
in the world, increased dramatically through the use of new information and 
communication technologies (ICTs). While support for intra-European research 
collaboration certainly with respect to the joint use of large research facilities in 
areas such as “big science” and digital broadband infrastructure continued to be 
very much welcome, most research collaboration became in effect global in 
nature, going well beyond the European borders. It is what could be called (yet 
another) European paradox: as Europe invested in intra-European research, in 
the collaboration and exchange of scientific knowledge among European 
scientists, or even in the technological strengthening of the competitive 
potential of European firms, the advantages of such geographically "bounded" 
collaboration became gradually more and more marginal, given the 
dramatically increased opportunities for the fast exchange of information and 
cooperation.  
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The globalisation trends described above have only partially undermined the 
ERA oriented policy agenda. In many ways the ERA appears today still a 
necessary but insufficient response to the new stage of globalization. Instead of 
being overly focused on intra-EU issues a much broader research policy agenda 
is needed oriented now also more explicitly towards global research and 
innovation challenges. In some of those global areas the issue is first and 
foremost one of a more rapid diffusion of new technologies, in other areas one 
of a major global research mission effort, and in each case new approaches to 
innovation may stimulate and amplify the issue. Such challenges raise also 
major questions with respect to the respective roles of Community and national 
research policies: not so much one of the traditional ERA type dealing with the 
need for an internal European rebalancing of those roles, but one of a 
repositioning of those respective research policies vis-à-vis those global 
challenges. In some countries, national research policies have taken a global 
lead in addressing some of those issues; in other countries, research efforts have 
been channelled primarily through community funding.  
 
A response to global challenges will require, as also announced by the new 
Obama administration34, substantially more R&D, including mission oriented 
R&D. However, as discussed in more detail elsewhere in this Report, such 
global, new mission oriented R&D should be quite different from the 
conventional view of national, mission R&D. It should be mission oriented only 
in objective, and very much globally network-based in implementation. In 
addition, mission R&D should target technologies on a broad front. For 
example, and as recognized in the SET plan, energy R&D actually requires a 
broad portfolio of technological options.  Unlike conventional mission R&D 
energy, such R&D is technology specific, not general purpose, and hence its 
potential is restricted to a narrow range of economic activities e.g. wind, solar 
and nuclear energy to power generation, hydrogen and biofuels to transport etc. 
As Bosetti (2009) has stated:  “This will have to be followed by significant 
technology deployment costs (that) may have to be incurred before low-carbon 
technologies can become competitive at market prices” (Bosetti et al., 2009). 
This point appears even more valid when considering global deployment needs.  
The diversity of technology options and the need to share knowledge across the 
globe can be successful only if it is based on extensive networking (see also 
David et al., 2009). 
A challenge to the rationale for European integration in research? 
The process of European integration in research and innovation closely 
resembled with some delays though the process of economic integration of the 
                                                 
34 See Obama´s NSF speech, April 27th 2009. 
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EU. Table 1.1 below helps locate the current concerns with the ERA in a longer 
term perspective of EU integration.  
 Stages of economic 
integration 
 Stages of integration in RDI 
1958-
1987 
Trade integration  
- Customs Union integration 
- reduced formal barriers  
- an expansion of internal EU 
trade 
- barriers to the mobility of 
investment and labour remained 
1972 Awareness of need for common 
R&D policies 
- Benefits of CERN, EMBO recognized 
- Resolve to implement a common 
policy in support of treaty Article 2 
1987-
1993 
Internal market integration 
- single market 
- removal of the remaining 
mobility barriers to capital and 
labour flows as well as various 
product market reforms  
- freedom to locate and operate 
in every EU country market 
completed by 1993 
- EU firms shift towards core 
activities  
- competitive advantage is not 
based any more on country 
specific factors but on the ability 
to optimally spread and link 
activities across Member States 
and at the global scale 
1984-
2000 
R&D integration based on scale 
rationale 
- EU R&D support based on the 
principle of subsidiarity  
- cooperative R&D programs  
1993 > Global market integration 
- leading EU firms have globally 
rationalized their activities 
- globalization of leading EU 
firms is also driven by inability 
to reap benefits of flexible 
labour and product markets 
2000 > Towards a European Research 
Area 
- networking of existing centres of 
excellence 
- a common approach to financing large 
research facilities in Europe. 
- greater mobility of researchers  
- Fifth Freedom policy agenda 
2000 Lisbon strategy 2000 Lisbon strategy 
2010 Post-Lisbon strategy 2010 Augmented ERA agenda - ERA in 
globalized R&D system- focus on cross 
border knowledge exchange, especially 
extra-EU 
 
Table 1.1: Stages in European integration in economic, research and innovation 
policies 
Source: Our elaboration on Bowen and Sleuwaegen (2004). 
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The parallel between the institutional process of integration of markets and 
economies on the one hand, and of integration of RDI on the other hand is 
illuminating. It calls into question the underlying rationales and requires a re-
examination. 
As Table 1.1 highlights, the trade integration stage has its parallel in the 
emergence of European, Community research policy, such as the introduction 
of the first Framework Programme (1984-1987). European research policy in 
this initial stage appeared to be justified by the scale or cost of cooperation 
rationale. The overall criteria formed the basis for the principle of subsidiarity 
and, at least in principle, served as the delineation between national and 
Community level policy (Georghiou, 2001). The basic tenet of EU RTD policy 
was the promotion of co-operation. This stage, which started in 1984 with the 
first Framework Programme, had been largely completed by the year 2000. 
Stage 2 of the EU integration process was driven by the objective to establish 
the internal market. This stage was largely successful as it helped firms to 
prepare for global competition. However, there are still (too) many protective 
practices which hinder a full implementation of the single market. There are too 
many directives that have not been fully transposed into national legislation; 
inadequate progress has been made in securing standardisation and mutual 
recognition for the supply of services; there are delays in liberalizing markets 
particularly those in the public sector; there are the well-known difficulties that 
have arisen in agreeing on an efficient, workable European intellectual property 
rights; there are distortions caused by various forms of fiscal competition. 
In parallel to this development, within research the concept of ERA was 
developed, the aim of which was to counteract national fragmentation and 
create an integrated space. ERA encompasses but also goes beyond a reform of 
the FP’s by introducing two new large-scale instruments: Integrated Projects 
and Networks of Excellence. These have been designed to break with previous 
FP’s emphasis on smaller projects and create more “European Added Value.”  
A third, more ambitious instrument is EU participation in research cooperation 
sponsored jointly by two or more member states. These variable geometry 
programs and actions at European level have not been well advanced except 
through the recent introduction of different ERA-Nets. The ERA project which 
was initiated as early as 2000 is still far from complete. The non-existence of a 
truly European research area is due to the compartmentalisation of public 
research systems and the lack of coordination of the manner in which national 
and European research policies are implemented. 
The philosophy of ERA greatly resembled of course the logic of the Single 
Market. The advantages of the Single Market were seen primarily in the 
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advantages of a market that would become bigger than that of the USA or 
China. Similarly, the advantages of ERA are seen in critical mass and the 
opening of national programmes.  
The third stage is driven by further advances of globalization which has given 
rise to a more complex unbundling of value chains. Increasing international 
flows of knowledge have become also more varied. Cross border flows include 
science knowledge, the licensing of know-how, the export and import of final 
products, the procurement of intermediate goods and services (offshoring), 
equity investments, and the attraction and use of immigrant experts and labour. 
These diverse flows have also very different degrees of transferability. Hence, a 
policy focus on knowledge generation and scale related issue in such 
knowledge generation should be seen in the context of the use of knowledge 
through cross border flows. In this third stage EU firms are facing serious 
challenges to compete in the globalized economy, outside and inside EU. The 
same applies to the ability of European locations to build unique local 
knowledge hubs and, on that basis, attract and create incentives for the most 
productive mobile knowledge resources. Policy issues that arise are no longer 
mostly related to the issue of EU integration but of global integration and the 
role of the EU in a much larger and globally changing space. 
Although R&D is the least internationalized business function of most firms, 
the process of the internationalisation of R&D has further advanced, and is 
likely to further advance with the economic crisis. As we discuss at greater 
length in Chapter 4, with a few notable exceptions, traditionally R&D was 
internationalised mainly to adapt products and processes to local conditions. 
However, this is now changing through the upgrading, specialization and 
fragmentation of dispersed R&D units. In addition to adaptation-driven R&D, 
the globalized R&D activities now include emerging economies, especially 
China and India.  The drivers of the internationalization of R&D are changing. 
Above, it was argued that with the third stage of globalisation and open flows 
of knowledge, scale, at least in its static meaning associated to economies of 
scale, should be reconsidered. Scale is important for R&D and innovation, but 
its impact applies very differently at various levels. It is important to note that, 
if the notions of scale, critical mass and integration are used in an 
undifferentiated, poorly articulated, non evidence-based way in designing RDI 
policies, they may be harmful. In fact, it must be recalled that the existence of 
increasing returns is always an empirical matter, not a general law, nor a 
general statistical regularity. One should always use empirical data to deduce 
whether increasing returns are at stake, and how large their effect is. This means 
that there might be a mismatch between the level at which increasing returns 
apply and the current policy focus. As an example, many European 
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governments have initiated policies for merging institutes of Public Research 
Organizations (PROs) and for merging universities. In both cases the rationale 
has been scale and critical mass. But the empirical evidence suggests that 
economies of scale apply at the level of research teams and laboratories, where 
there is a relatively small minimum efficient scale effect but also potential 
flexibility benefits to be achieved when it is possible to juxtapose different 
research capabilities, while it is more controversial when applied at the level of 
institutes and universities, where there is risk of losing sight of these team 
benefits. 
 
At the same time, we know that increasing returns are at play in the case of the 
job market for researchers, in the size of funding for research projects in 
technologies subject to indivisibilities, or for the issue of pre-
standardization/standardization/size in final markets for innovative products. In 
all these three cases size may be absolutely crucial. Still, policies to build up an 
integrated job markets for researchers across European countries lag behind. 
Instead of pursuing national policies for merging institutes or universities, 
governments should actively pursue the creation of a pan-European job market 
for research, one in which the mobility of researchers is fully implemented. 
 
Luckily, policies for increasing the average size of funding, reduce duplication, 
and coordinate research agendas across countries started under the Open 
Method of Coordination, using art. 169 of the Treaty, and ERA-Net schemes, 
and Technological Platforms, are all positively addressing the issue of scale. On 
a similar positive vein, the Lead Market Initiative started to address the issue of 
the size of final markets as a powerful incentive to industrial R&D. It is 
therefore important that the rationale for integration is made explicit and 
articulated in a full scale theoretical framework. 
 
There is no place where the lack of a theoretical foundation for policy making 
has become so clear than the recent EU policy on Networks of Excellence. 
Starting with FP 6th, this new instrument was explicitly launched with an aim of 
“durable integration” of research activities at European level. Again, the 
arguments underlying this policy goal were crafted in the language of 
overcoming fragmentation and reaching critical mass in the international 
competition. No serious reflection was given, however, to the meaning of 
integration across various scientific disciplines, different degrees of maturity 
and institutionalization of underlying scientific fields, plural research 
paradigms, and stages of the research-innovation continuum when applicable. 
Integration has a totally different meaning in genomics, nuclear safety, 
immigration studies, or in political economy. Given this ambiguity in overall 
policy goals, actors involved in Networks of Excellence defined themselves a 
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plausible ad hoc definition of integration and tried to pursue it (Luukkonen and 
Nedeva, 2009). The result was that, although Networks of Excellence have 
probably delivered an interesting and valuable array of results, their success in 
terms of durable integration has been varied and somewhat elusive35. If 
integration is to be pursued, a more articulated and theoretically informed 
design of instruments has to be put in place. 
 
On the other hand, it is well known that the advantages of scale may be out-
weighted by benefits of flexibility and adaptiveness, as sometimes there is a 
trade-off here both for an economy and an organisation. Unfortunately, how 
these important factors weigh together is by and large ignored at the level of 
policy making. Hence, what we may expect is double process of completion of 
the ERA agenda, still pursuing the overall goal of integration, but also its 
modification through what we already referred to above as an augmented ERA 
agenda.   
 
1.5 The European “business R&D deficit” and related policies 
since 2000 
 
It is important to discuss the implications of the above changes on the 
investment into R&D at the level of European countries. By the end of the 
1990s, the EU R&D deficit, especially vis-à-vis the U.S., had become one of 
the major factors influencing the 2000 Lisbon strategy (Rodrigues, 2002). The 
subsequent 3% R&D intensity target set in Barcelona reflected a benchmark 
with competitor economies that was implicitly based on the belief that more 
investment in R&D would result in more innovation and a stronger growth 
potential. In other words, macroeconomic R&D intensity was considered to be 
a key input indicator. 
 
The Barcelona target has remained high on policy agendas across the EU, 
influencing policy making at the national and European levels and has set an 
important aspiration. Nonetheless, despite this political attention, R&D 
intensity at the EU level has remained essentially flat since 2000, with 
aggregate R&D below 2% (Figure 1.2). The EU-27 is lagging behind the US, 
Japan and South Korea, and more broadly the OECD average, in terms of R&D 
intensity mainly due to a lower level of R&D funded (and performed) by the 
business sector.  
 
                                                 
35 See the Expert Group on the Future of Networks of Excellence. Final Report. DG Research, 
September 2008. 
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The level of R&D intensity differs of course widely among EU countries 
(average EU R&D intensity for 2006 is 1.84%, Key figures, 2008 – figure 
I.1.3). Some Member States (MS) are among the most R&D intensive countries 
in the world while, at the other end of the spectrum, a number of them have an 
R&D intensity well below 1%. Since 2005, each Member State has set a 
national R&D intensity target (Key figures, 2008 – figure I.1.6). The targets 
differ, as do the achievements of individual MS. If all MS were to reach their 
respective R&D intensity targets, the EU-27 as a whole would have an R&D 
intensity of 2.5 % in 2010 (Key figures, 2008: 29). 
 
Figure 1.2: Evolution of R&D intensity, 2000-2007. 
Source: UNU-MERIT 
Data: Eurostat, OECD 
 
The intensity of business funding of R&D has increased almost exclusively in 
Member States where this intensity was already low or very low (Key figures, 
2008). In high-income EU countries business R&D intensity has been flat or 
has decreased; the upward trend observed during the end of the 1990s has been 
short-lived. 
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Source : DG Research 
Data: Eurostat, Member States 
Notes: (1) IT: 2005;IE, AT, SK, FI : 2007 
           (2) IT: 2000-2005; IE, AT, SK, FI : 2000-2007; EL : 2001-2006; FR, HU, MT: 2004-2006; SE:2005-2006 
           (3) IT: 2005-2010; FR: 2006-2012; UK: 2006-2014; EL: 2006-2015; IE, AT, SK: 2007-2010; FI 2007-2011 
           (4) IE: The R&D intensity target for 2010 was estimated by DG Research. 
           (5) BG has not set an R&D intensity target 
         
Figure 1.3: R&D intensity: progress towards the 2010 targets (in percentage 
points). 
 
Figure 1.3 illustrates the wide variety in progress towards the 2010 target made 
in each MS, and the progress still to be made. Here too, the impact of the crisis 
is likely to have some perverse effects. The first country figures being 
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published on R&D intensity for 2008, show significant, sometimes even 
dramatic increases in R&D intensity (Iceland, Ireland, Austria) in some of the 
countries hardest hit by the financial crisis36. 
 
The most recent Eurostat R&D data available for all EU MS, as well as for the 
US, Japan, Korea, China and Russia, cover the year 2007 (Figure 1.4). 
 
                                                 
36 See e.g. in the case of Ireland: http://www.proinno-
europe.eu/index.cfm?fuseaction=nwev.NewsReader&news=2636&lang=EN&ParentID=0&topi
cID=90 
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Figure 1.4: R&D intensity in European countries (GERD as % of GDP, 2007). 
Source: UNU-MERIT 
Data: Eurostat, OECD 
Notes: CH: 2004, IT: 2006 
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The figure shows 3 groupings of countries: high R&D intensive countries (more 
than 2%) with only 6 MS, average R&D intensive countries (between 2 and 
1%) with the majority of MS, and low R&D intensity countries (less than 1%), 
primarily New Member States (NMS). 
The difference in total R&D intensity as illustrated in Figures 1.2 and 1.4 
between the EU and the US is almost exclusively due to differences in levels of 
private sector funding of R&D as illustrated in Figure 1.5. In 2006, China 
actually overtook the EU in the industry-financed funded R&D which grew 
substantially over the last four years for which data are available. By contrast, 
the intensity of business funding of R&D in the EU has remained more or less 
stable: from 1.05% of GDP in 2000 to 1.00% of GDP in 2006 (EU Key figures, 
2008). As a result the gap with the US and the OECD average has further 
widened over the period 2004-2007. 
 
 
Figure 1.5: Industry-financed GERD as a percentage of GDP (2000-2007). 
Source: UNU-MERIT 
Data: OECD 
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With respect to publicly funded R&D the picture looks very different, as 
illustrated in Figure 1.6. The EU R&D intensity has slightly declined between 
2003 and 2007 from the level of 0.6% of GDP, well below the Barcelona target 
of 1%. The US and Japanese publicly funded R&D intensities have also 
declined, whereas Korea witnessed a dramatic increase, likely to reach as non 
European country the Barcelona target of 1%. 
 
 
Figure 1.6: Government-financed GERD as a percentage of GDP. 
Source: UNU-MERIT 
Data: OECD 
 
Private sector investments in R&D are influenced by a wide range of factors 
ranging from: patterns of economic structure and sector specialisation; the 
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firms’ business models sometimes relying primarily on internal research 
activities, sometimes on external outsourced research; spatial geographical 
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regulatory environments; etc. 
 
Japan
US
EU27
  China
Korea
  Russia
OECD
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.0
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
 81 
Quite a number of studies have attempted to define which of these factors best 
explains the EU’s observed business R&D deficit.37 Moncada-Paterno and 
Castello and Smith (2009) suggest that economic structure (i.e. sector 
specialisation) and company demographics play an important role. A French 
official report has thus attributed the business R&D deficit of France vis-à-vis 
Germany and Japan to the higher share of mid-high tech industries of those 
countries (DGTPE 2006). It has at the same time identified a different source 
for the deficit vis-à-vis the U.S. The share of manufacturing is lower in the U.S. 
than in France and a substantial part of the deficit comes from a higher R&D 
intensity in some high tech sectors and in services. Similar conclusions can be 
drawn from the latest EU STC Key-figures report (EU 2008), which shows that 
the transatlantic business R&D differential is mostly explained by the 
substantially larger and more R&D intensive U.S. high-tech industry.  
 
The R&D Scoreboard (DTI, 2008) identified some 1,400 companies worldwide 
that invest more than €24.3 million in R&D, with the largest (Microsoft) 
investing €5.6 billion. The distribution is, however, very skewed, with 63 
companies accounting for 50% of the total of €372 billion. Data from the 
Scoreboard illustrate in general that for the EU there is a low contribution of 
high R&D intensity sectors to the overall R&D intensity explaining the higher 
R&D intensity of the US and Japan compared to the EU (Moncada-Paterno and 
Castello et. al., 2009: 13). This can be exemplified further using data for the 
relatively R&D-intensive IT hardware and software sectors (Table 1.2). 
 
 Hardware Software 
Where 
headquartered
# 
firms
Average 
R&D/sales
Aggregate 
R&D 
# 
firms
Average 
R&D/sales 
Aggregate 
R&D 
USA 134 9.6% €36.4 bn 71 10.6% €20.2 bn 
EU 26 13.5% €16.6 bn 32 9.8% €3.9 bn 
 
Table 1.2: Number of IT firms and their R&D expenses in the US and EU 
Source: Department of Trade and Industry, R&D Scoreboard 
 
In other words, EU-headquartered firms in these sectors are not R&D-averse 
compared to their US counterparts. The “deficit” comes from having far fewer 
firms making major investments (in the case of hardware) or being substantially 
smaller (in the case of software). This phenomenon, which we term the EU’s 
“growth paradox”, is discussed further in Chapter 4. 
 
                                                 
37 See also and in particular van Pottelsberghe, 2008.   
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Particularly among countries lacking large R&D intensive firms, low R&D 
spending by SMEs has also been put forward as a way of explaining the R&D 
deficit. One difficulty with this argument is the need to correct for the share of 
SMEs in the economic activity or total R&D. This issue has proved relatively 
difficult to study, but the available results suggest that the propensity of SMEs 
to spend on R&D (in a given sector) is not a major explanation of low 
aggregate R&D intensity. 
 
At the national level, it may be noted that the UK for example scores better in 
Innovation rankings than in R&D rankings. This could be related to the 
efficiency of the innovation process and/or to the relative importance of non-
technological innovation in the UK. In turn, the latter is related to the relative 
importance of the service sectors in the UK. This sectoral composition however 
is similar to that of the US, where R&D intensity is much higher.  
 
These different results suggest that the macroeconomic R&D intensity may be 
considered as much as an output of each national innovation system as an input 
(van Pottelsberghe 2008). 
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Figure 1.7: Technology specialisation, 2004-05 
Source: DG Research (EU 2008) 
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Additionally, it should be noticed that the EU’s academic research system is 
also not specialised in high tech related activities. First, the EU publications are 
not specialised in a number of emerging scientific disciplines and in some of 
the most dynamic scientific fields (EU 2008). Moreover, EU publications tend 
to have a lower impact than US publications, especially in some key emerging 
fields (Bonaccorsi, 2007). 
 
Second, the EU inventive activity38 is less specialised in high technology fields 
such as ‘pharmaceuticals’, ‘computers, office machinery’, 
‘telecommunications’ and ‘electronics’ than in medium technology fields such 
as ‘general machinery’, ‘machine tools’, ‘metal products’ and ‘transport’ 
(Figure 1.7). By contrast, the strongest specialisation of the US is in ‘medical 
equipment’, followed by ‘pharmaceuticals’. Japan shows strong specialisation 
in ‘electronics’ and ‘optics’. 
 
In summary, given the weight of high-tech sectors in the overall level of 
business R&D intensity, changes in the sector composition of the economic 
activity would be required in order to increase R&D intensity in the EU. If one 
uses the US as a benchmark, it would seem that there is room for further 
increases in the research intensities of high-tech sectors in the EU, which are 
about 20% less research-intensive than in the US (Key figures, 2008). A 
research intensity for high-tech industry in the EU that matched that of the US 
would therefore also contribute to an increase in overall EU business R&D 
intensity. These changes would involve seeking to expand the current high-tech 
sectors, to increase the number of sectors which require high levels of R&D 
intensity, and to increase substantially the number of large firms carrying out or 
supporting significant amounts of R&D within the EU. 
 
The data suggest that innovation systems are quite consistent in EU countries. 
In a number of countries, specialisation in mid-high tech industries interacts 
with specialisation of the research system in the related scientific disciplines. 
Put the other way round, it means that in a number of EU countries, both high 
tech industries and the related scientific disciplines have not really become new 
growth areas. This diagnosis, along with the evolutions of innovation processes, 
has important policy implications, which will be addressed below in the 
concluding section 1.7. 
 
Since 2000, research and innovation have moved up the policy agenda in many 
Member States, stimulated by the Lisbon strategy and Barcelona target. The 
schedule and strength of public support of R&D have nevertheless varied across 
                                                 
38 Measured by patents. 
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Europe. The share of Government Budget Appropriations or Outlays for R&D 
(GBAORD) in general government expenditure has been increasing at a rate of 
0.3 % per annum between 2002 and 2006, to 1.62 % in EU-27 (see Figure 1.8 
from the Key Figures, 2008: figure I.1.8). As can be seen in figure 1.8, a 
majority of Member States (14) have increased direct government support for 
R&D over the period 2000-2006. However, this intensity has only progressed 
by 0.3% at EU-27 level due to the decrease observed in Germany and France, 
and the limited increases in the United Kingdom and Italy (Key figures, 2008: 
36). Nevertheless, in countries where public R&D budgets were at low levels, 
the Lisbon Strategy has generally led to a steep change in the political 
importance attributed to research. 
 
At the EU level, the larger budget of the 7th framework program can also be 
mentioned as part of the effort to invest more in R&D. Part of this increased 
support to research has been channelled to business R&D. Member states have 
used different types of instruments, and especially the increasing popularity of 
fiscal schemes to support business R&D is worth mentioning (OECD 2007). 
For example, France reinforced its research tax credit scheme in 2004 and then 
again very strongly in 2008, when indirect funding should have reached € 4bn39 
and become larger than direct funding. The UK has extended its fiscal support 
to R&D whilst Germany and Finland, which did not have such a fiscal scheme, 
are seriously considering introducing one. Some countries, like France and 
Spain, have also introduced indirect support by reducing social spending related 
to research staff wages. Overall, indirect support to R&D now represents a 
substantial share of total support in some countries. 
 
The Lisbon strategy has had an impact on the MS’ innovation policies, and this 
impact has accelerated since the mid-2000s, strongly influenced by the 3% 
target. A growing number of policies aim to increase R&D spending, especially 
by private companies. The business R&D deficit has also stimulated policies 
aiming at promoting public-private R&D partnerships and technology transfer. 
Overall, the Lisbon strategy has stimulated supply policies aimed at increasing 
R&D input and the transfer of the results from academic research to companies. 
More recent policy initiatives take into account the evolution of innovation 
processes, but this trend should be reinforced as explained in the box below 
with respect to non-technological innovation and more generally in the 
following section that focuses on ERA. Furthermore, there is a general feeling 
within the business community (e.g. Swedish Confederation, 2009) that a 
number of EU and member states’ funding schemes are too small and often too 
complex to achieve the desired results, while the accompanying public policy 
                                                 
39 Up from €1.7 bn in 2007.  
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seems too abstract and science-oriented to justify significant engagement. 
While the importance of R&D is widely recognised, companies will focus on 
what this R&D achieves. In this respect, it is appropriate to view the EU’s 
business R&D deficit as a reflection of how the region’s environment 
attractiveness is to research investment. The limited attractiveness reflects the 
existence of other global opportunities and the poor capacity to support the 
growth of significant new businesses. 
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Figure 1.8: GBAORD as % of general government expenditure – average 
annual growth 2000-2007 
 
 
Source:  DG Research                                                                   Key Figures 2008
Data:  Eurostat, OECD
Notes:  (1) CH : 2000-2004; BE, ES, FR, IT, LV, PL, IS : 2000-2006; UK : 2001-2006; DK : 2001-2007; BG, EU-27 : 2002-2006; 
                    CZ, SK : 2002-2007; CY, MT : 2004-2006.
             (2) CH : 2004; BE, BG, ES, FR, IT, CY, LV, MT, PL, UK, EU-27, IS : 2006.
             (3) AT : GBAORD refers to federal or central government expenditure only.
             (4) Hungary is not included due to unavailability of data.
Figure I.1.8 GBAORD as % of general government expenditure - average annual growth, 
2000-2007 (1); in brackets : GBAORD as % of general government expenditure, 2007 (2)
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Box 1.1: Non-technological innovations and public policy 
 
There is considerable evidence demonstrating the growing economic 
importance of non-technological innovations. Moreover, non-technological 
innovation tends to be quite open. Much of the economic growth in the US in 
the 1990s and early 2000s  has been attributed to innovations which have been 
consequent upon understanding how to use IT most effectively (leading, for 
example, improved supply chain management; improved services to customers; 
etc.), rather than deriving directly from specific new technologies (Conference 
Board, 2009). There are also new business models that have emerged from the 
organisational innovations and community-based approaches that become 
possible in networked economies. 
There is growing awareness (see, e.g., reports by the UK body, NESTA) that 
such innovation often differs fundamentally from innovation in advanced 
manufacturing, but so far no agreement has been settled about which forms of 
innovation matter most in services or if and how policy should support them. 
Nonetheless, many of the reorganisations undertaken by firms in recent years 
can be understood in terms of bringing traditional “technological research” 
much closer to those other corporate activities that drive non-technological 
innovation.  
It is a mistake to see service innovations as being somehow distinct from the 
product and process innovations of manufacturing: all are required and they are 
often interdependent and linked. Rather than being mutually exclusive, both 
reflect the high-value, dynamic, creative activities that exemplify a KBE and 
the value added therefore lies in the combination rather than the single 
elements. Firms combining technological innovation and non tech innovation 
achieve the best results in terms of productivity improvement. 40 
It is thus important to incorporate new models of innovation within policy 
structures that have developed around linear models, which reflect the view that 
scientific research leads to technological development and thereafter combine 
with other non-technological activities that eventually lead to innovation. Very 
little public research funding so far reflects a belief that non-technological 
innovations can be as important for our societies’ development as the 
innovations that derive from scientific progress.  
 
                                                 
40 The interactions between technological and non-technological innovations are supported by 
empirical studies based on CIS. 
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1.6 The funding of higher education 
 
Comparing aggregate funding in the EU versus the US 
 
Next to the business R&D deficit, there is another deficit Europe faces: that of 
higher education funding.  
 
Data on the total percentage of GDP devoted to higher education indicate a very 
sharp difference between the US and Europe as a whole, as well as individual 
MS.  In the US, approximately 3.3% of GDP is spent on higher education, 
while in the EU27 the figure is only 1.3%41. In Euros per student, this translates 
into an even more staggering difference: 36,500 in the US versus 8,700 in 
Europe. While Japan is closer to the EU numbers in terms of GDP percentage 
with only 1.1% of its GDP spent on higher education, it still represents 13,800 
Euros per student. 
 
As in the case of R&D, the difference mainly comes from private sources: in 
the US, the 3.3% are the result of 1.5% of public funding and 1.8% of private 
funding, while in the EU the corresponding numbers are 1.1% and 0.2%. 
However, it is striking to observe that even public funding in the US is higher, 
and it is even more true as far as absolute numbers per student are concerned: 
16,600 Euros in the US versus 7,300 Euros in the EU. 
 
One may note that bridging this gap involves difficult choices, which the 
financial crisis is likely to further exacerbate. Public funding will be under 
stress in a large number of MS and the gap in private investment originates 
mostly from contributions of student fees. Other private donations tend to 
benefit only a small number of universities and revenues from activities such as 
spin-offs, licensing and consultancy rarely provide more than 10% of university 
budgets. It leads the EG to make an explicit recommendation to set a new 
European 3% knowledge investment target. One for which governments have 
actually a direct responsibility: a 2% higher education target which can be 
achieved either through increasing public funding or through larger private 
contributions from e.g. student fees; and 1% of public research funding, part of 
the Barcelona target, where overall Europe also lags behind as was already 
highlighted above (Figure 1.6)  
 
                                                 
41 These numbers can differ a bit due to computational conventions (e.g. in Figure 1.9 the 
corresponding OECD estimate is somewhat lower), but the order of magnitude is very clear. 
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As illustrated in Figure 1.9, combined this new 3% target is still well below the 
corresponding figures for the US, Canada and remarkably also Korea which has 
caught up rapidly over the last decade with the US. 
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Figure 1.9: Expenditures on higher education and public research as a % of 
GDP (2006)  
Source: UNU-MERIT 
Data: Eurostat, OECD 
 
At the same time and in contrast to Figure 1.4, representing total R&D 
intensities by country, none of the EU MS actually appears close to this new 
knowledge investment target. Even traditional leading European countries such 
as Finland or Sweden witness a substantial gap. In short, the proposed new 3% 
knowledge investment target has a number of clear policy advantages over the 
previous Barcelona 3% target.  
 
First, it focuses directly on what governments and policy makers are directly 
responsible for. Clearly and as discussed above, the 3% Barcelona target has 
had a significant impact on MS’ research and innovation policies. A growing 
number of policies have been introduced aimed at increasing private R&D 
spending and at promoting public-private R&D partnerships and technology 
transfer. But ultimately the influence of such policies on Europe’s business 
R&D deficit and on approaching the Barcelona target can only be indirect. As 
an input target, it has therefore major drawbacks. By contrast the proposed new 
3% knowledge target is directly under the control of governments, whether in 
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terms of funding or in terms of setting the funding rules such as in the case of 
tuition fees. This is a target for which governments and policy makers can 
hence be held both responsible and accountable. The proposal here is to set this 
target for 2020. 
 
Second, none of the EU MS is near or likely to come near to this target in the 
years to come. In political terms the target offers thus credibility. All countries 
are being challenged to either find own public resources to increase such 
knowledge investments, alternatively to call upon private resources to invest in 
individual’s future human capital. By leaving the latter to the individual choices 
of MS, the target provides also sufficiently political freedom to MS to decide 
how they intend to try to achieve reaching the target by 2020.  
 
 
Top university funding 
 
Of course one major problem with the above aggregate data is that they lump 
together very different higher education institutions, from community colleges 
to research universities. To address this problem, Aghion et al. (2008) sent a 
questionnaire in 2006 to the 200 European universities belonging to the Top 
500 universities of the “Shanghai Ranking” concerning their size, funding and 
governance. Like all university rankings, the Shanghai ranking is not without its 
limitations (in particular, it focuses solely on basic research and it under-
represents social sciences and humanities). However, it does select a broad 
sample of European research universities based on an array of indicators of 
research excellence (Nobel Prizes and Field Medals, articles in Science and 
Nature, citation counts, etc).  
 
More than 30% of these 200 European universities did fill the questionnaire, 
which allowed Aghion et al. (2008) to discuss data concerning 10 countries. 
While details are available in their “blueprint”, let us stress here some of the 
most relevant highlights. 
 
First, there is a lot of heterogeneity between the top research universities in 
Europe: 
 
• The Southern European universities (Italy and Spain) are very large 
(more than 40,000 students) but are not well-funded (7 to 10,000 Euros 
per student). 
• Those in Sweden and the Netherlands are of average size (20 to 25,000 
students) and are better funded (16 to 20,000 Euros per student). 
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• In several other countries, the universities are of similar size but have 
lower levels of funding (9 to 12,000 Euros per student): Belgium, 
Denmark, Germany and Ireland. 
• Finally, the UK and Switzerland have small (10 to 15,000 students) and 
very well-funded top research universities (around 25,000 Euros per 
student). 
 
Interestingly, while Europe is more “egalitarian” in its university funding than 
the US, the UK is an exception here: while in aggregate numbers it is not 
generous in its higher education funding (1.1% of GDP in total), it does manage 
to direct significant resources towards its top universities. By contrast, 
Switzerland is a country which funds very well its higher education system in 
general. 
 
Note also that these numbers have to be interpreted cautiously, in that they 
concern universities only, and not total basic research funding: for example, 
while German universities are not generously funded, this country also funds 
basic research through the Max Planck institutes.42 It explains also why it is 
best as in the case of Figure 1.9 to combine expenditures on basic research 
funding with higher education funding. 
 
It is also interesting to analyze the structure of university budgets. Aghion et al. 
(2008) report the following facts: 
 
• All countries have a 60-70% share of public core funding, except the 
UK and Ireland, where it is 35-40%. 
• These latter two countries have significant budget shares coming from 
student fees (23-32%); fees are also non trivial in Spain and Italy (12-
16%), while they are below 7% elsewhere, and even near zero in 
Scandinavia. 
• Finally, budget shares coming from competitively-allocated research 
grants are of the order of 15-22%, but they are lower in Spain and Italy 
(10-12%) and much higher in Sweden (34%). 
 
While the importance of public funding across Europe is clear, Aghion et al. 
(2008) stress the diversity of university funding across European countries, a 
point we come back to in Chapter 3. In fact, countries which are quite 
successful in the Shanghai ranking, like the UK, Sweden and Switzerland, 
                                                 
42 The same argument could be made for France and CNRS. Note however that Aghion et al. 
(2008) do not report results for France, due to a poor response rate to the questionnaire, as well 
as lack of comparable data as far as budget figures were concerned. 
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follow quite diverse patterns. For example as far as student fees and governance 
is concerned – the UK is closer to the “US model” of more private, more 
autonomous universities. One can thus not speak of a “unique route to success”. 
 
 
1.7 Conclusions: Globalization and the Lisbon agenda 
Over the last decade the Lisbon agenda as subsequently revised (2005) has been 
carefully monitored by the European Commission and has attracted high level 
political attention from the Council and the Parliament. The ERAWatch 
programme has produced a large number of careful reviews of national policies 
and implementations. Although another Expert Group is explicitly dealing with 
the issue of the Barcelona target, it might be useful to reflect on this target from 
the perspective of the two drivers of globalization and agglomeration 
considered here.  
In the previous section, the available data and analyses were briefly discussed. 
By and large, the existence of the 3% aggregate “Barcelona” goal for the EU 
had the merit of attracting top level political commitment at government level 
and has supported a large effort by stakeholders to push towards the increase in 
R&D expenditure. As a result, over 2000-2006, R&D expenditures increased in 
real terms in practically every Member State (14.8% for EU-27) while the R&D 
budget as a share of total government expenditures increased in 20 out of the 27 
Member States. However, privately funded R&D remained more or less flat, 
when increasing this part of R&D was a major part of the Barcelona goal. 
Interesting in this context is the relation between the globalization and 
agglomeration drivers discussed here and the possible lack of incentives for 
private investors to increase their share of funding towards the 2% of GDP 
target in the EU over the last decade. Could it be that, while the core of the 
Barcelona policy target was aimed at increasing the share of R&D funding from 
private sources, the overall drivers have been working in more or less the 
opposite direction. Let us put forward a few stylized hypotheses, discuss the 
evidence in favour of them and try to derive their implications for private 
investment in R&D. 
Hypothesis # 1 The circulation of knowledge at world level is larger and faster. 
Globalization means that markets are larger, hence that the private rate of return 
for introducing new products, if the R&D cost is fixed, is larger. At the same 
time, however, the private investment is less appropriable. Given a larger 
circulation of knowledge, companies may try to absorb external knowledge 
without having to pay the full costs for it. Profit-oriented companies may hence 
have fewer incentives to invest private resources in R&D.  
 
 93 
Evidence: While there are pieces of evidence in favour of this hypothesis such 
as the reduction in the share of industrial R&D devoted to basic research in 
many of the global firms and a growing emphasis on development and design, 
more easily appropriable, overall at the world and OECD level there is no 
evidence of any reduction in private R&D investments as was highlighted in 
Figure 1.5 above. However, with respect to Europe, there is evidence of a 
growing deficit in business-funded R&D compared to the rest of the world.  
 
Hypothesis # 2 Companies increasingly outsource R&D outside national 
borders. 
The impressive decrease in communication costs has made the allocation of 
activities in the value chain more efficient according to principles of global 
dynamic efficiency. This has meant that large multinational companies have 
increasingly allocated some of their R&D activities, and in particular 
development centres in places where the conditions of skilled labour markets, 
cost levels, and infrastructural endowment are most favourable to their business 
objectives.  
 
Evidence: The literature on the internationalization of R&D illustrates how this 
trend has become a truly global trend. The implication is that European 
companies do not necessarily carry out R&D in Europe, but rather and 
increasingly so in emerging markets. However, empirical evidence suggests that 
the outsourcing of R&D outside Europe may well be complementary with, and 
not merely a substitute for, investment in Europe. Nevertheless, the balance 
between inflows and outflows of R&D is still negative. 
 
Hypothesis # 3 Researchers are more mobile and select their place of activity 
on a world basis. 
Mobility of researchers favours those agglomerations that are visible and 
attractive on a global basis. Training European researchers without offering 
career prospects means ultimately subsidizing the research systems of other 
regions in the world, producing skilled young people that will generate first and 
foremost value elsewhere. 
 
Evidence: The evidence on the attractiveness of European universities and more 
generally of the research systems at postgraduate level and post-doc level is not 
particularly encouraging. On the contrary, the flow of European researchers 
outside Europe is growing over time. In other words, in the overall brain 
circulation, Europe, compared to the US and Asia, does not receive a large gain.  
 
Hypothesis # 4  Within the present crisis governments have difficulty in 
justifying an increase in public support for R&D. 
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This hypothesis does not refer to companies but to governments. In a certain 
sense, the globalization driver makes it more difficult to argue for an increase in 
national R&D spending, if the main argument is one based on strengthening 
national competitiveness. Governments might say to taxpayers: we need to 
spend more on R&D because there is global competition, but taxpayers have 
the intuition that spending more produces benefits at national level only if the 
country is already strong in the particular scientific and technological field; 
otherwise the additional expenditure will benefit other countries.  
 
Evidence: Certainly within the framework of the present financial crisis, there 
will be concern to make sure that demand stimulation measures benefit first and 
foremost the national economy. A nice illustration is the current competition 
amongst MS in providing R&D tax incentives.  
 
Let us discuss the implications of these hypotheses. 
 
If H1 and H2 are valid and significant, one would see a reduction in privately-
funded research, and in particular in the most risky R research parts, not only in 
Europe but everywhere in the world and certainly also in the US. As the 
evidence shows, this does not consistently seem to be the case. On the contrary, 
it remains a particular feature of Europe, where industry-financed GERD as a 
percentage of GDP has remained more or less flat over the last decade. 
Therefore we need additional explanations.  
 
One possible factor is that, under a globalization trend, the rate of return of 
R&D for private companies is also a function of the size of the domestic 
market. Insofar as internal markets for innovative products remain fragmented 
in Europe, there may be a lack of private incentives for firms to carry out R&D 
here because the profits from innovation may be eroded by higher marginal 
costs in market penetration. A possible related explanation is that firms in the 
typical high-tech sectors do not grow in Europe up to the point they might 
become big R&D spenders, while this is much more the case in the United 
States. We will come back to this issue in more detail in Chapter 4, but the key 
point is that business strategies are increasingly global in design and integrated 
in their execution and regions therefore compete on many fronts for investment. 
The average age of big R&D spenders in Europe appears much higher than in 
the US: few large European high tech companies were created over the last 
couple of decades; most of them are large incumbents with a long history of 
mergers and acquisitions in medium-tech sectors. In a globalized world, being 
able to grow fast in fast growing industries is crucial, something which appears 
not to have been the case for Europe. While globalization did not directly 
reduce the private incentives to carry out R&D across the rest of the world, it 
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seems to have done so in Europe for rather specific reasons which warrant 
further analysis of the shift towards open and global innovation business 
processes (see Chapter 4). 
 
Here though, we can conclude that under these circumstances the Barcelona 
objective, while useful in increasing policy awareness of the European business 
R&D deficit and stimulating MS’ policies aimed at increasing private R&D 
investment and the transfer of results from academic research to companies, 
was up to a point also misguided. It placed the burden of increasing Europe’s 
overall R&D intensity on the shoulders of European firms during a period 
characterized by an increase in knowledge spillovers and under domestic 
conditions involving severe fragmentation of markets for innovative products. 
In this sense globalization is likely to have made the achievement of the 2% 
private goal more difficult, precisely at the time when it was assumed as an 
overall framework for action. In particular, and as detailed above in section 1.5, 
the 2% goal would actually necessitate a substantial change in the economy 
structure of the EU towards more research intensive sectors, a process which 
would take much longer than a couple of years.  
 
If H3 is valid and significant, the European Research Area should be a crucial 
policy goal, to be emphasized and strengthened. In fact, it follows from the 
argument on globalization of knowledge that Europe has an imbalance between 
the creation of qualified human capital in universities (data show that the 
number of graduates and PhD’s in science and technology is comparable or 
larger than other areas in the world) and the valorisation of such capital. To gain 
an advantage in a knowledge regime characterized by a larger mobility of 
qualified human capital, it is important to become attractive, not only to 
produce human capital internally. Globalization makes the goal of a large and 
attractive research area, encompassing both public and private sector, not less 
important, but dramatically more important. 
 
Finally, if H4 is the case then we have to build a new argument to support 
public investment into R&D. In a global world, arguments based on 
competitiveness are not enough. They also increasingly lack credibility. 
Citizenship, as argued in the Epilogue of Part I is the key here. We have to 
invest more in R&D because living in the knowledge society requires moving 
the threshold of knowledge up on a continuous basis. It is here that our EG 
proposes a new EU 3% knowledge investment target to be achieved by 2020. If 
European citizens are not prepared either through taxes on through their own 
savings to invest in higher education and research, Europe as one of the richest 
regions in the world will ultimately not be able to address the many large social 
and global problems confronting Europe and the world such as climate change, 
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energy dependency, food security, immigration, poverty, and many others. The 
solution of large social problems will require both new knowledge and 
adaptation: but it will not be possible to adapt without investing massively into 
new knowledge and research.  
 
Summing up, globalization made the European goal of a 2% private investment 
target in R&D less likely and the political argument based on competitiveness 
less credible. Asking for more private investment in R&D from European 
business without at the same time offering a credible plan for further 
integrating, or at least harmonizing European markets in new products and 
services, was to some extent missing the point. The following list represents 
examples of aspects that ultimately will need to be taken into account in an 
augmented ERA: 
(a) companies invest private resources in R&D only if they consider the 
final market large enough to recover the investment; 
(b) having many national markets fragmented by regulation, language, and 
entry processes, implies an increase in marginal costs of the overall 
“time-to-market” decision, leading to a reduction of the rate of return to 
research investment; 
(c) the institutional separation between European research, leading to proof-
of-concept or prototype stage, European innovation policy and 
European competition policy, is a major source of uncertainty, seriously 
preventing companies from investing; 
(d) research policies need to be accompanied by reduced red-tape and 
institutional streamlining through frameworks for economic 
remuneration, non-monetary incentives, employment conditions, etc., 
and open up for more flexibility to individual research institutions how 
to sharpen their profile and strength in specific niches.  
 
The Lisbon strategy and the ensuing Barcelona targets have undoubtedly 
contributed over the last ten years to much stronger support in MS for R&D 
activities and for fostering innovation in firms. R&D fiscal incentives have 
increased in most MS and have been created in MS where they did not exist 
before. Furthermore, MS have adopted a number of measures to promote the 
creation of technology-based firms and encourage their growth, to favour 
collaboration with the public research base, to develop science and technology 
clusters. However, all these measures have been taken without much 
consideration for their overall European impact. On the contrary, the recent 
national MS’ measures taken with respect to R&D tax incentives raise major 
new issues with respect to intra-European competition with respect to R&D 
location.  
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One may conclude that the arguments put forward under this first Chapter on 
globalization and agglomeration of research and innovative activities highlight 
the need to refocus European research policy. Less focus on national 
competitiveness, internal networking, generic goals of structural internal 
integration and the static division of labour between the public and private 
sector; more focus on cooperation, partnerships with third countries, access to 
global flows of knowledge, dynamic partnerships between public and private. 
And finally, a clear and explicit role for European governments to take their 
responsibility, even in the difficult times of fiscal austerity to come, to invest 
3% of their GDP in knowledge approximated here through public research and 
higher education. A new, more realistic and politically credible target can create 
the financial conditions for the ERA to come to full fruition over the next 
decade.  
 
Having discussed at length in this first Chapter some of the internal 
contradictions and limits of European policies aimed at increasing knowledge 
accumulation and knowledge diffusion in Europe – what could be called in the 
language of the economist: policies aimed at increasing the rate of technical 
change in Europe – at a time when the globalization and spatial agglomeration 
trends of knowledge were precisely challenging such policies, we now turn to 
the challenge of designing European policies influencing the direction of 
technical change in the next Chapter. 
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Chapter 2:  
Addressing societal challenges 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
In recent years, the notion of Societal Challenges (often referred to as “Grand” 
Challenges) has been launched in the European arena as a promising concept 
for mobilizing in a more active way research resources and capacities across the 
EU43. At the same time, a debate has been opened in the research policy 
community on the need for research to be more responsive to societal needs, 
addressing complex, multi-disciplinary issues that have strong practical 
implications. 
 
The notion of Societal Challenges, which the EG prefers to use, applies to 
societal problems that cannot be solved in reasonable time and/or with 
acceptable social conditions, without a strong and, in the European case, 
coordinated input requiring both technological and non-technological 
innovation, and also, but not necessarily always, advances in scientific 
understanding. Important examples are, and without any attempt to cover all 
aspects: - climate change; - sustainable energy and environment; - sustainable 
city life (mobility, congestion, green car, urban quality of life); - ageing of 
population; - poverty. 
 
Each of these issues shares most, if not all, of the following characteristics: 
- the problem to be solved is primarily social and involves many complex, 
interacting and often contradictory elements; 
- few of these elements can  be solved by using a unique disciplinary 
approach, either in scientific research or in technology, but require 
knowledge from disparate actors and a strong integration of a large array 
of technologies, creating various types of coordination failure and 
system failure in the innovation chain; 
- the eventual solution of these societal issues is likely to involve 
significant changes in the organization of society and in the daily life of 
                                                 
43 As a matter of fact the Terms of References of the EG refers explicitly to the need for the EG 
to: “analyse how to build upon the Grand challenges approach to promote EU competitiveness 
and how to optimize the use and the functioning of the Joint Technology Initiatives.”   
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communities, requiring non-technological innovation through adaptation 
and learning; 
- nonetheless, the required levels of performance also demand substantial 
improvements in technology (e.g. in energy generation and 
conservation, and in the use of IST for mobility and health 
technologies), and also benefit substantially from advancements in 
fundamental science (e.g. in new matter physics for energy materials, or 
in new algorithms for mobility management)44; 
- the final demand is huge in size, but often only latent or potential in 
market terms, thus creating lack of incentives for private investment, at 
least in the short term; 
- the final demand is also usually fragmented in many regional and 
national markets, subject to a wide variety of standards and regulatory 
conditions, creating a large unfulfilled potential for growth45 ; 
- a significant role in final demand is played, directly or indirectly, by 
public procurement, although not necessarily in all cases; 
- private investment is hampered by several externality conditions that 
limit consumers’ willingness to pay; 
- the development of effective policies is very demanding because of the 
need to combine supply-side with regulatory and demand-side goals and 
tools; and 
- views of what constitute politically and socially acceptable solutions 
may change considerably over time (e.g. use of nuclear versus 
renewable energies; urban design; the balance between health care and 
quality of life; personal freedom). 
 
The determination to address such challenges will represent a strategic re-
orientation of European research and innovation policies, not just the 
introduction of new instruments, such as the JTIs, at the operational level. It 
must enter into many mainstream policy areas in addition to research and 
innovation. 
 
 
                                                 
44 Some things need step-change improvements in technology, others though don’t: much 
energy efficiency of housing would use available technologies, as well delivery of medical care 
to the poor, etc. The issue is primarily the performance of systems; the question of the need for 
breakthroughs in technology should be formulated in terms of whether some component within 
the system is a critical structural “hole”, into which S&T investment could be poured to 
transform the whole system’s performance.  
 
45 Think for example at how different national rules for reimbursement in public health care 
systems make markets for new biomedical technologies sub-critical, particularly for start-ups. 
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2.2 Rationale for a societal challenge re-orientation of European 
research and innovation policy 
 
There are a number of reasons which explain the timing of this re-orientation.  
First, the Challenges are both real and important, and it is unlikely that they can 
be solved without a co-ordinated approach. 
Second, such an approach can provide a strong driver for improved policy 
coordination, particularly between research policy and innovation policy, which 
is in Europe a particularly difficult and unsolved issue. 
Third, addressing Societal Challenges seems a sensible response to the 
increasing social demand for relevance and impact of research, as well as for 
global justice for all. The approach can increase the legitimacy of science and 
technology and investments therein, and foster better relations between the 
scientific communities and the public opinion46. 
Fourth, Europe has strengths in many relevant scientific areas (e.g. in energy 
research, climate change, virology, epidemiology, food science) and is also 
internationally competitive in areas of technology that seem likely to underpin 
successful attacks on these challenges (e.g. renewable energies, waste recycling, 
water management, urban transport, vaccines). This means that, if large world 
markets do emerge to address societal issues, Europe can play a leading role 
and expect to benefit, provided it is properly organised and equipped to do so. 
 
A Societal Challenge dimension would, in other words add a new objective to 
public policy, whereby research and innovation are seen not as ends in 
themselves, but as a means to a wider goal, defined as a societal benefit. The 
aim would be to foster those activities that have greatest impact on achieving 
the societal challenge, and not necessarily to increase research and improve 
innovation across the board. In contrast to existing policies, this approach 
implies a focus which is neither horizontal nor sectoral, but defined by the 
societal challenge, i.e. involving the mix of different sectors, markets and other 
actors that can bring about the changes needed to achieve the challenge. The 
relevant actors would include companies in various sectors, but also encompass 
                                                 
46 Notwithstanding that there always will remain areas of intense conflict even with respect to 
the legitimacy of science in relation to societal challenges. That is why the EG also prefers the 
use of the word Societal as opposed to Grand. The control of global warming is a good case in 
point. Global warming is undoubtedly a major global Societal Challenge, but it has not 
legitimated the science of climate research in the eyes of the public, on the contrary. The danger 
here is that the greater its social salience, the larger the number of voluble people who might 
say global warming is a plot by the conspiracy to create world government.  
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those involved in innovation in public sector and public services, and in setting 
demand side and regulatory and market frameworks that support innovation47. 
 
However, if the notion of Societal Challenge is not to be purely rhetorical or to 
serve as a catch-all redefinition of industrial and applied R&D, its meaning 
must be closely linked to the idea of some more societal, demand-driven or 
mission-led innovation policy. While the original formulation of mission-led 
policies was developed after the Second World War and dealt with critical or 
strategic technologies, the current approach is clearly different48. The following 
features appear particularly relevant (Gassler et al, 2008, pp. 214-15): 
- the identification of thematic fields is not done following technology 
push approaches, but by combining societal needs with inputs from the 
technological community; 
- priority setting is no longer a top down, centralized process, but an 
inclusive process involving many social actors, including those who will 
carry out the actual R&D; 
- the diffusion of results to a large audience (not the appropriation by 
large contractors) is critical; 
- incremental innovation and non-technological innovation are recognized 
as crucial (as opposed to the major technology breakthroughs demanded 
by the old sorts of mission-oriented policies). 
In short, while the definition of a Societal Challenge will be made at a rather 
macroscopic level – the objectives or challenges are so to say “large-grained” – 
the microscopic choices about the kind of “fine-grained” technologies to be 
developed and innovations will be left for markets to determine. So the policy 
focus has to be not on specific technologies and designs but on broad societal 
needs and systemic problems and on how to define the approach to these 
problems and sustain this approach over extended periods. 
 
                                                 
47 Again, the debate on Societal Challenges still has to take place within the research policy 
community. One might wonder why we haven’t had a Societal Challenge focus in S&T 
programs before? The political problem surrounding any policy vis-à-vis any attempt at 
designing a Societal Challenge policy (as discussed in more detail in the Appendix) is that 
resources are scarce and one would have to rank order the Societal Challenges by (a) their 
social priority and (b) the cost of solution – under alternative states of knowledge, which 
implies alternative dated ordering. Since the distribution of benefits of the actions justified will 
not be neutral with respect to the ordering of the priorities, there will be conflicts that with 
impugn the science, and the social science predictions of costs and payoffs.  Innovation, as 
common goal is wonderful because everyone can declare that it is good – and then compete to 
get the funding.  Diffusion policy which is central with respect to Societal Challenges is of a 
totally different nature: each societal challenge will call for decisions about diffusion.  
48 Actually some first ideas developed for the EC can be found in Soete and Arundel (1993) 
highlighting amongst others the importance of diffusion policies.  
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Historical examples amongst others from the US suggest that this will 
ultimately have to include strong political support. As Mowery (2006) has 
forcefully argued: in the case of the US government’s success in “funding the 
ICT revolution”, this was clearly based on a large consensus that this field was 
a high priority government “mission” in terms of national security; while 
conversely the US repeated failures in energy R&D programmes can be traced 
back to the lack of a strong link between R&D public spending in this area and 
any (federal) government mission that had broad political support. 
 
The substantial hurdles involved are illustrated by many, well-known failures in 
European mission-oriented policy initiatives, as well as by the additional 
problem of political fragmentation in Europe.   
 
One may think of the following:  
- The policies for national or European champions in Information 
Technology in the 1980s failed miserably, with almost all national 
leaders disappearing from the market, or reducing their operations, in 
any case never reaching a leadership position (e.g. Bull, Olivetti, ICL, 
Nixdorf); 
- Government-led informatisation plans had a significant impact in terms 
of technological learning, but usually failed to deliver the expected 
results (e.g. Minitel in France); 
- Large infrastructures have often been subject to huge increase in costs 
and substantive delays in implementation (e.g. ITER); 
- High Definition TV (a digital-analog technology) was at the centre of a 
large mission-led research programme, which was based on the wrong 
assumption that the rival technology, all-digital TV, would not be ready 
to enter the market. When all-digital TV entered the market, the whole 
HDTV suddenly became obsolete; 
- Cross-European public-private partnership rules in terms of profit 
sharing and responsibilities have been proved to be difficult to establish, 
as the failure of Galileo as a joint initiative has shown; 
- Government and region-led policies aimed at developing the 
biotechnology industry in a short time frame did not fully succeed in 
establishing a self-sustainable, long term-competitive industry  
- Major government-driven initiatives may fail to attract equivalent 
interest among key stakeholders (the UK’s digital infrastructure for 
healthcare; some of the programme-integration initiatives introduced 
with the sixth Framework Programme). 
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In a certain sense, most policy initiatives failed to deliver the expected results, 
and most results came either from lack of explicit policy at the European level 
or from unintended consequences of policies. 
 
What this shows, is that ultimately no “grand” challenge can be translated into 
the formation of an appropriate coalition of stakeholders committed to 
significant public and private R&D effort without there also being a broad 
political consensus, which in the European case must involve national 
stakeholders. Furthermore, the private sector will only respond to the incentives 
created by public policies to the extent that the policies are perceived as being 
credible, lasting and reasonably stable and otherwise fit within established 
patterns of business risk.  
 
At the same time, the good news is that after the “wars against communism and 
against cancer” as effective mechanisms for mobilizing abundant resources 
towards R&D, the case for large programmes in the area of environment and 
energy is now stronger than ever; most controversial discussions have been 
closed. One is now approaching a time of much wider political consensus 
regarding problems and solutions, with the EC having actually taken the lead 
with its SET plan. Increasingly the environment and energy crisis is being seen 
as a threat to the whole world, not just the richest countries (Soete, 2009). Two 
additional features help to make a good case for environment and energy R&D 
and technologies being one of the most attractive targets for large programmes 
and strategic initiatives: 
 
- First, there is an increasing awareness that R&D in these domains is 
becoming a central issue (Arrow et al. 2008; Klemperer, 2008; 
Rosenberg, 2005; Stern, 2006); 
- Second, the areas of business activities related to environment and 
energy are starting to represent an attractive source of entrepreneurial 
opportunities: market forecasts show that global demand for clean 
technology and environmentally friendly technology is likely to boom 
over the next decades. 
 
As argued above, as a “grand” Societal Challenge, the environment-energy-
climate crisis represents the perfect case for mobilizing research resources and 
capacities across the EU. At the same time, it is important to develop sound 
explanations for success and failures in developing such Societal Challenges 
based policies, supported by theory. Contrary to the examples given above, 
Europe cannot afford further major failures today in this area.  
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2.3. Non-neutral policies, distortion and programme design  
 
One important condition for the success of policy addressing a Societal 
Challenge within the European context will be the ability to shift resources 
across European stakeholders to more productive use whenever possible, that is 
to influence not only the rate but also the direction of innovation and technical 
change. 
 
This condition implies a non-neutral allocation process with respect to areas for 
focus and sectors. Departing from neutrality is always dangerous since it 
implies guessing future technological and market developments. So a central 
question concerns “programme design”: how to make these large mission-
oriented programmes less vulnerable to government failures such as wrong 
choices and winner-picking (see also Aghion, David and Foray 2008)49. 
 
A first principle is relatively straightforward: it is crucial to be non-neutral in 
identifying a very broad agenda while being neutral vis-à-vis specific 
applications and approaches. Mowery and Simcoe (2002) emphasized this point 
when analyzing US federal policies about Internet: federal agencies always 
tried to avoid the pre-definition of technology architectures and design but 
rather allowed the market to discover the best technologies. However, and as is 
also well-known, the “technology” of the internet was neither designed nor 
selected by the market, but rather developed and originally deployed in 
ARPANET and imposed through NSFnet in 1987, which subsequently opened 
for private commercial use. “Neutrality with respect to commercial 
applications” proved to be a wise policy principle of the US governmental 
agencies in contrast to efforts of other governments, such as the French Minitel 
programme or Britain’s national champion policy. In these cases, and in 
particular the Minitel case, the policy errors covered not just innovation but also 
diffusion policy: what became crucially problematic was the French decision to 
totally subsidize its diffusion, thereby entrenching the system and creating a 
temporary obstacle to the entry of general purpose computers. 
 
Other principles for mitigating distortions created by the provision of subsidies 
to favoured firms, industries, and other organized interests are quite 
straightforward: 
 
Complementarities with competition policy as argued below will be central as 
well as agency independence in providing grants, use of peer review with clear 
criteria for project selection, payment based on progress and outputs rather than 
                                                 
49 In Appendix 2.1, an example of European programme design is proposed.  
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cost recovery. Such programmes also have to be designed in order to foster the 
entry of new firms in emerging industries as well as building on existing 
commercial strengths - and not only to help the large firms already in place. 
 
There has been a lot of discussion in the US about the failure to commercialize 
the results of mission-oriented R&D programmes. Beyond the general problem 
that many of these results concerned technologies with limited civilian 
applications, there is also clearly a conflict between the mission requirements of 
funding agencies and the feasibility of commercializing technologies developed 
for these agency needs: awards are required to support research that meets the 
needs of the awarding agencies, yet products under so-called “dual 
procurement’ policies adopted by the U.S. Defence Department in the 1980s 
developed under the programme are expected to be successful in the 
commercial marketplace. Thus, there may be a conflict between the goals of 
procurement and innovation (Mowery, 2007). 
 
Organizing the allocation of resources in this way will not necessarily produce 
the “big push” (Murphy et al., 1989). Generating a “big push” requires not only 
an understanding of the basic principles of coordination problems but also 
getting a detailed grasp of the externalities and the innovative 
complementarities involved so as to create incentives and allocate resources at 
the right “places” for maximizing pecuniary externalities and leverage effects.  
 
For example, since technological progress requires both research and the 
substantial learning achieved through development and deployment, R&D 
programmes should not be planned in isolation from practical application50. 
R&D may be required to make even a relatively well-developed technology 
suitable for particular applications and attempts to make practical use of a 
technology may reveal points where additional R&D would be most productive 
(Arrow et al., 2008). 
                                                 
50 See in particular the point made in the theoretical literature on the diffusion of innovations 
published in the 1980’s by economists such as David and Stoneman; e.g. David (2006: Part 3). 
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2.4 Policy “grand” challenges in Societal Challenges  
 
There are several issues that deserve closer attention if we want European 
governments and the European Commission to build research and innovation 
policies around Societal Challenges. These include in particular the three 
following challenges: the articulation of final use; the problem of technological 
uncertainty and the impact on competition. These points require more 
elaborated theoretical treatment and innovations in the design of policies. 
 
Articulation of final use  
 
First of all, demand-driven policies suppose the ability of government, or an 
agent on behalf of the government (e.g. an agency) to be able to deploy a fully 
articulated plan that moves backward from expected social results to technology 
development. In doing this, the role of demand, as materialized in final users is 
crucial. Final users refer here to both consumers and professional users. The 
literature on the social dimensions of technology, on human-machine 
interaction, and on user-experience and interaction design has shown how the 
adoption and use of technology is dependent on social processes of 
legitimation, practice, learning and intimacy51. An approach based on top down, 
or technology push models of innovation makes little sense here. Users must, in 
other words, be involved in Societal Challenges. 
 
However, in most cases, there is no demand in the sense of economic theory, 
but only a need, often a latent need. People would like to have less congestion 
in cities, but there are few examples of markets for rights to less congestion, nor 
is there a clear willingness to pay for such a desired state of affairs (selective 
motorway tolls are perhaps one example, but this example hardly required 
extensive R&D). Aged people would like to have a less stressing daily life, but 
this is made up of dozens of disparate activities, each of which has to be 
examined in detail. 
 
In addition, it is well known from marketing science and from the literature on 
product innovation that the stronger the innovation, the lower the ability of 
customers to spell out the desired attributes of products or services. Asking 
people is not a solution, because they are likely to tell you something very 
similar to what they see in their everyday life. People perceive the need, but this 
is not enough to articulate the demand side of the problem, particularly if the 
demand will come from a new generation of users. 
                                                 
51 See Dourish (2001), Oudshoorn and Pinch (2003), McCarthy and Wright (2004), and 
Suchman (2007). 
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Historically, demand-driven innovation policies have been most successful in 
the case of military procurement. More recently, von Hippel has shown that in 
private markets it is possible to obtain quite careful information of future 
products by addressing not the large mass of customers, or potential customers, 
but a small group of clever and active users, called lead users (von Hippel, 
1988). 
 
However, demand-driven innovation benefits in the military field and in the 
case of lead users share a number of key features that are not found in Societal 
Challenges: 
- users are relatively small number, have a clear professional and social 
identity, can be accessed by producers in a focused and segmented way; 
- users are involved in the use of technology very frequently and with 
high intensity (physical, motivational, emotional); 
- users become able to define the desired functions of technologies in 
quite abstract terms and to decompose functions into sub-functions (task 
decomposition); 
- users are also able to translate desired functions into well defined 
performances, using an appropriate technical language; 
- users have good command of the system-of-use, so that they can 
manage network externality effects, coming from the interaction 
between individual use of several people, reasonably well. 
Under these conditions demand-driven innovation policies can indeed target a 
population of users, understand their needs in a quite detailed way, project them 
onto the future, and use their knowledge to develop future targets for research 
plans and for innovation goals52. 
 
All these features are not present in societal demands. 
 
Here the needs are diffused among million people, who use technologies in an 
episodic or non-professional way, have implicit and dispersed knowledge about 
the use, and cannot articulate their demand for better solutions. Accessing users 
is painful, slow and expensive. Even worse, the ability of users to articulate the 
needs verbally is quite limited; so many traditional social science research tools 
are of limited help, not to say deliberative procedures. 
 
                                                 
52 But of course there are many other public sector demands than just “military procurement”. 
In the EU, more than in the US, public service organizations, including health care, and 
educational services, as well as local authority housing, public-private urban amenity programs, 
and most of the ground transportation sector other than automotive vehicles represent an 
enormous “market”. The central problem seems here to coordinate and inform this demand 
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Societal Challenges comprise literally hundreds potential products or services, 
all of which suffer, more or less, from the problem of articulating the final use 
and building reasonable technology roadmaps backward from it53. 
 
A simple technology push approach is in other words not appropriate, because 
social demand is not already out there, but is created in a complex and open 
interaction with technology and public policy. In this area, further 
advancements in methodologies are needed. 
 
A number of companies have addressed this difficulty through use of 
systematic scenario building and foresight exercises.  A range of approaches 
exist, with different strengths and weaknesses.  It is appropriate to mention 
Shell’s long-term use of (non-technological) scenario planning to provide a 
shared understanding within the corporation of the socio-political context for 
future energy demand, and Siemens’ “Pictures of the Future” which link 
forward thinking based on roadmaps with “retropolation” of future markets and 
societal demand obtained from scenarios. 
 
Technological uncertainty 
 
Another crucial difficulty is the increase in technological uncertainty in the last 
few decades. The acceleration of the rate of technical progress implies an 
increase in the rate of uncertainty for long term programmes. During the 
deployment of the programme, new technologies appear that make old choices 
obsolete and earlier commitments a waste of money and time. But once 
expenditure has been committed, agents find it extremely difficult to make 
forward-looking decisions, ignoring the sunk costs54. Escalating commitment is 
the typical outcome, leading to huge cost increases or even the failure of policy. 
 
Technological uncertainty is also the result of a pattern of proliferation of 
hypotheses in underlying scientific bases, as can be found in many new areas, 
such as life science, materials science, or information science55. In most of these 
areas, technology and scientific discoveries proceed hand-in-hand. It would be 
impossible to develop engineering solutions without a deep and analytical 
                                                 
53 Perhaps an exception is the health care sector, in which final users may be unable to spell out 
the characteristics of new solutions, but hospitals and producers of equipment can be involved 
in a user-driven innovation process. As a matter of fact, anyway, association of patients already 
play a great role in advancing some medical technologies.  
54 Witness the widespread pride in Victorian infrastructures, despite evidence of their 
wastefulness and inefficiency. 
55 The notion of proliferation is introduced in Bonaccorsi (2008) and developed in van 
Besselaer and Laredo (2009), and Bonaccorsi and Vargas (2009), while Kiss et al. (2009) deal 
with a similar problem. 
 110 
understanding of the properties of matter, but that analytical understanding 
often involves the use of better technology. In many cases, scientific experiment 
proceeds through reverse engineering of nature, so that artificial manipulation 
and experimental observation cannot be separated. Under these conditions, new 
hypotheses are continuously generated in scientific laboratories, and many 
technological options are consequently opened. 
 
Thus there is only one established technological trajectory in microelectronics, 
based on silicon technology, but there are still many options open in nano-
electronics, based on discoveries in quantum physics about electronic properties 
of engineered material configurations of many different materials at the 
nanoscale56. As another example, there are few technological options when 
dealing with turbines, but there are many alternatives when developing solar 
energy cells based on new materials such as polymers.  
 
After the emergence of these science-based technologies, it would be 
meaningless to base innovation policies for societal challenges on more 
manageable but older technologies. But managing nowadays science-based 
technologies is a great difficulty. 
 
Technological uncertainty increases the option value of waiting. It is better to 
wait until further research has eliminated inferior alternatives and possibly 
created new options. But this makes the management of mission-oriented 
technology policies increasingly difficult and complex.  
 
Technological uncertainty magnifies a peculiar problem in mission-led policies, 
i.e. the trade-off between commitment and flexibility, as examined in the large 
literature on contracts and procurement in economic theory. On one hand, one 
would like to have investment commitment from firms willing to develop new 
technologies in the expectation to gain large market shares. On the other hand, 
it is hard to anticipate the evolution of technology, so that it is wise to keep 
resources flexible and avoid lock-in along obsolete technological trajectories. 
Or, put in another way, on the one hand, one wants to avoid ‘picking winners’, 
while at the same time reassuring firms that there will be sufficient demand in 
                                                 
56 Witness this state of affairs the last edition of the Semiconductor Technology Roadmap, the 
main document used by the semiconductor industry to align their technological expectations for 
the next 10-15 years. While the dominant technological trajectory (the Moore’s law) has been 
followed (or shaped) consistently for decades, the scenarios are much more uncertain in the 
next decades.  The more we move down the nanoscale, the larger the scientific uncertainty over 
the physical and electrical properties of materials, the more difficult it is to foresee industrial 
investment. Interestingly, one of the most predictable industry becomes subject to strong 
uncertainty (Delemarle and Larédo, 2009). 
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the future for their technologies. One way to achieve this, appropriate in certain 
circumstances, is by setting forward-looking standards, such as governments 
have done recently in respect of building codes and in setting phase-out dates 
for incandescent lighting. There is also the need to prevent markets from 
developing “excess momentum” in situations where there are strong positive 
feedbacks arising from demand-side externalities. In such cases the option value 
of “delaying” the emergence of a de facto industry standard is large, but a 
passive policy of “waiting” is ineffectual. Positive procurement strategies to 
maintain competition between the leading technical alternatives is required 
(David, 1987). 
 
The central question within the debate on Societal Challenges is ultimately how 
to achieve compatibility between top-down initiatives and a market-driven 
resource allocation logic that allows for “multiple decentralized experiments”. 
The logic of a “grand” Societal Challenge programme trying to impose 
predefined technologies would dissipate the extraordinary power of a free 
market economy in boosting a very large number of experiments to discover the 
best technologies. And this is precisely the result one does not want to see. As 
Rosenberg (1987) put it in a now famous article: “in the context of activities 
that are immersed in a high degree of uncertainty, capitalism provides multiple 
sources of decision-making and initiative, as well as strong incentives for 
proceeding one step at a time. The notion that planning and centralization of 
decision-making are efficient is the opposite of the truth when there is a high 
degree of uncertainty and when goals and objectives cannot be clearly defined. 
One of the less-heralded but considerable virtues of competitive capitalism has 
been the speed with which firms have unsentimentally cut their losses as it 
became apparent that a particular direction of research was unlikely to prove 
fruitful. Where funds come from the public sector, by contrast, monies are likely 
to be spent much longer on unpromising avenues”. 
 
This is what one would not want to lose by building a Societal Challenge 
programme: the historical creativity of capitalism as an institutional mechanism 
to encourage innovation in a context of centrality and pervasiveness of 
uncertainty, as well as the specific ways in which decentralized markets handle 
the risks associated with the search for new technologies. At the same time, the 
recent empirical evidence also highlights that firms quickly cut their losses by 
abandoning major R&D projects in defence more quickly than was the case in 
public non-military R&D. In the latter, a commitment to demonstrating 
performance under field conditions is often compelling. In the literature on 
corporate R&D, one of the themes that has figured in the literature on the 
advantages of Joint Research Ventures is that the involvement of teams from 
more than one firm weakens the resistance of research managers to abandoning 
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projects that their labs had initiated.  This does not mean that similar inertia 
would not arise in public sector R&D projects; rather, it suggests the need for 
some experimentation with joint research “ventures” between public research 
agencies in different EU member states.  
 
Being non-neutral in identifying a broad agenda is compatible and coherent 
with being neutral vis-à-vis specific applications. This is why generic 
instruments (subsidies, tax credits and programmes aiming at increasing private 
R&D returns) have, in principle, to be available to all firms that exhibit the wish 
to develop innovations that are in line with e.g. climate change amelioration 
goals. The goal is to make this area of research and innovation as profitable as 
possible for private investors, but the challenge nonetheless remains to ensure 
the desired outcome and not merely encourage grant-seeking behaviour. 
 
 
Internal market policy 
 
Mission-oriented policies often require the involvement of large, multi-
technology companies. The solution of largely diffused, socially relevant issues 
requires operations that are widely deployed, requiring competences that are 
normally associated with large companies. Think for example of industries such 
as energy generation and transportation, infrastructures, electrical equipment, 
transport, but also medical instrumentation. 
 
In many sectors, these companies operate in custom or semi-custom markets, 
addressing specific demands formulated in complex technical documents, such 
as Request for Proposal (RFP), or Request for Quotation (RFQ). Historically, 
most of these companies grew from national markets, addressing largely public 
demand at national and local level.  
 
An extremely effective way for protecting national markets has been through 
controlling technical specifications. In many subtle ways (e.g. sharing technical 
consultants, hiring former employees from government, influencing technical 
culture) governments and companies have shaped the demand in favourable 
ways, and have silently created formidable barriers to entry to foreign 
competitors. Multinationals adopt a range of strategies in response, including 
establishing national subsidiaries, usually with large employment, and 
participating in initiatives to boost national R&D capabilities. One of the most 
effective ways to protect market share has been to get access to top level 
technical decision making in customer organizations. 
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It is honest to admit that this state of affairs has not changed greatly in Europe 
after the advent of Maastricht Treaty. Although official figures are not 
available, a reasonable estimate based on expert views of the share of public 
procurement at national level that goes to foreign companies is in the range of 
few percentage points.  
 
Why is this state of affair a problem for Societal Challenges? Because there is a 
striking conflict between, on one hand, market and technological uncertainty 
associated to large societal challenges, and on the other the need to manage 
business risk associated with large companies’ strategic decisions. The 
probability to mobilize large private investment into R&D for addressing 
societal challenges is larger if the final market is less fragmented and more 
certain. Yet this state of affairs is also a strong obstacle for the entry of new 
innovative firms or start ups in addressing these needs. For example, these firms 
may be deterred from entering into public procurement procedures if these are 
designed in order to favour large incumbents at national levels. The experience 
of SBIR in the USA, and of related schemes in Europe (e.g. SBRI in UK, SBIR 
in the Netherlands) strongly suggest that start up firms and small innovative 
firms may greatly contribute to the solution of social needs, but also that they 
are subject to severe constraints, that require explicit policy interventions to be 
removed. 
 
 
2.5 The dilemma of societal challenges and a Stage-Gate policy 
model 
 
For the reasons outlined above, purely demand-driven policies of the Societal 
Challenges type are faced with a dilemma. On the one hand, companies do not 
invest in the widespread deployment of new applications until there is sufficient 
certainty over questions such as technology, regulation and market. On the 
other hand, defining the technology too early, or worse, allowing companies to 
define the technology in a collusive way without sufficient expertise from 
government on behalf of the potential purchaser, leads to wrong decisions. 
The only solution to this dilemma is a clear separation between stages with 
different goals, funding schemes and governance, keeping users involved since 
the early stages, and maintaining options open as long as possible. 
  
This idea is at the basis of the Lead Market Initiative (LMI) recently launched 
by the Commission, but still has to be strengthened and generalized57. 
                                                 
57 The lead market area's webpage http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/leadmarket/leadmarket.htm 
gives a detailed description of the market area. The Commission Staff Working Document 
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Key features of the six lead market areas identified in the LMI are: 
• They are highly innovative 
• The aim is not “to pick winners”, nor to artificially create a market for a 
given technology or pre-empt the development of other competing 
options. Therefore, the lead market areas are quite broad. They are not 
dependent on or focusing on a single product or single technology. 
These markets already have a strong technology and industry base in 
Europe. 
• The assessment of the market potential and of the demand side 
(including of users’ needs) is a crucial point. The market potential of 
these markets, both inside and outside the EU, will be largely demand-
driven, while less technology-pushed. 
• The six market segments provide solutions of broader strategic, societal, 
environmental and economic challenges. 
• The growth of these market areas depends, more than other markets, on 
the creation of favourable framework conditions through public policy 
actions. 
Lead markets are a subset of markets that can be created through the solution to 
societal challenges. As such, they offer a promising start to addressing the 
overall challenge. At the same time, the LMI typically does not allocate 
additional resources but mainly uses soft policy tools, such as inter-
governmental coordination, standard setting and regulatory reviews, and has a 
supply-side orientation. The idea here is to place societal challenges firmly 
within the budget allocations of national and European programmes for 
research, as well as of Structural Funds. 
The problem we address here is how to generalize this approach by linking in a 
more systematic way the research activity carried out under the European 
Commission responsibility, using its various tools, and the innovation and 
diffusion activities, and ideally to couple this with the larger resources available 
at national level. This will require: 
 
- a stronger governance within the European Union 
                                                                                                                                  
COM (2007) 860 final SEC (2007) 1729 presents the methodology used for the identification of 
the markets.  
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- a clear articulation of relative roles and responsibilities of the 
Commission and of Member States along the implementation 
path 
- an innovative use of Structural Funds 
- strong buy-in from research and innovation actors. 
 
In Appendix 2.1, we provide a general framework as illustration and propose a 
specific way of how this could be implemented into the current institutional 
framework of the European Commission and of the Member States, based on a 
Stage-Gate policy model. 
 
 
2.6 The new role of public procurement 
 
The role of Societal Challenge as strategic priorities for EU research policy fits 
nicely with the recent focus on innovation policy on the role of public 
procurement. In recent years this theme has gained recognition at EU level and 
in some Member States, with a number of promising experiences already 
reported (Edler and Georghiou, 2007). 
 
To start with, in 2003 the Research Investment Plan included public 
procurement for innovation as an element to contribute to the 3 % Barcelona 
target.  Then the theme was mentioned in several prominent policy documents, 
such as the Kok Report on the Lisbon strategy in 2004, the mid-term review of 
the Lisbon strategy in 2005 and the Report of the Aho Group in 2006. Thus in a 
few years the issue gained top level recognition and policy attention. 
 
In parallel, both DG Enterprise and DG Research commissioned studies on 
various dimensions of procurement (Edler et al, 2005; Wilkinson et al., 2005), 
followed by various initiatives, such as PRO INNO, INNOVA STEPPIN, and 
the Open Method of Coordination PTP project (OMC-PTP, 2009). The above 
mentioned Lead market initiative (LMI) is another key element of a renewed 
interest, as well as the intense preparatory work carried out by the DG 
Enterprise with governments and procurement agencies. 
 
This effort culminated in December 2007 with the publication of the 
Communication Pre-commercial Procurement: Driving innovation to ensure 
sustainable high quality public services in Europe (European Commission, 
2007a).  This highly innovative document and the related Commission Staff 
Working Document (European Commission, 2007b) articulate a framework by 
which the procurement of innovative solutions can be made attractive for 
private companies, while at the same time be compatible with regulation of 
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State aid and competition policy. Pre-commercial procurement is defined as 
“procurement of R&D services that involves risk-benefit sharing at market 
conditions and in which a number of companies develop in competition new 
solutions for mid- to long-term public sector needs. The needs are so 
technologically demanding and in advance of what the market can offer that 
either no commercially stable solution exists yet, or existing solutions exhibit 
shortcomings which require new R&D. By allocating R&D benefits and risks 
between public purchasers and companies in such a way as to encourage wide 
commercialisation and take-up of R&D results, more beneficial time to market 
conditions are created allowing both the public sector to introduce innovations 
faster and industry to be the first to exploit new lead markets.”  
 
By using pre-commercial procurement it would be possible for governments to 
buy new solutions without being stuck in the dilemma between buying far-
from-market R&D services and distorting competition, by exploiting the 
exception of article 16f of the Directive 2004/18/EC on public procurement. 
 
As the OMC-PRP Report makes clear, in fact, “Pre-commercial procurement 
will normally be organised in a way that is different from a regular 
procurement. The underlying reason is that in pre-commercial procurement 
there is still a technology risk due to the development effort required before an 
innovation can be made commercially available. This also implies that pre-
commercial procurement includes the need for a strong interaction between the 
demand and the supply side, this interaction seems stronger than is needed 
within the standard commercial procurement procedures. The main 
characteristic of innovation/technology is the potential it creates to improve 
operations and productivity and the functionality it offers to solve problems that 
are out of reach of existing traditional technology. Against the upside potential 
there is a downside risk for technical failure when spending money in 
developing (supply side) and acquiring (demand side) innovative 
products/services.” (OMC-PTP, 2009, p. 53). 
After pre-commercial procurement standard rules for public procurement may 
apply. At this stage, however, lot of uncertainty has been reduced, all actors are 
more informed, and expectations on the rate of return to investment will be 
more realistic. 
 
It is important to note that the European Parliament has endorsed the 
Communication, with a Resolution dated February 3 whose text is particularly 
strong and encouraging. The Parliament “considers that pre-commercial 
procurement constitutes an under-exploited driver of innovation-led growth for 
the EU with significant potential to achieve high-quality and readily accessible 
public services for example healthcare and transport, as well as to address the 
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social challenges of climate change, sustainable energy and an ageing 
population”, and “regrets that many public authorities are not aware of the 
potential of pre-commercial procurement and do not yet act as “intelligent 
customers” (European Parliament, 2009). 
 
A careful combination between research programmes, innovation and 
framework conditions policies, and pre-commercial procurement on the part of 
national and regional governments, might indeed create a strong platform for 
addressing Societal Challenges. 
  
 
2.7 Conclusions: structuring a policy response to Societal 
Challenges 
 
Based on a shared European vision and consensus, what does one want to 
achieve? Not really inventing a new helicopter or any kind of pre-defined 
technology that does not yet exist. The goal is rather, and limiting ourselves 
here to the ideal case of a Societal Challenge to promote a large area of “climate 
change – ameliorating innovations (health - or water supply - or nutrition -)” 
where the EU can develop a comparative advantage. The problem as argued 
above is not so much one of selecting the right technology, but making such 
activities (like “climate change ameliorating innovations”) as profitable as 
possible so that competitive entry (entrepreneurships) and intrapreneurial 
activities will occur, and this is central to mainstream research planning and 
innovation policy. A main goal therefore is to increase the rate of return on 
R&D in the particular fields through a concerted set of actions in order to 
generate positive responses from the private sector. 
 
In what sense is a policy addressing a Societal Challenge different from a 
classic policy that is designed to address chronic underinvestment in R&D on 
decentralized markets? In the latter class of policy, the main goal is to increase 
the rate of technical change while in the former the goal is to influence both the 
rate and the direction of technical changes.58 This is what makes the designing 
of such kind of policy difficult and… a “grand” challenge.  
  
As argued in this Chapter, some good documentation about federal US policies 
which were successful in preparing (and advancing knowledge toward) the 
Internet revolution is illustrative here (Blumenthal, 1998; Mowery and Simcoe, 
2002; Mowery, 2006; 2007). Such policies involved a set of concerted and 
                                                 
58 To borrow the title of the famous NBER 1962 book offering many seminal contributions in 
our field. 
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(loosely) coordinated actions on both the supply and the demand side of a 
broadly predefined agenda: 
- to create and expand the required “knowledge infrastructure” (human 
capital, science, technology and engineering capabilities); 
- to induce the private sector to respond positively to government policy 
by making the new domain as attractive as possible to for-profit 
organizations; 
- to encourage the creation of a market for the new technologies through 
public procurement and adoption policies. 
  
When analyzing the reasons for the success of the Internet revolution in the US, 
many experts frequently overlook decades of federal expenditures through DoD 
and other agencies to develop the knowledge infrastructure and human capital. 
A central component of any response to a Societal Challenge is therefore 
building the fundamental capacity to perform research in the future and ensure 
the mobility and use of the knowledge and skills that are created. This includes 
steps to promote the training of scientists and engineers, to rejuvenate 
laboratory capabilities in universities and other PROs, to establish programmes 
to disseminate research information for example through internships, 
postdoctoral fellowships and exchange programmes, both intra-European and 
between Europe and the rest of the world, and to foster the development of 
environments that promote the concentration of so-called “related variety”59.  
 
The generation of an adequate supply of knowledge, ideas and instruments as 
well as highly skilled people and receptive environments for collaboration and 
problem-solving activities constitutes a central pillar of any structured response 
to a Societal Challenge. Even a generous programme of R&D subsidies offered 
to private companies will fail to produce more innovation and faster growth if 
the knowledge infrastructure fails to provide an adequate supply of the various 
knowledge assets and adequate competition. Without an abundant supply of 
basic knowledge, human capital and academic and inter-corporate 
collaborations, private investors in this area are at risk.  
 
Government R&D policy should also encourage more risk-taking and tolerate 
failures that could provide valuable information. This can be accomplished by 
adopting parallel project funding and management strategies and by shifting the 
mix of R&D investment towards more exploratory R&D that is characterized 
by greater uncertainty in the distribution of project payoffs. 
 
                                                 
59 Hence the link with the proposed ERA reforms, see Chapter 2. 
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Not only is the promotion of scientific capabilities important, but also the 
development of engineering capabilities: the willingness of private industry to 
commit financial resources to scientific research is considerably increased by 
the progress of the appropriate engineering disciplines. Strong engineering 
capabilities are also a mechanism to ensure that endogeneity kicks in, i.e. to 
make universities and public RTOs fully responsive to the technological and 
scientific needs of industry in the Societal Challenge related areas of R&D.  
 
Public policies supporting innovations have proven especially effective when 
funding for R&D was combined with complementary policies supporting the 
adoption of innovation. As noted in a recent paper by Mowery (2009), the 
presence or absence of complementary procurement policies is an important 
factor mediating the economic effects of strategic/mission-oriented 
programmes. Many of the widely cited “spin-off” benefits of post-war US 
defence-related R&D spending have as much to do with the scale and structure 
of the procurement programmes that accompanied them as with the structure of 
the R&D programmes themselves. The lack of such procurement programmes 
in other mission areas, such as energy (because of the lack of federal 
responsibility), has arguably reduced the effectiveness of US mission-oriented 
R&D programmes in the field. (It will therefore be important to ensure that the 
steps taken in Europe to liberalise the energy market do not similarly hamper 
implementation.) 
 
In the area of climate change, the improvement in the energy efficiency of 
public sector building and transport systems is a good example of an important 
area of R&D investment that can generate near-term business innovation and 
private expenditures if the market for application is initially subsidized by 
public policy measures (David, 2009).  
 
In fact, analysis demonstrates that there are many climate-related initiatives that 
are potentially of low or negative cost, which nonetheless fail to be addressed 
under the constraints of current market structures and policies. Any R&D policy 
designed to address one of the global crises of our time (climate, energy, water, 
food, etc.) must activate a variety of instruments and mechanisms to create the 
needed knowledge infrastructure (human capital, science and engineering 
capabilities), encourage private sector expenditures through various kinds of 
incentives and demand-side initiatives and develop an EU comparative 
advantage in certain innovation areas (dealing with the problem).  
 
To conclude, there is certainly a conflict between the classic desirability of 
maintaining neutrality in technological choices in order to mitigate the usual 
distortions created by the provision of subsidies to favoured firms and 
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industries and the need to influence not only the rate but also the direction of 
technical change. One of the messages of the EG is that this conflict can be 
considerably diminished when each of these two needs is applied at the proper 
level of aggregation. Structuring a policy response to a Societal Challenge 
effectively and efficiently requires a fine policy mix, involving non- neutrality 
at the very general level of the identification of the challenge (to build a broad 
political consensus) and neutrality at the more specific level of the selection of 
R&D priorities and technologies within the large scope of operation defined by 
the Societal Challenge (to leave the market free to experiment and select). 
There is no logical necessity in the idea that government failure is always larger 
than market failure. 
 
The second message is that such a policy response to a Societal Challenge can 
prove valuable in three ways: 
- by rapidly addressing some of the great socio-economic and global 
problems; 
- by playing a contra-cyclical role during the current recession; and 
- finally by providing a new political support framework for European 
policy initiative pulling together and coordinating national policies in 
each of the 27 member states.  
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Appendix 2.1 Implementing a Stage-Gate 60 policy model for 
Societal Challenges61  
 
A2.1 General Framework  
 
The general idea is one of designing a new balance between flexibility and 
commitment.  
 
On the flexibility side, there is the idea of allowing entrants to come up with the 
best ideas, in an adaptive/evolutionary fashion, basically a dynamic and 
competitive market-based process. Furthermore and still on the flexibility side, 
there is also the idea of being able to stop projects that become negative net-
present-value projects, i.e. to avoid the so-called ‘soft budget constraint’ 
syndrome. At the same time, one must come up with a solution to avoid under-
investment from companies, or short-termism, if they anticipate the possibility 
that projects will be stopped, perhaps arbitrarily, before commercialisation is 
possible. 
 
A Stage-Gate model is a technique in which a (product, process, system) 
development process is divided into stages separated by gates. At each gate, the 
continuation of the development process is decided by (typically) a manager or 
a steering committee. The decision is based on the information available at the 
time, including e.g. business case, risk analysis, availability of necessary 
resources (money, people with correct competencies), etc. 
 
Without any attempt to impose a specific label, let us define the general stages 
of such a design as follows: 
(a) Exploration stage; 
(b) Finalisation stage; 
(c) Application stage. 
 
a) In the Exploration stage, new and radical ideas for how to address Societal 
challenges should be encouraged. There must be competition among all actors 
(public research, industry) and the results funded by European research money 
must be open and fully accessible. Exploration of all possible alternatives 
should be fostered, with no reverence to the established technologies or 
company positions, and sufficient public support for foresight exercises, 
scenario planning and technological road mapping. Data must be publicly 
                                                 
60 The term Stage-Gate® is a registered trademark of the Product Development Institute. 
61 This appendix is added as illustration of the principles which the EG considers essential when 
designing an appropriate policy model. It does not address the many technical details.  
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available, so that they can be used for further replication, validation and 
diffusion.  In this stage there is no need to force cooperative research. It should 
be possible for single research units or firms to submit a proposal. Research 
money should be quite limited, because there will be no large scale 
experimentation and testing. 
 
However, it is important to involve final users into early conceptual innovation 
experiments in this stage. New methods should be implemented, such as 
Functional Analysis for the generation of radically new ideas and Ethnographic 
observation for early detection of user issues. 
 
This activity must produce a clear Proof-of-Concept demonstration. 
 
At the end of the Exploration stage there should be a preliminary Technology 
Assessment gate. All options should be subject to independent evaluation and 
strengths and weaknesses should be clearly elucidated. Results of the 
Assessment should be public. The Technology Assessment should be done 
through peer review, even open peer review, and not delegated by a committee 
that does not take final responsibility on the final advice. 
 
The Technology Assessment exercise would be a gate, in the sense of 
suggesting the go/kill decision for the next stage. However, taking into account 
the probability of mistake, a small percentage of killed ideas (say 20%) should 
be permitted to resubmit. 
 
b) In the Finalisation stage, the formation of consortia or coalitions of actors 
should be encouraged. Actors would bring complementary technologies and 
would build complete system architectures of new solutions to Societal 
Challenges. 
 
Since the results of Stage 1 research are public, there would be a great 
opportunity for all participants to access the best available knowledge. 
However, at this stage there must still be strong competition. Several 
architectures must compete fiercely. It is not enough to have variety in the early 
conceptual stage; there is a need to have parallel exploration of all systemic 
problems down to the details of use of systems62. Therefore we should have 
several consortia, competing against each other to demonstrate the virtues of 
their systemic solutions. At this stage consortia may impose severe IPR 
restrictions. However, the EC should insist that all data referring to 
                                                 
62 Interestingly, this is the approach followed by the US Small Business Administration in 
managing the SBIR scheme for R&D in small firms, apparently with great success. 
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experimentation and testing should be made available, in order to avoid 
monopoly positions. Information on drawings and technical details, on the 
contrary, might be proprietary and protected. 
 
The Finalisation stage should include an extensive Field testing activity. Early 
users involved in the conceptual stage are not enough here. The Field testing 
stage should include Public Administrations, municipalities, local utilities, 
consumer associations, voluntary organizations, and the like in large scale 
social experimentation of the adoption of new technologies. 
 
All consortia should carry out these testing activities according to the same 
protocol. 
Furthermore, all consortia should provide certifications (CE) and quality 
standard compliances needed to operate in the market. No further substantial 
uncertainty should be left on the shoulders of the prospective buyers of these 
solutions. 
 
At the end of the Finalisation stage a final Technology Assessment exercise 
should be carried out.  Again, the results should be made public. The 
Assessment will illustrate the benefits for society of all options, as well as the 
costs and risks associated. 
 
c) For the Application stage we have a simple suggestion: use Public 
Procurement. National and regional Governments should take a commitment to 
buy those solutions that emerge positively from the second stage Technology 
Assessment. This commitment should be taken before the completion of stage 2 
(Finalisation), in order to give an incentive to all actors in competition to 
deliver better results. 
 
The EC should fund the Exploration and the Finalisation stage, but not the final 
Application stage. Systems must be ready to deliver their value in the final 
stage, so they should be ready for public procurement. Governments might 
adopt the specifications that come out from the Finalisation stage as the basis 
for their tenders. Those companies that received the best Assessment will have 
an advantage, because they have more experience with these specifications. 
However, it will also be possible for other companies to converge on the 
winning solution. 
 
Under certain circumstances, governments may also ask the winners of stage 2 
to share their technology, perhaps under licensing agreements, in order to 
enlarge the market. 
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We insist on the importance of public procurement at regional level. It will be 
easier for 3-4 regions across Europe, irrespective of their national policies, to 
agree on a common procurement policy. While national governments are 
committed to protect national companies, and might be reluctant to abandon 
their champions in favour of technologies developed abroad, regional 
governments may have more degrees of freedom. In areas such as 
environmental protection, health care, aged people, energy or mobility, regional 
governments have concurrent or exclusive legislation in many European 
countries. Regional public procurement is the next stage for demand-driven 
innovation policies. 
 
Simply committing governments on public procurement will have an enormous 
incentive value for companies. Their systems must perform appropriately, since 
there will be a though customer at the end. It will not be possible to develop 
prototype-type results, as it is still common in most technological research with 
European money. 
 
However, governments can make a commitment to procure new technologies 
only if they are proved. There must be a tremendous effort to deliver ready-to-
use systems, although adaptations will always be required. A full Life Cycle 
Management approach must be demonstrated.  
 
The Stage-Gate approach we suggest has several advantages: 
- it permits a reduction of uncertainty over time, both in 
technology and use conditions; 
- it allows continuous feedback from users, from early 
involvement in the Exploration stage to large scale field testing 
in the Finalisation stage, using most advanced techniques; 
- it gives incentives to researchers to explore wildly different 
solutions, in the hope their ideas will be picked up in further 
stages; 
- it gives incentives to companies to produce the best solutions, in 
the hope their products and services will be procured by 
governments; 
- it gives incentives to procure new technologies safely, because 
all experimentation and field testing activities have been carried 
out; 
- it does not offer any excuse for relaxed type of behaviour (i.e. 
developing unusable technology in the hope there will never be a 
“real” customer, and circumventing bureaucratic requirements); 
- it addresses rationally the issues of information asymmetry and 
technological uncertainty; 
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- it demands the Commission to concentrate financial resources in 
the upper stages, leaving the lower stage to governments, thus 
leveraging on scarce financial resources; 
- it leaves open the possibility of Art. 169 cooperation among 
countries, even without the involvement of all Member states, 
thus taking into considerations the differences in the need for 
public procurement across countries; 
- if public procurement projects have sufficient scale, it allows the 
formation of large markets, with adequate critical mass, that 
become attractive for private investors in the long term. 
 
It clearly requires a great deal of contractual and administrative innovation, as 
articulated below. 
 
A2.2 New policy approach and tools 
 
Alongside the Stage-Gate policy model, new tools for societal involvement 
must be explored. New participative and networking methods are increasingly 
used for these purposes, including groupware for supporting face-to-face 
interaction in scenario workshops, content analysis, mindmapping, and 
deliberative democracy tools. However, several authors note that “one problem 
in the foresight process lies in the tension between human stakeholders (the 
participative dimension) and technical expertise (employed in prospective 
studies and some planning tools). The issue is that increasingly sophisticated 
methodologies of futures analysis and planning may be hard to integrate with 
more participative activities” (Miles et al., 2008, p. 408). 
 
The point is that simply “asking society” is not adequate. When asked, society 
does not tell you what you need to drive policies. There is often a naïf argument 
in recent debates, according to which consultative, open, bottom up methods of 
society involvement into technology policy making are the solution. There is 
still a gulf between what society asks, and what should be done in technology 
and innovation policy making. Society is neither like military complex, nor like 
professional users.  
 
According to many authors, but also to authoritative policy fora (e.g. the 
European Commission Expert Group on Policy Mixes63) there is strong need 
for developing new policy tools at the interface between deliberative procedures 
aimed at involving users, stakeholders and citizens, and the technical expertise 
needed to make appropriate decisions in technology policy. 
                                                 
63 See www.policymixes.eu.  
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However, new tools should be developed in order to manage the complexity of 
technological development alongside the complexity of social demand. A 
promising line of inquiry comes from Functional Analysis, a rigorous tradition 
of scientific analysis of engineering design, the cornerstone of any 
technological progress64. 
 
In short, with this proposal we have put forward a series of requisites for policy 
making in demand-driven innovation policies: 
- keeping exploration of technological options open until possible 
- avoid regulatory capture from incumbent companies 
- involve final users and stakeholders early in examination of 
technological options 
- keep flexible until the cost of delaying adoption becomes larger than the 
benefit from further exploration and learning 
- take into consideration network externality effects, taking a commitment 
to a technology only when it can be considered credible by final users. 
 
A2.3 A realistic governance for Societal Challenges65 
 
These ideas must find a realistic way into the current institutional framework 
and the policy toolbox. Otherwise, they will not be robust to implementation 
issues. Let us first review some risks of proposing a Stage-Gate approach, 
which come from a number of still unsolved issues: 
 
- Policy makers have followed, in the last two decades, an approach based 
on separating policy planning from delivery, delegating it to market-
based mechanisms. In turn, this typically make policies rigid, because 
policy makers are detached from implementation issues and do not 
really adapt policies to the limitations that emerge from practice; 
- Rules for sharing responsibilities and profits between public and private 
actors are not yet clear and stable (as the experience of Galileo has 
shown); 
- If we separate the responsibility for research from responsibility of 
governments in public procurement, it is difficult to ensure 
                                                 
64 See the large number of papers on functional analysis and its application to foresight and 
social issues submitted to the last International Conference on Engineering Design (ICED), 
www.iced2009.stanford.edu. 
65 To increase the degree of realism, the Stage-Gate policy tool box as well as the way it should 
be implemented has been described at a rather high level of practical detail. This is just meant 
as an illustration of the way the ground principles suggested here, could be implemented by the 
EC.  
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coordination, so that the classical situation of research that “never finds 
a real customer” is perpetuated, not removed; 
- If we allocate responsibility for procurement to national governments, 
they will inevitably prefer national champions; 
- If the time window between research and final implementation is too 
long, it will be difficult to mobilize research communities, to align their 
goals to public priorities, and to avoid serious management issues; 
- There is already a “jungle of programmes” at European level, so the 
introduction of new schemes is dangerous. 
 
From these initial remarks, it becomes clear that the overall governance of 
Societal challenges is a crucial issue. The governance should be simple and 
authoritative, but at the same time it must permit the management of complex 
issues. 
 
From the point of view of European Commission role, we warmly recommend 
strong coordination and shared vision and responsibilities between all the DGs 
involved. Although such coordination is the crux of innovation policy almost 
everywhere, and we do not ignore the intrinsic associated difficulties, it is 
highly recommended that a new approach is put in place. 
 
The issue of “how” of societal challenges-led research and innovation policy is 
the crucial one. Nobody has the final answer to the question how to design and 
implement an appropriate institutional framework. The difficulties experienced 
by all attempts, discussed in this Chapter, witness how difficult is the issue. 
Therefore we do not advocate a single institutional and governance design, but 
leave the options open for deep reflection at policy level. We can consider three 
main options: 
 
(a) inter-directorate governance, high political profile, and platform 
management 
(b) coordination based on conditionality and variable geometry 
(c) executive agency 
 
Inter-directorate governance, high political profile, and platform 
management 
 
This option sees societal challenges as a major theme for the Innovation Plan 
and demands that all Member States take a high profile role. 
 
A societal challenge approach applies a much stronger coordination across the 
policies and programmes that could support the achievement of the objectives. 
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Moreover, the societal challenge approach should lead to stronger focus and 
greater coherence in the range of projects, policies and tools selected, as well as 
simplified engagement for innovation actors who would be involved in a single 
set of relevant actions rather than a fragmentation of initiatives across 
programmes, policies and DG’s. 
 
Based on experience to date, a new approach could be introduced in the 
Innovation Plan with the following features. 
 
High level political governance 
A small number (e.g. 2 – 4) Societal Challenges are identified for a 
coordinated, EU level response. These should be clearly linked to the 
future Lisbon strategy and selected in terms of the innovation potential, 
EU added value, and importance/ medium term nature of the challenge. 
The final selection of the challenges should be a high level political 
decision, i.e. by the European Council who would also take other major 
decisions. 
 
The definition of the challenge should be of a sufficiently high level to 
warrant an EU level coordinated response but sufficiently targeted so 
that clear goals can be set and that agenda setting and implementation is 
manageable.  
 
A smart package of policies and actions 
For each challenge a coordinated set of actions should be agreed which 
make use of the full range of relevant tools and competences within the 
control of the public sector.  
 
At EU level, the toolkit could include: calls under the thematic priorities 
of FP; innovation actions under the Competitiveness and Innovation 
Programme; instruments of the Lead Market Initiative; and instruments 
under the European Research Area, such as joint programming. 
Consideration could also be given to including further policy tools, such 
as: the market monitoring exercise under the Single Market; Financial 
instruments (equity, loans etc) and/ or training and education 
programmes with a thematic basis. 
 
At Member State level (including regional and local levels), the toolkit 
could include research programmes, innovation programmes, public 
procurements, testing/ demonstration within public services, 
infrastructure and planning, etc. Under the societal challenge, the 
relevant ministries should be engaged to align, coordinate or jointly 
 129 
implement policies and actions. This could also involve actions financed 
by the Structural Fund programmes. 
 
A partnership approach 
A platform could be created for each of the identified challenges to 
develop and agree an action plan and ensure coordinated 
implementation. The platform would bring together the key partners, in 
particular those responsible for the policy tools from Member State 
ministries, agencies and regional/ local bodies and from Commission 
services. The platform should also engage businesses including SMEs, 
non-governmental organisations, and leading researchers and experts. 
This could make use of existing structures such as European 
Technology Platforms.  
 
A champion for change 
For each challenge, a champion could be appointed as a high level, 
experienced leader supported by a small secretariat. The role of the 
champion would be to act as a change agent, to drive the process and to 
report on progress. An innovative approach could also be taken for the 
secretariat, for example by using seconded staff with relevant 
experience drawn from the Commission services, Member State 
administrations and external experts. 
 
Coordination based on conditionality and variable geometry 
 
This option takes seriously into account the possibility of policy failure and 
bureaucratic capture. Therefore it advocates a stronger definition of contractual 
schemes that reduce the risk of “soft budget constraints” (i.e. to fund projects 
beyond the point where their usefulness is clearly remote) and also does not 
demand that all Member States participate to political decisions. 
 
This scheme uses then the legal notion of variable geometry in order to induce a 
differentiated approach by Member States, making decisions more fluid. 
 
These levels of governance will be responsible for the following activities. 
 
A. Exploratory stage 
 
The Exploratory stage is mostly funded by DG Research. DG Research, within 
the limits of FP 7 and in future FPs, may use a wave of calls to mobilise the 
research community towards a small number of Societal Challenges. 
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This does not take necessarily the form of new research projects, since most of 
them will already be in place within IPs, STREPs or JTI. In areas where there is 
a gap, new projects may be at the basis of the Call. 
 
The Exploratory stage exploits existing research activities, but also opens new 
Calls in areas not covered by the FP, if needed, or covered in a different 
perspective. In this case, it adds money in order to support exploratory research 
on alternatives for addressing Finalization and Application issues for the 
delivery of Societal challenges. 
 
It takes the form of a Call for Finalization candidatures whose goal is to identify 
possible leaders for the subsequent stage. Candidatures must be associated to a 
clear plan on how to lead and implement a Finalization activity, based on 
research results and a clear understanding of final application challenges.  
 
Candidatures must include a Risk management plan and a clear management 
structure. The relation between research results and the proposed Finalization 
must be explicit. 
 
In the future, EIT KICs may present a candidature as such, realizing a ready-to-
use critical mass of research and users. KICs seem natural candidate, if 
successful, to implement demand-driven innovation policies. 
 
B. Finalization stage 
 
After the launch of the Exploration stage, Finalization projects must be ready to 
start. Their duration should be limited in time and not exceed, say 24 months. 
At the end of the period, there must already be a wave of procurement practices 
for new solutions to Societal Challenges, based on the specifications issued by 
Finalization projects. 
 
For each dossier of Societal Challenges, there must be at least two Finalization 
projects in competition. The leader typically should not be a research 
institution, although all projects must have substantial input from research and 
include research clearly in the management structure. Finalization projects are 
based on public-private partnership. Their legal nature may be variable. 
 
C. Application stage 
 
In parallel to the Exploratory stage, the EC would open a consultation 
procedure with Member States and with Regions. 
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The goal of the consultation would be: 
- to set up art. 169 reinforced cooperation agreements among Member 
States, or agreements among Regions, aimed at sharing responsibilities 
for future decisions on public procurement in selected areas; 
- to delegate a political committee formed by participating national and 
regional governments, staffed by an adequate technical support from 
administrations, in charge of cooperating with Finalization projects in 
defining the specifications of future tenders for public procurement; 
- to ensure that participating countries and regions will collaborate in 
launching large scale testing exercises of Finalization solutions in the 
respective fields; 
- to set up a legal advisory board, in charge of identifying the legal and 
administrative path that the Finalisation solutions may safely follow in 
order to facilitate the implementation in member states and regions. 
 
Agreements must be signed and put in operation before a predefined date. Once 
signed the agreements, Member states and Regions have access to the 
Finalization programmes, and will actively intervene in the definition of 
specifications, to be used in future procurement procedures. 
 
It would be great if a strategic agreement with DG Regio could be achieved, 
with the following content: 
- DG Regio should consider Societal Challenges as a key component of 
conditionality (see also the analysis and proposals made in Chapter 5; 
- DG Regio could e.g. announce that future allocations of Structural 
Funds to Member states will include a significant attention to Innovative 
procurement; 
- From a practical point of view, monies could be allocated conditional to 
the political willingness of Member states and Regions to adopt public 
procurement schemes, and co-funds such schemes considering them as 
an investment activity (whatever the content in terms of 
products/services actually bought); 
- DG Regio should participate in Finalization projects. 
 
Executive agency 
 
Another option would be to strengthen the coordination up to the point where a 
separate institutional, legal and administrative entity is required – i.e. a public 
agency. One may think for example at a European Agency for Climate Change. 
It must have a larger autonomy than the EC has so far granted to other 
independent bodies, such as ERC or EIIT. 
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In favour of this option stands the historical experience. Most examples of 
successful demand-driven innovation policies have seen the involvement of 
large national agencies, or of similar entities with large autonomy and strong 
technological and scientific background. The problem here is of course the 
willingness of national governments to delegate powers in fields that still are 
largely controlled by national authorities. But the alternative might simply be 
no additional money on these issues. Agencies benefit from attractive labour 
conditions for skilled technicians and researchers, as well for managers and 
administrators willing to be involved in the implementation stage. In political 
terms, it could be argued that governments and the public opinion would buy 
the idea of an additional agency in charge of addressing, with a clear mandate 
and a tight time schedule, a number of complex societal issues. Setting up an 
agency will in any case require a number of years.  
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Chapter 3:  
Public research in Europe  
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
This Chapter considers key roles of public investment in research and 
development. In the following funding issues, governance, quality, excellence, 
specialisation and knowledge transfer are considered for this part of the 
research and innovation system. In exploring the role of community research 
policy in the knowledge based economy, the research organisation and the 
funding of universities and Research and Technology Organisations (RTOs)66 
as well as research carried out by industrial enterprises and services, is 
essential. 
 
Public research in Europe is carried out predominantly by universities and 
RTOs. Both kinds of institutions operate under diverse legal status, structures 
and in diverse funding modes. The European Association of RTOs (EARTO) 
defines RTOs: Research and Technology Organizations (RTOs) are specialized 
knowledge organizations dedicated to the development and transfer of science 
and technology to the benefit of the economy and society67. RTOs therefore 
occupy the middle ground between academic research and practical application. 
In the context of this report, we use the term RTO to include all non-profit 
research organizations that are not universities (excluding the Research Funding 
Organizations). Therefore, our use of the term RTO covers those that are closer 
to Academia and those that are closer to the market as well.   
 
Due to historical circumstances, universities are managed differently in 
different European countries. Some countries have a central system for tertiary 
education while others have totally or partially devolved the system to regional 
governments. This complex institutional structure often makes reforms difficult 
to implement. In addition, the reform difficulties are compounded by political 
differences and internal tensions within the universities themselves between 
                                                 
66 By using the term in a broad sense, we emphasize their mission of knowledge production and 
transfer which positions them somewhere between the pole of ‘research’ and the ‘innovation’ 
pole in the so called Knowledge Triangle. 
67 http://www.earto.org/ 
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those which seek to preserve the idea of ‘academic freedom’ and those which 
push for wider engagement with industry and society. Although a general trend 
can be observed in granting universities greater autonomy from government, 
legislation which should enable this remains highly uneven across Europe and 
so does the actual use of newly acquired “autonomy”. 
 
Universities are in a general sense subject to great hopes for showing how they 
can contribute to the knowledge economy. New expectations and pressures for 
change are on the rise. Some pressures emanate from students becoming more 
mobile and demanding, accompanied by the development of an international 
market for higher education. The current shortage of public funding, rapidly 
changing needs in industry and the service sector and increasing requirements 
of lifelong learning and learning in the work place create additional pressures 
on universities to respond. Pressure for change has also been stepped up 
considerably through the introduction of (some) measure of competition among 
universities, notably through the introduction of systems for quality assessment 
and quality control. The rapid diffusion of bench-marking systems and the 
dependence of funding on evaluation of research and higher education 
performance indicators have added considerably to pressures for change in the 
European university landscape.  
 
When one compares data on investments in European and US universities 
substantive issues regarding the comparability of data must be taken into 
consideration. However, it is clear that the overall amount spent in the US in 
higher education is much higher (1.3% of GDP in the EU versus 3.3% in the 
US) if one takes into account public and private investment (see Chapter 1, 
section 1.6). This necessarily has effects regardless of whether funding is spent 
directly on research or in sustaining other funding needs of universities.   
 
In addition, the aggregate differences in resource provision to universities and 
RTOs between EU and US mask a considerable variation, which impacts what 
applies for the individual institution. The US has a highly stratified system that 
displays huge discrepancies between universities, as they range from those with 
the greatest resources among any of the world, to a large number of 
underfunded institutions. At the same time, US universities display greater 
diversity when it comes to access to different sources of funding, compared to 
the EU, where public funding is much more dominant. Another structural 
difference in the organisation of higher education is that the EU has more 
universities granting Ph.D. degrees (which in turn grant a greater number of 
such degrees) than the US, where a greater share of institutions focus on 
undergraduate studies. These structural differences result in the US having a 
relatively small number (approximately one hundred) of top universities 
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focusing primarily on research. In Europe, by contrast, most universities seek to 
combine the function of mass education at undergraduate and even graduate 
level with research, which prevents them from competing fully on research 
quality and impact. 
 
RTOs account for about 40% of publicly funded R&D and about 14 % of all 
R&D in the EU-15 (EURAB, 2005). Their weight varies considerably between 
the individual member countries. However, according to the EURAB report 
RTOs account for 15%-30% of total expenditure in Portugal, France or Spain 
with a substantial lower share in Sweden or Belgium (less than 5%). 
Differences in the relative importance of RTOs generate different pressures for 
change. Although many of the issues confronting them are of a generic nature, 
different policy approaches may be required to tackle them, both in different 
countries and at European level. 
 
Clearly, the heterogeneity of RTOs, with differing missions and diverse 
integration in the national systems, is even greater than that of universities. 
While having undergone some major shifts towards Europeanization and 
internationalisation in the last decades, RTOs continue to operate mainly as 
national entities and hence under the competence and legislation of Member 
States. As a consequence of the government subsidies and often their focus in 
the “home market” RTOs suffer from a national lock-in, despite their 
contribution to international research programmes.  
 
While universities combine teaching and research, RTOs are as a rule not 
engaged in teaching. Although many RTOs train PhD and post-docs, only a few 
(like some of the Academies) are able to award PhDs and teaching is really an 
exception for RTOs.  Being more “mission oriented” and in general less 
influenced by academic tradition, the RTOs are generally more manageable. 
Many RTOs are also far better prepared than universities to work with the 
private sector. RTOs clearly play an important role in certain industries, 
services and countries, whenever their management is professional and where 
they contribute to industry renewal. 
 
It is noticeable that many RTOs tend to be more aligned with, and are closer to, 
existing industry/services, compared to universities. Their research agenda may, 
however, also show greater overlap with universities and be less 
complementary to industry. On the other hand, universities may be less inclined 
to become trapped by vested industrial interests, and may thus breed research 
and innovations (including general purpose technologies) that are more relevant 
to a range of industries and services, including emerging ones. In addition, the 
links that typically exist at universities between research and higher education 
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offer a number of advantages for industry, especially through the extent to 
which graduates employed by industry have acquired valuable, as well as 
fungible skills. In overall, the issue is not whether universities brand RTOs can 
perform better each other’s functions in relation to industry, but how they 
complement each other. 
 
A specific case to be mentioned is the one of RTOs dealing with Research 
Infrastructures, which represent special RTOs performing mainly basic research 
services. Since several years they tend to organise themselves to serve better the 
research community at European and international level68. The links that exist 
with universities and the basic research they support allow them to train a high 
number of Ph.D. students and young post-doc researchers. 
 
Many of the issues discussed specifically for universities are applicable to 
RTOs as well. While it is more straightforward to urge reinforced public-private 
partnerships for RTOs, there exist also plenty of unfulfilled and potentially 
favourable opportunities for RTOs to collaborate more closely with universities. 
The concrete form under which specialisation and collaboration might be 
developed needs to be worked out based on an understanding of the specific 
strengths and opportunities that pertain to each institution. An interesting case is 
provided by the Forschungszentrum Karlsruhe that recently merged with the 
University Karlsruhe in the wake of the German Excellence Initiative. It now 
has been established as the Karlsruhe Institute of Technology, KIT. 
 
3.2 Governance of universities 
 
Too often the current Higher Education governance systems across EU do not 
allow for specialization and diversity. Legal and policy frameworks should 
allow for greater autonomy and for universities to develop their own strategies 
provided that criteria of quality and relevance are met. In addition, there is a 
need for fostering capabilities in university management in support of 
specialisation and diversity in the wider knowledge environment, while 
boosting creativity and initiative from below (Andersson, 2008). If universities 
are to remain the prime knowledge producers, and facilitate innovation that has 
potential to generate what is truly new, universities must be able to test and 
improve their own way of governance, based on striving to cherish the strengths 
and opportunities that pertain to the specific institution. Today, the ability of 
universities to do just that is, in practice, restricted due to a combination of 
                                                 
68 As an example, European Strategy Forum on Research Infrastructures (ESFRI) was created in 
2002. 
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funding principles and governance structures which hinder autonomy, 
excellence and social relevance, often also in need of professionalization. 
 
Policies should be framed in recognition of the need for multiple and inherently 
diverse and complementary institutions engaged in higher education, research 
and innovation. Each university must then be able to foster its own specific 
governance model, capable of serving as an instrument for day-to-day learning 
as well as for setting long-term strategies. This must apply across the range of 
university functions, including education, research, innovation with the wider 
society. This calls for greater quality and diversification also in accreditation, 
evaluation and ranking of universities. 
 
As stated above, specific policies are needed for pluralism and complementarity 
to develop. A general observation however is that greater strive is needed to 
reform and improve the governance of universities. Emphasis on strategic work, 
active examination of lessons from best practices and abilities to implement 
needed reforms must be viewed as long overdue in most universities in many 
European countries. Although incentives and requirements for reform have 
been initiated in recent years, putting in place policies capable of engineering 
more effective implementation of the lessons learned, by central and regional 
governments as well as by universities themselves, is a matter of great urgency. 
Part of the answer in this regard lies with awarding universities greater 
autonomy. Despite some deregulation in many countries, legal structures still 
tend to severely limit the autonomy of universities, including their financial 
room for manoeuvring, in the selection of students, the recruitment and 
compensation of professors, and so on. Thus, in order to raise the quality of 
higher education and to excel in research, the barriers against such efforts must 
be addressed and removed. At the same time, one must be aware that the 
autonomy of universities is not a panacea to overcome the extremely 
conservative attitudes in terms of resistance to change that prevail in many 
institutions. Autonomy is necessary but not sufficient condition for change. 
 
It is the view of the group that each university must define and implement its 
own strategic profile. Differentiation is inevitable and can evolve in many 
directions. Students must be able to select what suits their needs and 
aspirations best and universities must be able to select students according to 
the strategic profile. Universities also need to meet with various options how to 
define their core mission and develop unique combinations of higher education, 
research and other relations and outputs of relevance to society, as laid out in 
the concept of the Knowledge Triangle. 
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3.3 Differentiation of universities 
 
Since most European universities are based on the legal fiction of equality of 
degrees, differentiation according to profile is clearly underdeveloped. In other 
words, universities tend to unequivocally aspire to be able to combine research 
and teaching in a universal, Humboldtian spirit within the same institution and 
regardless of its size, instead of sharpening their own, unique profile. In fact, 
differentiation is not solely a question of “overall quality” but also of “focus”. 
Specifically, one should not concentrate exclusively on research excellence, 
accompanied by heavy concentration of funding and talent, strong selection of 
students and (international) university staff. Indeed, every researcher cannot 
belong to a “research elite”. Success can also come from a well-positioned 
profile that each university and its constituents can define for itself, in terms of 
its balance of teaching and research, levels of teaching, kind of research, 
combinations between teaching, research and relations with industry or other 
parts of society, and its local, regional national or international aspirations, 
outreach and impact. 
 
Bonaccorsi and Daraio (2009) suggest that countries that have implemented 
policy instruments directed towards increased differentiation are ranked high in 
international university rankings. They also find that the European landscape of 
universities is poorly differentiated and therefore concluded that there is a 
structural linkage between the poor performance of European universities in 
research-based rankings and the lack of differentiation. The factual dominance 
of streamlining regulations, national funding systems and traditions further 
reinforce the statement that more diversity is needed in terms of profiling 
universities, not less.  
 
The fact that many European universities operate first and foremost in a 
regional or national context naturally has consequences that need to be spelled 
out, e.g. in terms of the geographical-regional distribution, of aspirations and 
requests to be relevant in a local context, and of almost every university 
wanting to do also ‘research’. There is also the issue of size: while some 
universities, e.g. in Southern Europe, have been so big as to be unmanageable, 
in other countries there is a common belief that universities have to be “big” to 
be competitive. In Denmark, for instance, the merger of universities has been 
seen as a strategic response to increase efficiency, as well as to achieve greater 
international visibility in global rankings69. 
 
                                                 
69 The reform of the Danish universities (from 2002) is currently (2009) being evaluated. 
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Whereas the EC has limited responsibilities with respect of universities, the 
European level matters and should be mobilised for furthering differentiation 
under ”incentivizing” conditions. Europe has an interest in doing so, which 
should take pre-eminence over pushing for a neoliberal agenda or setting 
objectives for harmonising European universities according to one-dimensional 
objectives. The EC as well as the member countries need institutions that 
specialise in addressing multiple objectives, which has consequences for 
determining the profile of individual institutions. Excelling in research will, in 
some disciplines and knowledge domains, require concentration, whereas 
nimbleness and networking may be most efficient in other cases. Producing 
high-quality graduates meeting the needs of industry, public service, and the 
professions, will typically require a more ‘professional’ profile, entailing 
perhaps also close contact with future employers. If the main objective is to 
raise the numbers of young people in the age cohort to pursue tertiary 
education, the profile will differ again. In practice, these and other objectives 
will not be so easily separated, but differentiation and sharpening the profile of 
each university depends on obtaining clear priorities among the main 
objectives. 
 
The EC has a role to play, not to harmonize the European university landscape, 
but to further a framework in which instruments required for multiple 
successful development paths are developed. This can be achieved by 
introducing a clear and strong, merit-based competitive scheme for universities 
(and RTOs) at EU-level. The EC could also set up further bench-marking 
exercises that would help to compare and monitor the future professionalization 
of universities. 
 
3.4 Quality of research at universities 
 
Measurement of quality of research or of the performance of institutions as well 
as of the impact generated by research must be carried out with utter care. Since 
the results are likely to be used either for comparative, bench-marking purposes 
or with specific policy measures to be attached, indicators should never be 
allowed to take on a life of their own and must always be carefully interpreted. 
Keeping this in mind, it is widely believed that European universities lag 
behind US universities when it comes to the quality and impact of research as 
shown by measurements of scientific output in comparing the ratios of 
publications with respect to population, or to the number of researchers (Dosi et 
al. 2006). The same exercise can be applied to researchers that have received 
the highest number of citations across the past two decades (see table). In this 
case citations have not been corrected for disciplinary structure. A more 
 140 
detailed disciplinary study contained in Bauwens et al. (2007) corroborates the 
leadership of the US.  
 
 Number of HCRs HCRs per million inhabitants 
United States 3.829 16,82 
Switzerland 103 16,28 
EU (15) 1.177 3,01 
UK 439 7.79 
Sweden 59 7.09 
Netherlands 92 6.50 
Germany 240 3.12 
France 155 2.88 
   
Source: Bauwens et al. (2007)       (HCR: Highly Cited Researchers) 
 
Another aspect of universities’ research performance, already mentioned in 
Chapter 1 (section 1.6), has been discussed by Aghion et al (2008). Using the 
“Shanghai ranking” of universities grouped by countries, they observe that US 
universities outperform European universities in the Top 50 and Top 100. 
European universities do better in the lower tiers (Top 200 and Top 500). 
Europe thus appears to lag behind the US when it comes to very research-
intensive universities. As Aghion et al. note, there are, however, several 
university models in Europe and there is no unequivocal way of concluding 
which one is the best. Furthermore, as the latest UK Research Assessment 
Exercise has demonstrated, small world-class research teams do exist in the 
midst of institutions and departments that are otherwise of average calibre. 
Benefits of research come from working at the “frontier”, as well as emanate 
from a broad basis. The organisation of universities needs to be such, however, 
that they become much more competitive, either for competitive funding, for 
students, or for industry/services. Especially for competitive research grants, 
individual researchers must be supported in an adequate way by their 
institution, while some institutions must be able to compete with other 
institutions among the best. On this basis, for Europe, Aghion et al. recommend 
a combination of increased public funding for research, increased autonomy and 
increased mobility and competition as a way to improve research performance 
(see also section 1.6, Chapter 1). 
 
Increased autonomy needs to be accompanied by increased accountability and 
transparency in evaluating results. Once universities are expected to classify 
themselves, it would be more conducive to measure their impact along a 
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number of different dimensions. Among the relevant measures, the number and 
the attractiveness of the graduates they produce is certainly key. It is well 
known what industry/services treasures most: well-trained graduates, i.e. 
possessing the latest skills and knowledge plus, whenever possible, the ability 
to be flexible and continue learning. With regard to basic research, scientific 
publications and citations offer important parts of the toolbox for quality 
measurement, although their weight should be normalised with a view to 
variation across scientific disciplines, size of institution, profile etc. On top of 
this, there is a need for complementary indicators to disclose and measure the 
ability of universities to attract funding from external sources or to attract in 
other ways, thus enhancing its reputational capital. Again, universities must be 
requested to define their objectives and disclose progress made in multiple, 
alternative terms, based on solidly tested frameworks that allow for 
comparability and transparency. 
 
However, what matters most for Europe is not to be “mechanically” better 
placed in the top when it comes to the ranking of individual universities. The 
key is to put in place stronger mechanisms for encouraging and allowing a 
stronger performance, and for a better organisation of universities to allow for 
differentiation and collaboration. 
 
On this basis, policy measures need to be put in place that are capable of 
improving both the quality of research in European universities and to 
strengthen its impact, including the economic impact. References in patent 
documents, number of spin offs, number of high-growth firms created, the 
scope and success of resulting collaborative research, etc. can be applied to 
trace progress. The EC should work with member countries to develop the 
entire playing field, and to ensure that the mechanisms required for enabling 
and measuring progress in university performance are put in place.  
 
One of the key factors that impact on the quality of research in universities and 
RTOs is the research environment and the structure and dynamics of academic 
careers. These, in Europe, still take place overwhelmingly in national contexts, 
dependent upon pension schemes, social security arrangements, recruitment 
channels and work conditions. A considerable effort has been made by the EU 
with its “The European Partnership for Researchers”70. The aim of this initiative 
is to accelerate progress in key areas including social security, competition 
based transnational recruitment and portability of funding, employment and 
working conditions and training and skills.  
 
                                                 
70 http://ec.europa.eu/research/era/specific-era-initiatives_en.html) 
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It would be preferable to start by improving working conditions and leverage 
career prospects –e.g. institutionalising tenure track systems in European 
universities – instead of continuing to exhort mobility as a virtue independently 
of emphasis on other factors. That said, Europe still has low mobility of 
professors and researchers, and is lagging behind most of its competitors in that 
respect. However, in spite of limited availability of statistical data at European 
level it seems that we have made some progress during the last several years71. 
 
The ERC experience after two concluded Starting Grant rounds, and one 
Advanced Grant round, is telling. The UK remains number 1 as the country 
with the most successful host institutions (although not UK nationals). 
Apparently, UK institutions are highly attractive to foreign (mobile) researchers 
of the highest quality. This is partly because their university structure allows 
and furthers the early independence of young researchers. The UK also has a 
well-functioning grant competition system which is coupled, however, with 
teaching positions as a fall-back in case a researcher is not successful. The 
reverse case is found in Italy: a country that so far has few attractive host 
institutions, but Italian nationals hold top positions among the most successful 
national group (working largely outside Italy). 
 
The ERC sees clear messages for universities coming out of these and other 
figures. Working conditions must be rendered such that they attract researchers 
from outside or enable those inside to compete successfully at EU level. 
 
In addition, mobility is itself a heterogeneous phenomenon. As with other 
indicators of scientific productivity, e.g. publications, it can be shown that a 
large part of mobility is due to a small number of highly mobile (and extremely 
productive) researchers and professors. They are the ones who cross-fertilize. 
One way to nurture mobility is, therefore, by giving incentives to recruit 
internationally, especially for younger faculty members, in addition to making 
working conditions sufficiently attractive. 
 
One of the main reasons for the attraction exerted by the US system when 
compared with Europe is that younger researchers in the US are given scientific 
independence much earlier. Of course the elements that make a system 
attractive are many and can only be changed in the long term. Some activity has 
been undertaken to improve this issue but Europe needs to do more. This is 
particularly true in those fields susceptible to be exploited by the market. 
Universities have to be encouraged, even if it implies a change of legal rules, to 
install a more proactive recruitment policy. This should allow them to attract 
                                                 
71 See Key Figures, 2008. 
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international talent. Such an active recruitment is considered central to 
improving the quality of universities. Therefore incentives should be put in 
place in support of high quality recruitment at universities and RTOs. 
 
3.5 Knowledge and innovation clusters 
 
Examining the performance of universities and their contribution to the 
economy often brings up the question of the ‘right’ balance between basic and 
applied research (see also the Epilogue in the Policy Report, Part I). While basic 
research of fundamental nature is predominantly, but by far not exclusively, 
linked to universities, many researchers still seem to keep their distance from 
research considered relevant to markets. The traditional notion that public 
funding should support basic research constituting a public good is still 
prevalent in many European places. Similarly, private funding is there to 
support applied research whose payoff can be appropriated by individual firms. 
However, developments in science and engineering, for instance in the life 
sciences, have rendered such a dichotomy largely obsolete: the distinction 
between what is “basic” and what is “applied” is often quite unclear. 
Furthermore, excellent research requires, among other, economic valorisation 
through appropriate IPR arrangements leading towards innovation and in some 
instances collaboration with the private sector for effective knowledge transfer.  
 
Valorisation is a field where RTOs play a very fundamental role, which could 
be reinforced in conjunction with efforts undertaken by some universities. For 
this purpose, appropriate forms of collaboration are needed to realise a win-win 
situation between universities and RTO’s and enterprises. In the increasingly 
integrated innovation systems of knowledge based economies, public and 
privately-funded research are indispensable for the emergence, growth and 
ultimate robustness of what have become identified to be knowledge and 
innovation clusters. Universities and RTOs constitute a central node in these 
clusters, but perform much below their potential when finding themselves 
outside such a cluster. 
 
Historically, links between research and innovation actors were situated either 
within a national, regional, or even a local context. A major change occurred 
when industry, with exceptions like the pharmaceutical industry, either greatly 
reduced its in-house research or ceased to do research altogether (while 
continuing with development). These changes have induced industry to turn to 
universities and RTOs for needed knowledge and graduates. This has put 
pressure on universities and RTOs to become and remain competitive at 
European or, indeed, at global level. Nurturing links between new knowledge 
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production (research), development activities and innovation actors is therefore 
no longer an option, but has become a must72. To become selected as university 
requires a strong focus on strategic profiling of universities and RTO’s leading 
to identification of their competitive edge, while acting according to the 
strategic orientation. Policy measures like the German “Excellence Initiative” 
have contributed to raising awareness in this regard, although the best balance 
between traditional research orientations and new combinations remains to be 
seen. 
 
Changing attitudes might also be a matter of generations. Ambos et al. (2008) 
found, in a UK context, that successful university-industry collaboration 
occurred where (1) the scientific quality of the research project funded was high 
and (2) where the Principal Investigator belonged to the younger generation. 
While high quality choice is not a surprise, it is interesting to note that the older 
generation of professors was much more resistant towards cooperation with 
industry and also less able to follow research lines appreciated by industry. The 
younger generation, perhaps already used to the expectation of close 
collaboration in the UK, was much more open. 
 
If fundamental research aims to produce new knowledge, the combination with 
industrial/services, relevant research may, through different mechanisms, 
enable combinations, that are more effective in producing improved new 
knowledge with a social impact. This is also visible in the spontaneous 
emergence of new mechanisms for knowledge sharing, such as “open 
innovation” discussed in the next Chapter. All this reinforces the idea that better 
linkages between public research and industry and services benefit the overall 
performance of the research and innovation system. It also adds to the need to 
introduce the notion of entrepreneurship along the graduate and post-graduate 
schemes including the involvement of research staff as a further strong 
motivation in the cooperation between the public and the private sector. 
 
The important role played by RTOs in supporting technology diffusion and 
innovation in certain industries needs to be appreciated. RTOs have a 
particularly great capacity to adjust to the conditions in individual industries 
and to develop professional management specialised for industrial cooperation. 
At the same time, because RTOs tend to be more aligned with and be closer to 
existing industry, compared to universities, their research agenda may also be 
more overlapping with, and less complementary to, that of industry.  
  
                                                 
72 See also Chapter 4 on open and global innovation practices. 
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In industries and countries where the linkages of RTOs to industry tend to be 
dominated by defensive purposes, the economic benefits are likely to be 
weaker. This makes it important to ensure that RTOs are capable of putting 
strong efforts behind processes of renewal and are not trapped in defending 
status quo. Universities, meanwhile, may be more inclined to produce research 
that my lead to innovation relevant to a range of industries, including emerging 
ones. In addition, the links between research and higher education that 
characterise universities may offer a number of advantages for industry, e.g., to 
the extent that graduates employed by industry thereby acquire valuable skills. 
 
Knowledge transfers have been supported by all MS through a variety of 
instruments. Clearly, there is plenty of duplication and overlapping in the 
mechanisms applied, especially when judged from a European viewpoint. 
Fewer, more focused and better linked instruments (including across national 
borders), based on genuine competition, should be encouraged. In addition, 
European research policy should take into account and exploit the opportunities 
for specialisation and complementarity between RTOs and universities in 
generating valuable industrial linkages. 
 
3.6 Research and innovation in New Member States (NMS) 
 
In terms of university profiles, NMS have inherited one type of university: 
teaching oriented with weak R&D. The mission of the universities was seen to 
be to primarily prepare graduates with the knowledge and skills required by 
industry. R&D was most often undertaken within the academy or industry 
(branch) oriented R&D organisations. During the transition period there has 
been several developments which somewhat changed this profile.  
 
First, there has been an explosion of HES in terms of enrolment rates but at the 
price of reduced quality. Second, an important development has been the 
emergence of private universities, and the establishment of colleges of tertiary 
education, mostly in the private sector. For example, Poland has 195 private 
institutions with enrolment of about 380,000 undergraduates. Third, R&D has 
strengthened but mainly at large and comprehensive universities. It is almost 
non-existent at private universities. Fourth, HES has become internationalised 
with expected far reaching effects on student mobility, quality and research 
excellence. 
 
However, universities in NMS face several challenges in trying to fulfil their 
mandate of having to improve the quality of research and forge strong 
partnerships with the industry in R&D. If judged by international evaluations 
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and different league tables the quality of higher education has been in decline in 
NMS in the past decade. This has been accompanied by scientific careers being 
seen as unattractive among the younger population, ageing of researchers 
population, and increasing pressure for the universities to actively contribute to 
the emerging knowledge based economy. Although the best performing 
research institutions and universities have already developed international 
connections, the majority of them are still operating largely on a domestic basis.  
 
Generally speaking new member states, for historical reasons, have certain 
strands of first-rate research concentrated in academic institutions. On the other 
hand, links to industry have often been one-sided and excessively concentrated 
in supporting existing lines of business rather than to encourage renewal or a 
range of innovations. Science-industry linkages have thus played a different 
role than in the EU-15 MS. Opening national funding mechanisms directed to 
the institutional renewal of new MS will be important for addressing these 
problems. 
 
In NMS, academy – industry linkages have been primarily encouraged through 
the expectation that universities will either sell their new products through 
university sponsored spin-off companies or that they will sell knowledge by 
patenting and licensing it to commercial organisations. Within this product-
oriented mode perspective, it is expected that the university will generate 
knowledge that will be directly used in the innovation process. These 
expectations contradict empirical evidence from NMS innovation surveys, 
which show that universities are marginal to industry as a direct source of 
information for innovation. In that respect, the results of NMS innovation 
surveys are not different from results for other countries including EU15. 
 
However, it seems that universities are much more important as an indirect 
source of information for innovation (Pavitt 1991). In terms of the Stankiewicz 
(1986) taxonomy, universities are the most effective in consultancy and R&D 
contracting mode selling problem-solving capabilities. This function is quite 
complementary to their role in informal knowledge transfer through 
professional networks. It is true that fundamental research in biomedicine and 
genetics has produced directly commercially relevant results. It is also true that 
software can be commercialised within or in conjunction with universities. 
However, this reasoning should not be extended to the entire spectrum of 
science and technology as the proximity of academic science to commercial 
application varies greatly. 
 
The contribution of NMS universities to national innovation systems is much 
greater through the consulting and contracting than the product oriented mode. 
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Their most important contribution is through the development of high level 
problem solving skills (Pavitt 1991).  As the science base becomes essential 
background knowledge for all sectors, the universities’ role in generating high 
level PhDs becomes an essential precondition for industrial research. If we take 
this broader notion of ‘utilization’ of knowledge, then NMS universities still 
have to make large strides towards this objective. Unsystematic evidence in 
NMS indicates that the consultancy and R&D contracting mode is the major 
part of universities’ ‘utilization’ of knowledge activities. We do not know to 
what extent these are standardised knowledge intensive services and to what 
extent these are services which closely rely on the results of academic research. 
Case study evidence would suggest that in this respect, universities in NMS are 
substituting for the still undeveloped sector of knowledge intensive services. 
Universities are complementing extra-mural business R&D institutes in NMS 
which de facto operate as knowledge intensive service providers (Radosevic 
and Kriaucioniene, 2007). Often the informal character of this activity, which is 
undertaken by individual academics, and the lack of institutional involvement, 
makes it difficult to assess the scale and scope of this substituting function. 
 
In an ideal model, the three functions of universities would reinforce each other. 
We would argue that, contrary to this, we observe substituting effects instead of 
complementarities between individual functions. As a result, universities are 
not operating as dynamic nodes in national systems of innovation in NMS. 
Evidence suggests that this trend is not unique to the NMS. According to Geuna 
(1997), many universities are driven by budget cuts to do routine contract 
research for industry which neither leads to high publications (and spillovers) 
nor lays a basis for long term fundamental innovations. The empirical evidence 
shows that this is the case for the NMS’ economies where the highly developed 
higher education and R&D sector faces the challenge of economic survival. It is 
reorienting itself to market led activities, which in many cases are more routine 
and are application rather than R&D oriented. In summary, substitutive effects 
between different knowledge functions dominate over synergy effects. 
 
When compared to the ‘old EU15’ situation in universities and R&D 
organisations in NMS differs more in terms of degree rather than quality. 
Hence, there is even stronger need for reform of HES in NMS in terms of 
greater autonomy, accountability and excellence. In terms of policy priorities 
research at universities should be further encouraged and criteria of funding 
should be much more based on criteria of research excellence. There is strong 
need to couple policies of support through Structural Funds with their 
participation in Framework Programmes and other EU programmes. University 
R&D could be boosted by linking the curricula at MA and PhD level with 
research activities at academy institutes. A stronger integration of teaching and 
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research would help to introduce students to research methods, and increase 
their interest and competence in professional work after graduation. In addition, 
promoting a shift to more applied research and practical problem-solving would 
provide a recruitment channel for students and companies. 
 
3.7 Conclusions: policy implications and the contribution of 
ERA 
 
Community policies for merit-based competition schemes among universities 
and RTOs at EU level. 
The above discussions have raised a number of issues for policy implications 
and recommendations. Although responsibilities for universities and RTOs 
remain with MS and leaves a relatively minor role to the EC, a number of 
actions can be undertaken by the EC, on its own or together with MS. 
 
The obvious advantage of the EU level with considerable European value added 
is that the more competitive, large, transparent and accountable the competition 
process is, the stronger the pressure towards better quality and hence the larger 
the impact will become. 
 
A novel institutional funding model tied to specific criteria in a merit-based 
competition at EU level 
Inventing new mechanisms is an integral part of adapting to changes in the 
larger environment, but great care must be taken that they will indeed provide 
solutions to the problems that have been identified. Support for institutions is 
certainly an idea whose time may have come, but many pitfalls are waiting in 
the details.  
 
In general, there is far too little of a learning culture in the EC. When combined 
with a widespread risk-aversion on the part of officials (linked to personal 
liability in the Financial Regulation) organisational and strategic innovation 
tends to become stifled. The overly ‘bureaucratic’ ways of the Commission 
must be genuinely reformed and simplified, and not just ‘outsourced’ under the 
guise of Executive Agencies. One of the main obstacles, and determining the 
ways in which the Commission now operates, are the financial rules imposed 
on the Commission. They have introduced a management culture which lies 
largely based on mistrust.  
 
• The revision of the Financial Regulation planned for 2010 should 
therefore include a derogation for research, whose management culture 
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rests on trust. Progress in this regard would be of great importance since 
it could radically improve the efficiency of the funding system at 
European level. It should also consider that the rotation principle within 
the Commission may have detrimental effects on DG Research. It may 
therefore be advisable to derogate certain rules of the staff policy for the 
benefit of research policy and implementation, while of course making 
sure that accountability is guaranteed as far as the use of public funds is 
concerned. 
• A clear setting of priorities at EU level and a strategic reconfiguration of 
what is predominantly left to MS is urgently recommended. The ‘one 
size fits all’ has never been a valid, nor a good principle. In order to 
enable universities to test and improve their governance and to foster 
their strategic capabilities in university management in a 
professionalized way, we recommend setting up a merit-based 
competitive scheme at EU level for universities (and RTOs) which 
provides funding with considerable European added value for those 
institutions that excel on a number of clearly defined dimensions. MS 
may want to join forces in preparing their universities by including 
criteria that will enable universities to better compete at EU level, e.g. 
within the pluri-annual performance-based contracts now negotiated 
between universities and their governments or intermediate bodies. 
 
• Incentives should include measures to support high quality recruitment 
at universities and RTOs, encouraging them to install a more proactive, 
international recruitment policy.  
 
Ph.D. training: a competitive scheme for European doctoral schools 
• One of the keys for raising the overall quality of research at universities 
is the improvement of their Ph.D. training through a mechanism of 
competitive funding for Ph.D. programmes. It could include competitive 
institutional funding for the best Ph.D programmes, based on criteria 
aiming for excellence and the improvement of the career prospects of 
the future generation of researchers in Europe as well as their working 
conditions. 
 
Strengthening the basis of basic research and innovation at European 
universities and RTOs through Community policies 
 
The impact of the ERC on universities and RTOs 
Generation of frontier knowledge is an indispensable precondition for the value 
chain and the future well-being of our societies. It has been reinforced at 
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European level through the radical policy initiative taken by the EC in setting 
up the European Research Council (ERC). Its success, within a very short 
period of time, has been widely acknowledged, both within the scientific 
community, as well as by MS and the EC. In order to build upon this success 
and to guarantee its sustainability, the Final Report to review the ERC’s 
structures and mechanisms “Towards a world class Frontier Research 
Organisation” issued on 23 July 2009 has made a number of recommendations. 
 
• We urge the Commission to implement these recommendations and, in 
particular, to guarantee the independence and efficient operation of the 
ERC beyond 2013 in an optimal and sustained way. Towards this end, 
the ERC has to receive a higher overall budget and should become an 
operationally integrated, autonomous European institution sui generis, 
making it a truly world class frontier research funding organisation. 
 
Fully integrating RTOs in the ERA 
RTOs turn out to be crucial for the success of the ERA because of their 
fundamental role for both research and innovation. In particular their role in 
national innovation systems is important. The competition of RTOs in the 
market of contract research, the structural cooperation with universities, the 
benchmarking with peers among others would benefit highly from a better 
integration into the ERA. 
 
The Commission should be more cogniscent of the importance of RTOs in the 
innovation system. Therefore, incentives to RTO-RTO cooperation and RTO-
University cooperation are strongly recommended. This will reduce 
fragmentation and reduce overlap, and stimulate cross border cooperation in 
projects and research facilities. At the same time RTOs would benefit from 
continuity of funding programmes on collaborative research with emphasis on 
knowledge transfer that already in place. RTOs are well equipped to respond to 
such challenges. 
 
Europeanization of research infrastructures 
While Community policy on research infrastructures aims to an improved 
coordination leading to possible integration, so far the EU contribution to 
national research infrastructure resources has been limited to contributing a few 
percent of the cost of opening up access to all researchers. ESFRI is a purely 
advisory body set up at the request of the Council bringing together the 
representatives of research ministers and a representative of the Commission; it 
has a mixed intergovernmental / Community approach to develop and support a 
coherent and strategy–led approach to policy making on research infrastructures 
in Europe and to facilitate multilateral initiatives leading to better use and 
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development of research infrastructures, and on whose advice the Commission 
and Member States may act. The development by ESFRI of a European 
Roadmap for RI has induced several countries to develop coherent national 
roadmaps mutually connected through the ESFRI roadmap, thus producing a 
growing trend towards integration and upgrade of national resources, including 
existing potentially relevant infrastructures.  
 
Recently, moreover, the Council has adopted a specific legislation at 
Community level (Council Regulation n° 723/2009 on the Community legal 
framework for a European Research Infrastructure (ERIC)) that will allow 
greater institutional integration of national resources, as well as some 
exemptions already available for international research organisations. This is a 
very welcome initiative since a mechanism to deal with European research 
infrastructures is definitely needed. Again, lessons learnt should be used in 
designing a truly European approach that goes the beyond predominant 
nationalism. 
 
• The initiative on RI is a positive recent development of EU research 
policy although the decision making process is still far from efficient. In 
order to be able to attract the best researchers, RI must be international 
and develop both the highest scientific-technological competence and 
adequate management capabilities in a competitive environment. 
Supporting transnational infrastructures and granting international 
access to national facilities is an important point. It should be 
reinforced, and attracting the best researchers to and from infrastructures 
on a competitive basis should become a key indicator. 
 
Joint Research Initiatives 
The “Expert Group on the Future of Networks of Excellence” recommends to 
discontinue the scheme (with very few exceptions where funding on a small 
scale is envisaged). For the future, it proposes a revised concept “Joint Research 
Initiatives” (JRIs), oriented towards long-term academic research of ‘slender’ 
alliances between universities and research organisations. The objective of JRIs 
should be the creation of ‘virtual institutes’ of a medium, manageable size of 3 
to 7 partners. These virtual institutes should be committed to joint long-term 
research planning and activities, with a typical duration of 7-9 years. The expert 
group sees them as complementary in a two-fold sense: to the industry-led Joint 
Technology Initiatives (JTIs), as well as an institutional complement to the 
‘individual excellence’ supported by the ERC. This would also be in line with 
the EIT mission of creating “Knowledge and Innovation Communities” (KICs) 
in priority areas to engage in world-leading innovations and to produce highly 
qualified people with the right entrepreneurial and proactive skills and values. 
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• The difficulty to coordinate national policies and undertake joint actions 
(although several examples show that we can do it if there is political 
will) is clearly a major weakness in the EU research policy. Therefore 
we support the JRI scheme which should be mainly implemented in a 
‘bottom-up’ competitive mode (with a ‘top-down’ approach of very 
limited extent in selected strategic research, e.g. the Grand Challenges) 
and would thus be committed to enhancing ‘institutional excellence’.  
 
In addition not all research infrastructures are large and have physical 
embodiment. Increasingly, scientific communities build up forms of 
coordination that deal with sharing equipment, pooling datasets, setting up a 
shared research vision, establishing experimental protocols, validating 
laboratory procedures and developing Standard Operational Protocols (SOPs). 
All these activities do not directly produce scientific output, but produce 
“intermediate collective research goods”, i.e. goods that are used by other 
researchers to improve research productivity. In most cases these goods are 
intangible.  
 
• We support the policy proposals made by the “Expert Group on the 
future of Networks of Excellence” to launch Joint Research Initiatives 
(JRIs), as voluntary, self-administered coordination mechanisms to 
produce intermediate collective research goods in a synergetic manner 
with the continuing development of Research Infrastructures of pan-
European interest. A particularly strong reason for supporting the 
production of such scientific goods is the need to counter-fight the 
fragmentation of the institutional and regulatory environment across 
European countries, which in many fields makes it more difficult to 
produce valid and generalizable results.  
 
Knowledge and innovation clusters 
Funding knowledge transfer has been tackled by MS through a high variety of 
instruments. Probably there are more mechanisms available than can be 
managed. Therefore, fewer and more focused instruments, based on genuine 
competition should be encouraged. One of the mechanisms has to deal with 
helping in the development of knowledge-intensive companies and building 
ecosystems that concentrate effort around the leading universities and RTO’s. 
 
• The importance of research technologies, i.e. research instrumentation 
and new methods that have been invented or set up for purposes of 
research, mostly in the lab, but that carry an inherent potential for wider 
use outside the lab, is not sufficiently recognized. In order to realize 
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their cross-cutting, integrative potential, either for other research fields 
or, perhaps even more important, for industry/services in innovative 
ways, flexible opportunities need to be created that allow industry, 
academia and RTO’s including research infrastructures to jointly 
explore already at an early stage how basic research, applied research 
and innovation and entrepreneurial activities in general might be 
transformed into ‘experimental innovation’. This includes the search for 
new forms of practice, e.g. how to use, adapt or transform research 
technologies for purposes and objectives outside the laboratory. 
Research technologies come with the skills and knowledge of those who 
have been trained to use them, hence the importance of well-trained 
graduates. 
 
Establish the balance between funding excellence and R&D relevance in 
NMS 
NMS’ R&D funding systems have made significant progress towards openness 
and excellence. Access to the Research Framework Programmes and other EU 
sources of R&D funding has stimulated the drive towards world excellence. 
While funding efforts and performance of high level research remain important, 
ensuring industrial and social relevance has been given insufficient priority, 
which is a cause for concern and will not ensure innovation relevant to the 
economies and societies of the NMS.  
 
• Research capacities should be linked to firm level demand through an 
increased share of co-funding mechanisms involving the business 
enterprise sector. Co-funding schemes can help connect pockets of 
scientific excellence with the business sector. Co-funding can also 
enhance the impact of science parks, high-tech incubators and other 
similar initiatives. Building applied research capacities in the public 
sector and capacities for supporting technology absorption and 
technology development in close cooperation with commercial 
enterprises should enhance the competitiveness of firms in NMS. 
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Chapter 4:  
Global networks of open innovation 
and the ERA  
 
 
4.1 Introduction: Open innovation as a new paradigm 
 
Innovation processes can involve a wide range of actors, including firms, 
universities, research and technology organisations (RTOs) that may be public 
or private in nature, as well as customers, consultants and suppliers. Open 
innovation marks a departure from previous mainstream approaches to 
innovation. Although the basic objective (“take advantage of resources other 
than your own”) is not new, approaches to support this objective have changed 
considerably and have become more diverse, thereby shifting the balance 
between in-house activities and the use of external resources in response to the 
growing complexity and melting together of product and service categories and 
to growing competition. 
 
These changes were already visible in the 1990s, and were first coined as a new 
paradigm by Chesbrough (2003) in terms of the commercialisation of external 
(as well as internal) ideas by firms’ deployment of outside (as well as in-house) 
pathways to the market. The perspective was then developed further by pointing 
out its two-way nature: the inward leveraging of the discoveries of others, and 
the outward search for organizations with business models that are better suited 
to commercialise a given technology than the firm itself (Chesbrough and 
Crowther 2006). Activation of internal capabilities is strengthened by 
complementing them with external inputs, and by identifying external returns 
for projects that no longer correspond to the firm’s strategy. 
 
This Chapter considers the changing nature of the business innovation 
practices, the relation between these practices and research and development, 
and the implications for European policy.73 In particular, it focuses on open 
innovation and internationalisation of R&D as key challenges for innovation 
processes. The chapter explains the concept of open innovation, assesses its 
                                                 
73 Chapter 1 explored the European gap in business sector R&D mainly from the perspective of 
aggregate national data. 
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current advancement, and examines how open innovation may interact with the 
internationalisation of R&D to generate global innovation networks. It then 
examines some of the current policy instruments and funding schemes that are 
intended to improve the innovation ecosystem in Europe and concludes with 
recommendations on how these policies might be improved.  
 
4.2 Understanding Open and Global Innovation Processes  
 
Use of the term “open innovation” has become quite commonplace, but the 
phrase can still be misleading. Any discussion of innovation processes requires 
consideration of the collaborative architecture, and recognition that part of what 
is termed “open” innovation takes places in relatively closed structures, in the 
sense that the activities are based on restricted company-to-company 
agreements with the conventional commercial objectives of profitability and 
defensibility. Open innovation is not equivalent to open science, nor does it 
correspond with open source software (in the ICT area). Intellectual property 
rights remain important, although the way these are managed may change to 
reflect the collaborative architecture and business goals. 
 
Pisano and Verganti (2008) distinguish between the truly open collaboration 
that can include virtually anyone in the architecture (the participant decides to 
participate, as seen in e.g. crowd sourcing) and closed networks, where 
(normally) it is a company or existing consortium that decides who to select and 
involve in the innovative activity. It is generally the second approach that is 
seen as providing the primary evidence for firm’s open innovation practices. 
This is because firm’s innovation networks, while not being totally open, have 
become much more important and central corporate laboratories have become 
more open to various types of co-operations.  
 
Figure 4.1 highlights the two directions of open innovation. Inbound open 
innovation can be reflected in the extent of R&D collaboration (private-private 
and public-private), licensing in, venturing and acquisitions. Outbound open 
innovation may include licensing-out, the provision of R&D services, spinouts 
and divestments. As further illustrated in figure 4.1, firms can apply a range of 
tools to access a broad array of knowledge sources. In some situations, research 
partnerships, with both firms and academic institutions, are used to complement 
in-house R&D capabilities with specific competences. In other cases, 
collaboration is aiming at cost and risk sharing. Partners are selected depending 
on the precise objectives or problems pertaining to the firms’ needs or problems 
(Miotti and Sachwald 2003). Firms also buy licenses during the process when 
they identify patents corresponding to their needs. A company can also identify 
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potentially-interesting external projects and follow closely their evolution 
through venture capital investments. Finally, companies can buy a more mature 
firm when they consider that its competences are necessary or particularly 
promising. 
 
As innovation processes become more open and distributed across geographies, 
and associated with increasing levels of collaboration and outsourcing, the 
linking of actors in the business eco-system becomes of fundamental 
importance (Howells, 2006). Considerable research insights already exist on the 
inbound side, whereas the outbound side is less developed. A set of actors, 
known as innovation intermediaries, have specialized in establishing links and 
stimulating cross-fertilization in business networks. Innovation intermediaries 
perform a range of roles including articulation and selection of technology 
options, scanning and locating new sources of knowledge, introducing existing 
technologies in new industries and for new applications, building linkages with 
external knowledge providers and development and implementation of 
innovation strategies (Bessant and Rush, 1995). Howells (2006) additionally 
stresses the role as brokers for commercialization, foresight and standard 
setting. These roles imply that innovation intermediaries cover a broad range of 
activities, which all are relevant as stimulators of opening up the innovation 
process. The innovation intermediaries may therefore assist in accumulating 
relational capabilities across the range of actors within the business eco-system 
and thereby broadly promote open innovation practices. 
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Figure 4.1: Open innovation tools along the innovation process  
Source: de Jong (2007) 
 
The relevance of this paradigm for the KBE derives from a widespread belief 
that openness accelerates innovation by being potentially faster, cheaper or less 
risky by taking advantage of resources other than the ones in possession of the 
firm.  
 
In summary, open innovation offers the potential for firms to access a much 
broader scope of knowledge and ideas than could be generated by its in-house 
R&D capabilities alone. It can substantially reduce the cost of innovation, 
whilst accelerating the process. Lastly, it can enable companies with mature 
markets and technologies to successfully introduce more radical technological 
and organisational innovations. 
 
4.3 Dissemination and impact of open innovation practices  
The available indicator data on open innovation practices is of variable quality 
and comparability; furthermore outbound approaches seem less extensively 
analysed than inbound (OECD 2008; Zuniga and Guellec 2009). 
 
Collaboration with different types of partners 
 
National innovation surveys provide one set of data for making cross-country 
comparisons. In these surveys, collaboration is defined as an active 
participation to common innovation projects with other organisations and does 
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not include e.g. R&D sub-contracting. Collaboration can involve the 
development of new products or processes with customers or suppliers, as well 
as common R&D projects with competitors or academic laboratories and 
universities.  
 
Table 4.1 illustrates the propensity to collaborate across countries and that these 
vary substantially. Companies from small countries in the north of Europe 
collaborate more than those from the larger European countries and those from 
Japan. Larger companies collaborate much more to innovate than SMEs. This 
conclusion has been confirmed by empirical studies, which found that the 
extent of R&D collaboration is correlated with firm size, whatever the sector74. 
A recent survey (UNECE 2009) confirmed that collaborative modes of open 
innovation are more often found in mature rather than early stage companies. 
Their lower propensity to collaborate may be explained by SMEs’ scarce 
human and management resources or by their weaker absorption capacity. 
Equally, contracting between counterparts depends on their relative bargaining 
power, which in turn depends on a variety of cultural, economic and regulatory 
factors that may easily disadvantage younger ventures. 
 
 All population Industry Services SMEs 
Large 
companies 
Denmark 22.2 24.6 20.0 20.8 53.9 
Sweden 21.4 26.0 18.6 20.0 53.5 
Finland 19.2 23.4 14.8 17.3 56.1 
Belgium 18.3 22.0 14.9 16.6 60.9 
United Kingdom 15.8 14.7 16.7 15.3 27.7 
France 12.9 14.1 11.7 11.6 43.6 
Netherlands 12.8 18.4 8.4 11.6 45.3 
Norway 12.3 15.8 9.3 11.3 36.9 
Germany 10.4 14.2 7.0 8.6 36.3 
Switzerland 9.9 16.6 5.9 9.4 22.2 
Austria 9.1 10.8 7.6 7.7 40.2 
Japan 7.4 8.4 6.2 6.5 27.9 
Table 4.1: Companies collaborating on innovation activities (percentage of all 
companies, 2002-04) Source: OECD (2008) 
 
Companies from industrial sectors tend to collaborate more to innovate than do 
service companies, and collaboration is particularly intense in high tech sectors 
(Hagedoorn 2002, Miotti and Sachwald 2003). The extent of collaboration also 
                                                 
74 See particularly, Miotti and Sachwald (2003), Laursen and Salter 2004, Dhont-Peltrault 
(2005), Herstad et al. (2008). 
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varies according the different types of partners. Table 4.2 shows that those 
firms that cooperate tend do so first with their suppliers and their customers. 
Collaboration with competitors is less frequent (but it is important to keep in 
mind that companies may compete with one another in some areas and 
collaborate in others). Collaboration with public research organisations, 
universities or institutes, is also less frequent. However, significant differences 
are observed among countries.  
 
These differences may partly be explained by the national sector distribution. 
For example, Finland is specialised in ICT, where collaboration to innovate is 
particularly prevalent because of the short technology cycles. Firm size may 
also be an explanation in some countries. Characteristics of the national 
innovation system may also contribute to these differences. Both the quality of 
academic research and its openness to business vary noticeably between 
countries and this could also be a factor in the variable diffusion of partnerships 
between public research and companies.  
  
 
Table 4.2: Companies collaborating on innovation activities, by partner 
(percentage of all companies collaborating on innovation, 2002-04) 
Source: adapted from OECD (2008a) 
 
While there are also other explanations, including prevailing incentive 
structures as influenced by the regulatory and financial policy frameworks, the 
lower propensity of companies to collaborate with academic research 
institutions can in part be explained by the nature of such collaborations. 
Firstly, upstream collaboration focus primarily on the exploration phases of the 
 Suppliers Customers Universities Public 
institutes, 
government 
Competitors 
Finland 92 93 75 59 77 
Czech Republic 80 68 37 26 40 
Sweden 75 65 41 15 25 
Netherlands 75 55 31 24 31 
United Kingdom 74 73 33 25 36 
Belgium 73 59 37 26 27 
Hungary 71 53 37 14 37 
Denmark 66 65 32 16 35 
France 65 50 26 18 36 
Italy 56 39 36 11 37 
Spain 52 23 26 28 17 
Germany 44 51 53 26 27 
Austria 43 45 58 30 22 
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innovation process (Bercovitz and Feldman 2007). Such upstream research 
typically represents a relatively low share of the total innovation process in 
companies, compared to the resources devoted to development. A survey of 605 
innovative Dutch SME’s explored eight open innovation practices75 and 
provides complementary results (Van de Vrande et. al. 2009). It showed that 
employee involvement, customer involvement and external networking were 
utilised much more frequently than the other practices. Especially, licensing 
(inward and outward), which typically result from R&D investment, was 
utilized less frequently (20% and 10% respectively). The fact that interactions 
with customers and clients are the most frequent is consistent with the fact that 
R&D activities represent a relatively low share of the innovation process. 
 
Co-operation with public research appears to play a specific role, as suggested 
by a study based on British data (Laursen and Salter, 2004). Universities are 
used to source knowledge to innovate by a relatively small number of 
companies operating mainly in certain industrial sectors (pharmaceuticals, 
chemicals, machinery, transportation, and electrical and electronic equipment). 
Furthermore, the companies that collaborate with universities invest in both 
their internal R&D capabilities and the development of open innovation 
practices. Similarly, Tsai (2009) found that absorptive capacity positively 
affects the impact of collaboration with research organisations on the 
performance of marginally changed products. He argues that firms with 
insufficient absorptive capacity cannot easily jump into totally new areas of 
technology.  
 
These results confirm that companies that cooperate with universities also 
develop ambitious innovation strategies. Such firms may also be the more likely 
to generate radical innovations. But these companies are relatively few and they 
focus their collaboration on upstream academic research. As a result, this aspect 
of public-private collaboration may be limited in volume, but qualitatively very 
important.  
 
The role of academic research for company R&D can also be measured through 
patent data. A recent study uses the OECD patent data base to measure the 
degree of co-location of the inventors of the patents76 filed by companies on one 
hand and by academic research organisations on the other hand (Guellec and 
Thoma, 2008). It shows a positive correlation between the number of patents 
                                                 
75 These include venturing, outward IP licensing, employee involvement, customer 
involvement, external networking, external participation, outsourcing R&D and inward IP 
licensing. 
76 Demands submitted to OEB and PCT. Inventors’ addresses are filed in 330 regions of OECD 
countries, or in 1700 zones of the type French ‘département’.  
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from academic origin invented in a region and the number of patents invented 
by companies in the same region77. The importance of academic patents is 
stronger at the intra-regional level. It is also stronger at the industry level, 
which suggests that intra-region interactions are important in specific fields. 
Furthermore, the correlation is stronger in sectors that rely more directly on 
scientific activities, pharmacy, chemistry and instruments78. Finally, the 
correlation has increased between the beginning of the 1990s and the beginning 
of the 2000s.  
 
This evolution coincides with the development in different countries of public 
policies that have favoured concentration in clusters. It is consistent with the 
development of open innovation practices by companies, in which priority is 
given to those favourable environments that offer a sufficient concentration of 
academic organisations producing relevant inventions. Further studies are 
required to establish the determinants of these correlations between academic 
and business patenting patterns. 
 
Outsourcing of R&D activities 
 
The share of R&D outsourcing provides a simple indicator of one aspect of 
open innovation. However, there is no comprehensive statistical series that 
follows its evolution over the long term and across different countries. The 
following is therefore based on non-comprehensive collections. Surveys among 
the top EU R&D-investing companies in Europe measure an increasing 
outsourcing rate. An exceptional figure of 30% was recorded in 2007, although 
this value was sample-dependent. (Companies from sectors such as 
pharmaceuticals and ICT tend to outsource more R&D.) A figure of 18% seems 
a better estimate of the overall current situation79 (EU 2006-2009). Two-thirds 
of outsourced R&D goes to other companies and one-third to public research 
organisations. 
 
More general surveys involving representative samples of firms indicate lower 
outsourcing rates. At the beginning of the decade, outsourced R&D spending 
was 5% in Austria, 8% in Belgium, 10% in Denmark and 12% in Norway 
(Herstad et al. 2008). Such figures are close to the share of R&D expenses 
outsourced to non-affiliated companies in national statistics. Indeed, 
                                                 
77 The estimate includes control variables for the year of filing, the sector and the country of 
origin. 
78 The patents can also play a role in the strategies of protection.  
79 Samples are different from one year to the other.  
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outsourcing to independent local or foreign subcontractors and to academic 
research represent generally less than 10% of business R&D spending. 
 
A German study of 1663 firms reported that 3.6% of all companies with R&D 
activities outsourced parts of these activities from 2004 to 2006 (FHG-ISI 
2008). Among firms with more than 500 employees the share was 13.8%; 
among small companies with 20-99 employees the share was 2.9%. This study 
also explored the main motives for outsourcing of R&D and mentioned the two 
most important as capacity bottlenecks (58%) and cost of human resources 
(53%). By comparison, the large EU firms responding to the 2007 survey on 
EU R&D Business Investment Trends argued that by far the most important 
reason to outsource R&D was to access knowledge and results (EU 2008). 
These perspectives may not be as different as they seem on the surface, possibly 
reflecting only a different emphasis on the relative importance of in-house and 
external resources. 
 
The available data suggests that outbound practices are less developed than 
inbound ones (OECD 2008). Some companies have nevertheless systematically 
developed their out-licensing operations and a greater number have at some 
time tried this approach (EIRMA, 2002). Whereas the success of both inbound 
and outbound practices may involve cultural adjustments by the firm, it seems 
that outbound practices tend to require the greater adjustment. So-called 
“corporate venturing” requires a specific managerial mindset which is quite 
different from those required to run other managerial processes. The EIRMA 
study found the degree of interest in corporate venturing was influenced by 
product life cycle (short cycle = more interest); complexity of 
product/technology (more complex = more interest) and phase of technology 
cycle (incremental versus disruptive growth). In high tech sectors, acquisitions 
by large companies mean that start ups and SMEs are involved on the outbound 
side. More generally, the symmetrical perspective can be adopted for R&D 
outsourcing.  
 
Impact of open innovation practices  
 
Drawing on results from national innovation surveys, Herstad et al. (2008) 
designed a synthetic indicator of open innovation. This approach is supported 
by the work of De Backer et al. (2008), who have suggested using composite 
indicators to analyse more complex interactions in research. The indicator aims 
to summarise the intensity of various open innovation practices: R&D 
outsourcing and licensing-in, collaboration, search for information on external 
resources and the use of instruments to protect intellectual property. For the 
 164 
first three practices, the indicator includes both an intensity factor and a 
diversity factor that depends of the variety of the partners or sources of 
information. Computations have been harmonised for four countries, Austria, 
Belgium, Denmark and Norway. The study found that it is primarily the overall 
openness of organizations which impact positively on innovation performance, 
in addition to intramural R&D and international collaboration within the value 
chain, i.e. with customers or suppliers. The study continues to argue that from 
the firm perspective, the ability to tap into, absorb from and serve as 
gravitation points within such networks is contingent on a strong, internal 
capacity. From the economy perspective, this capacity is essential as it serves 
to “anchor” companies to economies of origin and as it produces knowledge 
spillovers into these economies (Herstad et. al. 2008). 
 
An estimation based on the results of the UK innovation survey showed that 
companies with the more active strategies of search for information exhibit a 
stronger innovation performance (Laursen and Salter 2006). Companies that 
resort to multiple information channels and use them intensely have a higher 
probability to produce radical innovations.  
 
These various studies find a positive contribution of in-house R&D expenses to 
innovation, but also clearly identify an additional contribution of open 
innovation practices. Evidence on open innovation is building up progressively, 
but more coordinated data collections are needed to better assess the European 
potential and needs for policy interventions.80 
 
4.4 Internationalisation of R&D and networks of innovation 
Another dimension of open innovation particularly relevant for the 
development of the KBE comes from the internationalisation of companies’ 
R&D and innovation activities. Since the 1990s, the trend towards 
internationalisation has accelerated, and companies have set up and expanded 
their R&D centres in a growing number of countries. Foreign R&D activities 
have also become more diverse and companies develop global networks 
through their own research locations and international partnerships. 
 
The expansion and diversification of foreign R&D centre 
 
The internationalisation of business R&D continues largely to follow the 
development of production in new areas, which leads to the need to adapt to 
                                                 
80 See also recommendations in EU 2007b, EIRIMS Expert Group. 
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local markets (CNUCED 2005, OECD 2008a). Yet, access to local scientific 
and technological resources has motivated a growing number of R&D centres 
abroad. 
 
Over the last twenty years, European and Japanese companies have used their 
subsidiaries in the United States to draw upon the resources of the American 
innovation system in high tech sectors. Different studies have thus shown that 
the establishment of R&D in the United States had a positive impact on their 
production of patents in these sectors (Almeida 1996, Frost 2001, Sachwald 
2003, Iwasa and Odagiri 2004). A study has also shown that the productivity of 
British companies investing in R&D investments in the United States in the 
1990s grew as a result (Griffith et al. 2004), suggesting that these transatlantic 
investments were more efficient in terms of improved productivity than the 
R&D investments made by these companies in the United Kingdom (see also 
Chapter 1).  
 
The behaviour in term of access to technology through investment abroad has 
progressively developed and gained in sophistication. In particular, companies 
have tried to better integrate their various R&D capabilities into their 
innovation strategies. The relative importance of different trends varies 
depending on companies’ sectors and countries of origin, and this makes the 
identification of the different motivations of R&D internationalisation more 
complex.  
 
Beyond the factors that initially determine the location of R&D centres, their 
activities also evolve over time. Centres develop relationships with their local 
environment and, depending on the latter’s characteristics, this can enhance 
their own innovation capability. So, even if the establishment of a R&D centre 
was justified largely because of the importance of the local market, its 
subsequent development may hinge on a co-evolution with local scientific or 
technological capabilities.  
 
This sequence has been verified in the case of the foreign subsidiaries of 
American companies between 1991 and 2002 (Hegde and Hicks 2008). The 
likelihood of establishing a R&D activity in a specific country depends first on 
the local market. On the other hand, the likelihood that the local R&D centre 
files patents depends more on the local technological capabilities, measured by 
the number of American patents attributed to the inventors of the country81. 
Finally, the number of patents filed by a subsidiary, representative of its 
                                                 
81 The authors have subtracted patents attributed by the American office (USPTO) to inventors 
from a given country, those that have been attributed to American multinational companies. 
They use fractional accounts for the patents with multiple inventors. 
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innovation capability, depends essentially on the scientific production of the 
host country, measured by the articles published in sciences and engineering82.  
 
Symmetrically, studies based on patent data have shown that the European and 
Japanese multinational companies effectively benefit from the American 
scientific and technological capabilities, thanks to their centres in the United 
States (Almeida 1996, Iwasa and Odagiri 2004, Griffith et al. 2004). The 
relationship between R&D units in different countries varies, however. 
Analyses of R&D expansion abroad by multinationals based in the Nordic 
countries have demonstrated both cases of complementarity with R&D in the 
home country, and evidence of substitution effects (Andersson, 1998).   
 
Looking at large companies with a strong R&D base in Europe, recent surveys 
of R&D Business Investment Trends by larger firms with a strong EU base (EU 
2006-2009) draw a number of consistent conclusions. For example, the 2008 
survey, drawn from a sample of 130 (larger) companies from various sectors 
accounting for 30% of the EU’s business investment in R&D, reports that: 
1. The companies carried out over 20% of their R&D outside the EU. The 
largest share of foreign R&D investment (almost 10%) went to the US 
and Canada. The percentages of R&D investment carried out in China 
and India were 2.7% and 3.5%, respectively.  
2. Expectations for growth in R&D investment within the EU were the 
highest (4.6%), ahead of Japan (4.4%), the US and Canada (4.3%), other 
European countries (3.8%), India (3.2%), RoW (3.1%) and China 
(2.5%). In the 2007 survey, R&D investment growth expectations were 
the lowest in the EU (6%) and higher in the US and Canada (10%), 
Japan (15%), and India (17%).  
3. The companies surveyed generally indicated their home country as the 
preferred location for R&D, and identified Germany, the US, and India 
as the most attractive locations outside their home country.  
4. Availability of researchers and access to specialised R&D knowledge 
are main drivers affecting decisions about R&D location, especially in 
high tech sectors. The cost of employing researchers plays a small role 
overall, but is an important consideration for those companies preferring 
a location outside their home country. 
                                                 
82 The article distinguishes between nine industrial sectors, for which the nomenclature differs 
from that in scientific articles. The authors calculate a relevance ratio for each scientific field in 
each sector based on quotations from articles in the patents of the sector. The local publications 
in a given field are weighed by this ratio. 
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International partnerships to innovate 
 
Data from innovation surveys indicate that for European companies substantial 
share of their co-operations are with foreign partners, particularly in industry 
(table 4.3). For example, 19% of the Finnish companies collaborate to innovate 
(see table 4.1) and 13% do so with foreign partners (table 4.3). Logically, the 
relative propensity to cooperate with foreign partners will be weaker in larger 
countries, but this is also the case in Switzerland.  
 
Co-operations with foreign, including distant, partners have a positive impact 
on the propensity to innovate. The empirical analysis done in Northern 
European countries already quoted (Herstad. et al 2008) measures a positive 
impact of the international collaborations with customers or suppliers on the 
propensity to innovate. This impact is constant and stronger than that of the 
national co-operations and of the international co-operations with competitors.  
 Table 4.3: Companies having partnerships to innovate abroad in 2002-04 (% of all 
companies) Source: OECD (2008) 
 
For EU companies, the share of the extra-European collaborations is logically 
lower than the share of the intra-European collaborations (OECD 2008a). 
Indeed, the international economic relationships are always likely to be more 
costly and uncertain to maintain, and even more so when they are more distant. 
Still, the geographic distribution of the co-operations does not provide useful 
information on the qualitative aspects and the respective importance of the 
different types of collaboration. Insofar as distant partnerships are more costly 
and difficult to manage, companies which use them are likely to be highly 
motivated and putting a lot of demands on the distant partner.  
 Industry All Large SMEs 
Finland 16.9 13.3 51.6 11.2 
Denmark 16.5 14.8 44.2 13.5 
Belgium 15.7 13.5 51.0 11.3 
Sweden 14.2 11.4 45.3 9.9 
Netherlands 11.8 7.6 35.6 6.6 
Switzerland 11.0 6.4 19.1 6.0 
Norway 10.1 7.9 27.4 7.1 
United Kingdom 7.8 7.7 19.7 7.2 
Germany 7.6 4.8 32.4 2.9 
France 7.4 6.2 31.9 5.0 
Austria 6.1 5.3 30.2 4.2 
Japan 1.6 1.2 9.9 0.9 
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4.5 The dynamics of global networks of open innovation 
The interactions between openness and internationalisation of firms’ innovation 
process support the formation of global open innovation networks. These 
networks reach more globally and are more integrated than previous R&D 
activities by multinationals, which mainly involve small networks of the firms’ 
own R&D laboratories, relatively small-scale collaborations with limited 
groups of universities, and the acquisition of technology as a distinct 
commercial activity. In the following, these possible interactions are explored 
further focusing on the links and the drivers of global and open innovation 
networks. 
 
Table 4.4 summarises the drivers of open innovation and internationalisation of 
R&D, revealing that both trends depend simultaneously on supply and demand 
factors and reflect changing preferences in respect of business model and 
corporate management.  
  
Table 4.4: Factors of openness of the innovation process and 
internationalisation of R&D activities 
 
The increasing demand for innovation has exerted a growing pressure on 
companies’ R&D capabilities and the managerial competencies that bind R&D 
into the overall business process. In various sectors, the evolution of the 
business models and the importance of services have challenged the traditional 
Incentive to: Demand side Scientific and technological supply 
Develop open 
innovation practices 
1. Acceleration of the innovation 
cycle; increasing demand for 
innovation  
2. Hybrid or complex innovations, 
including interactions between 
products and service 
3. Evolution of the business 
model. 
4. Growing attention to demand or 
customer driven innovation, 
including in services 
1. Increasing supply of technologies, in 
particular from new firms and knowledge 
intensive services 
2. Internal focus on defendable core 
competencies in face of growing external 
competition; limited R&D resources  
3. New practices and methods of exchange of 
data, of simulation…etc. 
Establish or increase 
research and/or 
development 
capabilities outside 
the home base 
1. Importance of the local market 
(size, purchasing power) and 
implications for differentiation of 
products/services 
2. World leading local market  
1. Increased global availability of high 
quality S&T human resources and 
infrastructures 
2. Excellence centres and good relations 
between academic research and firms in 
foreign countries 
3. Good cost-efficiency ratio for some R&D 
activities in foreign countries 
4. Increased capacities, qualities and cost-
effectiveness of supporting ICT services 
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(technology-dependent) view of innovation and led to new combinations such 
as product-service offerings and business process innovations. 
 
The increasingly multi-disciplinary nature of innovation provides another factor 
driving the opening-up of the innovation process, while locating R&D centres 
in leading markets can increase the firm’s capacity to monitor the evolution of 
global demand and increase the legitimacy of that firm’s presence in the local 
market. 
 
On the supply side, the emergence of new specialised firms reinforces the 
development of new technologies as the market grows. These trends stimulate 
R&D outsourcing or the substitution of in-house capabilities with efficient 
third-party facilities and software. Increasing foreign R&D capabilities means 
that some of the externalisation can take place abroad, particularly when the 
centre(s) of excellence in a research field are located there. The shortage of in-
house resources has also strengthened the trend toward externalisation and 
specialisation of the firms’ R&D operations, but also the relocation of some 
operations. Similarly, cost optimisation has encouraged sub-contracting and 
relocation of certain activities into centres that can offer greater cost-efficiency 
e.g. where salaries are relatively low but performance is sufficient to achieve 
high-quality results and good integration into the firm’s global operations.  
 
The efficiency of innovation networks depends on their capacity to integrate 
innovation processes effectively, and on companies’ ability to combine these 
processes with a relevant and timely perception of demand. A major challenge 
is to maintain the right balance of in-house R&D activities to sustain the firm’s 
absorption and anticipation capacities. A further challenge is ability of the 
companies to secure the appropriability of knowledge-related investments. 
 
Combining the available empirical results indicate that the degree of both 
openness and internationalisation varies along the innovation process, across 
sectors and firm sizes. Based on numerous case studies, the OECD (2008a) 
concluded that outside-in openness is at its highest upstream and diminishes as 
projects progress and applications are being developed. Empirical studies 
further suggest that partnerships with academia tend to focus on this upstream 
end and the most R&D intensive sectors (see chapter 2 for extent of use). 
Furthermore, case studies confirm that companies tend to be both more widely 
open upstream and to focus their partnerships with universities on exploratory 
activities (Sachwald 2009). Finally, companies engaging in radical innovation 
processes tend to benefit more strongly from alliances with partners with very 
different technological profiles (Noteboom et al. 2007). Global innovation 
networks are thus partially motivated by access to foreign competences and 
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ideas that thrive in specific ecosystems. Similarly, start ups, which develop a 
very specific technology, play an important role in open innovation networks. 
They are often themselves very open to academic research and participate to the 
transfer of technology, either to the market if they grow and gain a large market 
share, or to more mature companies when they are acquired.  
 
4.6 Policy implications and the contribution of ERA 
 
The Lisbon strategy rightly aimed at stimulating knowledge-based growth in 
the EU. It combined an input based policy (increasing R&D investment) with 
an attention to demand through the achievement of the Single Market. The open 
innovation paradigm nevertheless implies that innovation processes are 
becoming more integrated. As a result, the contributions made by the different 
actors tend to be more specialised and interactions between actors become more 
crucial. In particular, high tech start ups, despite being small and few, can play 
a fundamental role in technology transfer, market development and growth. 
Similarly, technology transfer and public-private partnerships, while 
representing only a small share of R&D budgets, can constitute a major 
stimulus for various innovation types. In this perspective, policies that aim to 
stimulate an evolution of the sector composition of the European business will 
need to reflect and promote open innovation practices appropriate to that 
evolution.  
 
The emergence of open innovation practices thus provides an opportunity to 
reconsider a number of national policies, including RTD policies, interaction-
oriented policies, entrepreneurship policies, science policies, education policies, 
labour market policies and competition policies (De Jong et al. 2008). Global 
open innovation networks also call for a fresh look at attractiveness policies and 
at the role of knowledge circulation. For the EU level a number of 
recommendations follow from the above development three challenges relating 
to international and open innovation networks.  
 
 
1. The entrepreneurial challenge 
Open innovation practices require variety in terms of small entrepreneurial 
activities and their avenues for growth, combined with the structures and 
activities of more established firms. The challenge is to put in place 
structures, networks and markets capable of supporting the development of 
such entrepreneurial activities, which are capable of challenging and also 
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replacing incumbent large companies in dynamics markets, such as high 
tech and knowledge intensive service sectors.  
2. The ecosystem challenge 
The need for more interconnectedness of actors, activities and knowledge 
implies corresponding complementarity among different actors, both public 
and private, as well as appropriate open innovation infrastructures. The 
challenge is to put in place the appropriate incentives and research soft 
infrastructures to enable the exploitation of complementarities and reduce 
transaction costs.  
3. The global connection challenge 
As innovation activities open up to the global economy, a primary challenge 
is to stimulate demand and develop local environments that are attractive to 
the players that perform these activities and deliver commensurate benefits 
to the community. Conversely, local companies, research institutions and 
cluster need to be efficiently connected to global networks, especially if 
they are at the frontier and aim at generating radical innovation. 
 
This Chapter puts forward one policy principle and five policy 
recommendations that focus on the above challenges and the potential 
contribution of ERA to the successful application of open innovation practices 
in Europe. 83  
  
Design EU policies as direct instruments to stimulate research and 
innovation. 
First, as a general principle, EU policies should be designed to have a direct 
impact on research and innovation performance, as opposed to the construction 
of ERA per se. Currently, most ERA initiatives are institutional in nature, and 
seem to take for granted that their successful implementation will eventually 
support the broader goals of the Lisbon strategy in today’s context. A more 
explicit perspective is requested, which requires that policy makers fully 
understand what drives business R&D, how contemporary innovation processes 
operate, and where there are opportunities for the EU to gain a comparative 
advantage. 
 
This change in focus has many implications, for example for the Co-operation 
programme within the Framework Programme. The new perspective could lead, 
                                                 
83 They are intended to be consistent with the findings of earlier expert groups, including the 
2008 report on the rationales for the European Research Area (Georghiou, 2008). 
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for example, to a greater role for the ERC based on excellence through 
competition criteria; the promotion of young innovative companies and their 
growth at the EU level; full reflection on the role of EIT alongside JTIs, lead 
market initiatives, the Eureka programme, etc. Most of all, however, it points to 
the importance of effective policy integration beyond R&D. 
 
Promote the evolution of EU specialisation through the growth of young 
innovative companies 
There are many recent examples of radical and high-performing innovations on 
the market that have come from successful start-ups and also of the enhanced 
cross-fertilisation that is taking place among firms of different ages and sizes. 84 
Yet many European countries have experienced limited growth of such young 
innovative companies, preventing these firms from taking a key role as an 
efficient channel for innovation and knowledge flows to the benefit of the entire 
eco-system. We refer to this as the EU’s growth paradox. Since innovative 
start-ups are less tied down by costs that are sunk in established activity and 
tend to be more agile and flexible than large, already mature firms, they can, 
despite their limited size and number, be a source of new activities. Such firms 
therefore constitute a potentially very important avenue for the evolution of 
specialization and knowledge growth in any economy, including in Europe. 
Furthermore, because (as shown in Chapter 1) aggregate industrial R&D is 
currently concentrated within a small number of large firms, the failure to 
achieve widespread growth has contributed directly to the deficit in European 
business sector R&D. 
 
The challenge is therefore to put in place structures, networks and markets 
capable of supporting the development of such entrepreneurial activities. A 
range of measures need to be taken to underpin opportunity-based or 
knowledge-based entrepreneurship, which by definition hinges on the attitudes 
of individual human beings and the presence of arenas in which risk-taking, 
experimentation and intensive collaboration between complementary 
competencies are possibly (Andersson et al, 2009). Progress will also depend 
on local initiatives enabling improved knowledge and technology transfer, as 
well as on broader issues, including the promotion of demand for innovation, 
the relationships between large and small companies and standard IPR issues, 
such as the Community patent and a European litigation court. It is likely that 
such actions will not be the primary responsibilities of research ministries and 
                                                 
84  Apart from case studies and the transatlantic age differential of large innovative companies, 
Veugelers (2009) provides a statistical analysis in the case of Germany.  
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DG Research, but their active support will be needed for such initiatives to be 
well-targeted and succeed. 
 
SME-related policies in Europe have not been as successful as was hoped, for 
example when measured in terms of these firms’ survival and growth compared 
to other parts of the world (Guellec and Sachwald, 2008). The difficulties faced 
by young innovative companies are largely due to characteristics of national 
economies. Nevertheless the Cooperation programme within the FP has not 
assisted in supporting these, but was instead targeted towards a particular level 
of participation by SMEs. A specific new EU instrument could be designed to 
support the growth of innovative start ups and their evolution. Veugelers (2009) 
has proposed such a new scheme, the characteristics of which could be 
elaborated and further specified.  
 
Stimulate the development of open innovation (soft) infrastructures 
The second challenge specified the need for more interconnectedness of actors, 
activities and knowledge implying complementarity among actors and open 
innovation infrastructures. The challenge is to put in place the appropriate 
incentives and research structures to enable the exploitation of 
complementarities. At the European level, one such structure could be the 
community patent, which should be complemented with European Patent 
Litigation Agreement (EPLA). The implementation of the community patent 
would be an important step to promote efficient open innovation practices but 
also to support the development of young innovative companies in the EU. 
Researchers’ mobility (public-private, international) is another such soft 
infrastructure. The European Institute of Innovation and Technology (EIT) and 
its Knowledge and Innovation Communities provides a specific example of 
such mobility measures. A third structure would be to focus on stimulating 
knowledge and innovation intermediaries supporting the growth of markets for 
knowledge and technologies by matching ideas, knowledge, linkages and 
networks. Such a measure would therefore enable enhanced connectivity 
between small and large firms and between young and more established 
companies in international and open innovation networks emphasising the 
linking of complementary technologies and business opportunities. 
 
Stimulate demand for innovation to increase ERA attractiveness 
Companies’ practices stress the importance of market demand in the 
organisation of the innovation chain as well as in the choice of location for 
R&D activities. In EU countries, companies’ R&D activities will partly depend 
on the development perspectives of new markets, for example to face the 
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challenges of ageing and environment: such markets must provide the prospect 
of sustainable profitability. 
Debates on the stagnation of R&D intensity in Europe have suggested that 
production structures should evolve as the R&D spending of mature firms 
reflects the sectors in which they operate. Open innovation can, and does, 
challenge established companies’ routines and thereby stimulate more radical 
developments which can permit entry into new markets. But the take-up of 
these developments depends also on having successful new and innovative 
firms, for which access to markets is vital and to a large extent comes from 
trading with other (larger) companies. A more integrated ERA and common EU 
market would contribute to a more dynamic growth of new firms within their 
global networks as well as the continued success at global level of established 
players. Lead markets are one example of instruments that could be at the 
intersection of ERA and the Single market. A specific instrument to stimulate 
demand for innovation is Pre-Commercial Procurement of R&D services, a 
very promising scheme that was modelled upon successful US examples and 
put forward by the Commission at the end of 200785. 
 
Promote radical innovation and global connectedness  
As discussed in this Chapter, open innovation tends to be global and vital for 
innovative performance. Empirical studies more specifically suggest that 
companies engaging in radical innovation processes tend to benefit more from 
alliances with partners with very different technological profiles, including 
foreign ones. Innovation intermediaries are important actors, particularly 
suitable for linking partners with complementary technologies. Global 
innovation networks are thus partially motivated by access to foreign 
competences and ideas that thrive in specific ecosystems. ERA should thus 
promote connection with and participation in global networks in order to 
stimulate radical innovation.  
 
A specific open innovation instrument should be designed to promote radical 
innovation and anchor global networks of innovation nodes in ERA. Such an 
instrument would spur partnerships on a European scale and on the basis of 
their potential for radical innovation. It would be based on the “excellence 
through competition” promoted by this report and would impose no 
geographical conditionality. In particular, the scheme could fund projects 
involving non-EU partners, especially in cases where global connectedness is 
necessary to stay at the frontier and help generate radical innovation. 
 
                                                 
85 See http://cordis.europa.eu/fp7/ict/pcp/home_en.html and Chapter 2 on Societal Challenges. 
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4.7 Conclusion: complete and rationalise the ERA policy mix 
 
The dynamics of open innovation networks defines the extent to which 
companies will seek co-operations, engage in identifying the right partners, and 
finding the adequate forms of collaboration for each of their objectives. This 
Chapter has, for example, discussed the case of university-industry 
collaborations and analysed their determinants: companies engage 
spontaneously in extensive collaborations because they have ambitious 
innovation projects that demand specific intellectual input. When companies 
identify a strategic partnership, they tend to seek an agreement, even if the 
partner is geographically distant and if there is no public funding. 
 
The empirical studies available on the determinants of the different types of 
collaborations can be used to revise the objectives and instruments of the 
Framework Programme, in the ways suggested by the Ex-Post Evaluation of 
FP6 (EU 2009a), which proposes greater strategic focus with fewer, 
managerially compatible objectives. This chapter has in particular proposed the 
design of two schemes to address the challenges of global open innovation. 
 
This perspective can also guide the future development of the EU’s State Aid 
Rules and related regulations: to foster university-industry collaborations, to 
provide straightforward operational guidelines that explain when restrictions 
apply and to aim for the minimum restrictions necessary consistent with 
broader policy objectives. 
 
Overall, the range of instruments used by the Commission and others seems 
unmanageable and often unclear to the intended beneficiaries. A general table is 
required of the ERA instruments, expressing their objectives and assessing their 
performance. It is not possible to express the eventual desired balance between 
different mechanisms in place to support research, between funding and non-
funding instruments at one level and between mechanisms such as 171s, 169s, 
Joint Programmes, and the finer details of new PPPs, KICS, and the ERC. This 
will emerge when proper instruments are devised for creating true PPPs and for 
achieving an effective variable-geometry ERA. A judgment can then be made 
of which approaches are working well and which are not. 
 
Considerable impact may be achieved by focusing on a few key areas. Such 
areas include improving the possibility for actors to collaborate according to the 
different logic of their situations; improving the attractiveness of local 
environments within the EU in support of innovation-oriented goals; addressing 
the excellence of public research infrastructures; identifying the strategic 
priorities for R&D and innovation in EU; and improving the connection 
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between R&D, innovation and other public policy priorities, aiming always for 
simplicity and risk-tolerance. 
 
There are some inherent differences in emphasis and potential contradictions, 
which need to be recognised and accommodated. For example, open science 
concentrates on the free flow of knowledge within a global community, without 
too much consideration given to the economic implications, while open 
innovation is driven primarily by the possibility to gain benefits that will be 
economic in nature, if not in their articulation. The ability to resolve such 
differences within public policy will depend largely upon the responsible 
authorities’ ability to provide leadership and take a holistic approach to 
government (Mulgan, 2009). The effectiveness of local, national and regional 
policies is likely to change as innovation practices become more global and 
connected, and policy development will partly depend upon having appropriate 
supporting metrics.86  
 
                                                 
86 There is evidence that current metrics are inadequate for this task (e.g., EU 2007b and the 
OECD “Blue Sky” initiative). 
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Chapter 5:  
Regionalisation and the future of 
European research policy 
 
 
5.1 Introduction: Regional disparities: a problem for research 
and innovation policies 
 
After a long period of incubation, the European Union has adopted the notion of 
merit-based and grant-based competition for funding by creating the European 
Research Council as an independent entity and protecting it from considerations 
of national share and fair return. This is an enormously important achievement, 
one that corrects the previous policy orientation entirely based on networks and 
addresses some of the most relevant weaknesses of the European scientific 
system. The recent institution-building activity at European level is extremely 
encouraging87. It is important to continue along these lines, by keeping the 
political consensus high and by maximizing the impact of new merit-based 
institutions supporting research and innovation.  
 
However, the spatial concentration of innovative activities creates an important 
issue for EU research and innovation policies to address.  At European level, 
the large regional disparities in innovation potential do not seem to reduce over 
time. Such disparities represent a problem not only for cohesion policy, but for 
innovation policy itself. Successful innovation can reinforce, rather than 
counterbalance, a core-periphery hierarchical structure of territories. 
Cumulativeness and path dependency can easily dominate over the catching up 
and entry of peripheral territories.  
 
If innovation inevitably follows a natural pattern of concentration, and if 
competing on a world basis implies the need for excellence, then it will be 
important to reward excellence at European level, whatever the geographic 
origin. However, a number of government policies, including public 
procurement as well as some research and innovation policies actually counter, 
rather than improve, opportunities for decentralisation and spatial 
                                                 
87 On the relative role of policies and institution-building see Bonaccorsi (2007); on the poor 
performance of European science see Institutions vs policies. Science and Public Policy, 303-
316. 
 178 
diversification. Unless such factors are addressed, laggard regions may argue 
that playing the excellence game is unfair, because the playing field is not being 
levelled, and that allocating resources to pure merit-based competition means 
fostering the capabilities of those regions that not only are already strong, but 
also beneficiaries of unfair advantages. 
 
Faced with such issues, there have been at least three main reactions: 
- a position that considers that less developed countries and regions will 
benefit from increased quality of the overall European research system, 
following some unspecified spill-over effect88; 
- a position that underlines the potential for enhanced diversification and 
specialisation given that research and innovation policies become more 
conducive to autonomy and tailoring of growth strategies to local 
conditions; 
- a more critical position that considers that some counterbalance must be 
put in place so that there must be adequate cooperation between 
European research and cohesion policies. 
In this report we have already noted the potential contributions of policies in 
line with the second of these positions. In addition, we subscribe to the third 
position and try to articulate carefully how it may be achieved. 
 
5.2 Institutional path dependency and the persistence of 
disparities: The case of Eastern European countries 
 
Regional disparities are particularly strong and persistent in the New Member 
States in Eastern Europe. It is useful to focus on these countries, not because 
other underdeveloped regions are less important, but because it highlights some 
stringent lessons for research policies that require urgent attention. Possibly, not 
enough time has passed since joining the EU for these NMS to have gained full 
benefits in the fields of research and innovation policy. However, it is also 
possible that they are experiencing the rapid and unintended consequences of 
policies outside the original goals. Such consequences must be understood and 
where possible corrected. 
 
A number of structural factors may explain the persistent disparities89: 
                                                 
88 For example, the per-capita distribution of ERC grants by nationality is much flatter than the 
distribution of the institutes where the grant recipients then work. Unfortunately, this 
observation does not guarantee that there will be subsequent spillover benefits in both 
directions.  
89 It is worth recording that negative outcomes are not inevitable, and that there are regions 
within the NMS which do have relatively strong industrial bases and excellent connections 
between government, academia and industry. 
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(a) Traditionally, many of the NMS have had a high level of tertiary 
education, sometimes with peaks of participation rates for doctoral 
degrees. 
 
The availability of highly-qualified human capital would seem to provide an 
ideal pre-condition for supporting a rapid catching up effort. Paradoxically, this 
is not necessarily the case. In the absence of adequate local infrastructure and 
capital investment, young talented students may be attracted by multinational 
companies that can offer superior wages and relocate them to another country, 
or may prefer to be hired by foreign scientific institutions and universities, also 
because the local research system is uncompetitive in terms of salary and 
careers. Because of this, brain drain can still be a major impediment to growth. 
 
(b) These countries have had a prestigious tradition of public investment 
into fundamental scientific research, mostly organized in centralized 
institutions (Academy of Science). This means that there exists a 
population of scientists and researchers that are active, prestigious and 
internationally recognized. Under these conditions, it is possible that 
national priorities in research and innovation have been driven directly 
by academia rather than by industrial or national objectives, thereby 
tending towards a priority agenda that reflects excellence in scientific 
activity, not necessarily long term growth potential of the economy. 
 
What happens may be similar to the “regulator capture” in industrial markets: 
those that are subject to the policy are those that write it. 
 
(c) On top of these structural conditions, the Europeanization trend in 
research means that the most productive scientists from NMS are being 
drawn into networks at European level. They become more and more 
“European”, receive additional funds, and leverage on initial money to 
build up long term capabilities for fund raising at European level. 
 
This happens in a context where the bulk of the research system is heavily 
influenced, in terms of resources and goals, by the national environment. The 
separation between the internationalized part of the scientific sector and the 
inward-looking part may become dangerous. 
 
(d) Because of the long-term absence of these countries from competitive 
international capitalism, there may be a lack of skilled people who 
understand how to operate in the global economy except on a basis of 
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low costs. This creates a vicious cycle of low investment, poor wages, 
reduced attractiveness and further decline in competitiveness. 
 
This situation will persist until substantive efforts are made to improve the 
competitive performance of the industrial system.  This will not be achieved 
solely by investing primarily in national science, but in general levels of 
education and training and capital infrastructures. 
 
(e) The final outcome of these structural conditions is to create a deep 
separation between the research system and the manufacturing and 
tertiary structure of the country. They have different priorities and 
divergent goals, and the dialogue is problematic. Consequently, there is 
still lock-in of resources that are stuck with low productivity levels over 
extended periods of time.  A new dynamic is required, perhaps along the 
lines described by Saxenian (2006), which fosters brain circulation and 
reinvestment. 
 
Let us review these factors in more detail and consider where and how it may 
possible to overcome them. 
 
Optimal funding 
 
Regardless of whether the objective is to foster excellence or cohesion, the 
current allocation of research funding in many parts of Europe is sub-optimal.  
Strict control of funding by national research agencies and an aversion to 
competitive project funding has produced a lack of competitiveness and sub-
optimal funding at project and team level and unwarranted duplication of effort 
at the system level.  
 
The 2008 ERA Rationales report described the consequences mainly in terms of 
sub-criticality at the institutional level: a reduced inability to handle inter-
disciplinary studies well; lack of economies of scale that could be gained by 
sharing expensive equipment; inability to configure teams from a range of 
capabilities leading to reduced industrial interest in collaboration and higher 
overhead costs; and, perhaps most seriously, reduced flexibility to cope with 
shifts in funding patterns from one field to another. Such issues exacerbate the 
path dependencies that have given rise to regional disparities. 
 
Realizing a more effective market for research funding is a long term goal for 
Europe. Partial achievements have been realized through the Open Method of 
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Coordination approach (OMC)90, particularly with ERA-Net and ERA-Net+ 
schemes and through bilateral and multilateral agreements between research 
funding agencies. A further impact is expected as the European Research 
Council develops, with national governments joining the efforts using the ERC 
approach to enlarge the pool of competing researchers. The notion of Fifth 
freedom is very important here. But much less has been attempted or achieved 
in areas where the concept of a single market would make most sense: the 
funding and organisation of applied research, primarily carried out by RTOs. 
 
The strategic move towards a European level for funding of fundamental and 
applied research on the basis of pure merit, without any national quotas, is to be 
confirmed and reinforced. The key is not to add another source of funding, but 
to change structurally the funding system of public research by pushing towards 
the creation of a large, competitive and transparent funding pool at European 
level. The positive effects may be slow to materialize but in the medium to long 
term, this will benefit those national systems that are willing and able to 
undertake appropriate parallel reforms.  
 
Mobility of researchers 
 
Achieving full mobility of researchers is one of the primary objectives of the 
European Research Area, because this will improve knowledge exchange and 
thereby lead to a thicker and richer job market. Mobility is also necessary for 
junior researchers from less well-resourced countries who wish to pursue state-
of-the-art opportunities but currently work in environments that cannot attract a 
sufficient diversity of skills and resources.  
 
Regional disparities tend to exacerbate the unbalanced patterns of brain drain. 
Countries may have a pool of talented undergraduate and postgraduate students 
to whom they cannot offer career and wage prospects that are reasonably 
competitive with other European countries. For them, entering into the 
European Research Area without a counterbalance policy may worsen the 
situation, with movement of researchers to international centres of excellences 
being seen to reduce local capacity by more than it raises the overall capacity. 
Furthermore, the resulting human capital impoverishment of cohesion regions 
can reduce their capacity to modernize by depriving potential researchers of a 
place to return to. 
 
It is possible to anticipate that some countries and regions with a negative brain 
drain may withdraw political support to European policies aimed at fostering 
                                                 
90 See Appendix 5.1. 
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mobility of researchers. In large countries (such as USA) that share a common 
national identity, where responsibility for research is mainly federal and where 
there has been sufficient time for the system to equilibrate, flows of people 
across states or regions are less of a political problem than in Europe. Yet, we 
can start to see evidence that China is starting to suffer a backlash as a 
consequence of its centralised policies. 
 
The implications are that policies aimed at encouraging international mobility 
require also a widespread belief, which can only partly be sustained by strong 
evidence, that the “European project” is worthwhile and mutually beneficial, 
and by parallel efforts to invigorate all regions according to local interests, 
strengths and priorities. 
 
General levels of education and training  
 
While there is a problem at the top of the skill hierarchy, NMS also start to 
suffer from inadequate investment into mass education at all levels. High 
quality education, particularly in terms of cognitive skills, is essential for 
building the absorptive and innovation capacity of NMS. The OECD PISA 
results indicate that the situation in the majority of NMS in this respect is far 
from satisfactory. There is a need to ensure stricter teaching standards and to 
introduce staff appraisals at all levels in the system. Education systems should 
support creativity by increasing levels of specialisation late in school careers 
and abandoning the culture of mechanistic and repetitive learning. In addition, it 
is essential to reconcile quality and equity of education. The example of Estonia 
confirms that this is possible to achieve in NMS. However, higher quality is 
unlikely without increased investment. The evidence suggests that expenditure 
on education in the Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs) is 
associated with improved quality of education. Most of the NMS spend less per 
student than the OECD average. Improvements are required at all levels of 
education and should not be made at the expense of other levels.  
 
The wider problem of skills mismatch in the labour market is not unique to the 
NMS, but is a major structural problem for them. The need to invest more in 
lifelong learning and retraining to help workers and firms to continually 
upgrade their skills is not yet a national priority in NMS and should be given 
much more prominence. The evidence suggests that providing tax incentives for 
workers and firms to take up training opportunities is more fruitful than 
attempts to set up publicly-managed training programmes. The current global 
financial crisis should not be used as an excuse for reducing funding for 
education and training. 
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Priority setting 
 
R&D systems in NMS are currently caught up in a strong process of 
“Europeanization”. The dynamics of EU RTD policy have become a part of the 
organizational logic of national S&T and innovation policies.  However, this 
may lead to the mechanical transfer of policy models that may not be the most 
relevant for their priorities. The strongest effects of Europeanization in the 
southern EU countries were on the definition of relevant policy actions and 
mechanisms and of national priorities. There is no reason to believe that the 
outcome will be any different for the NMS, and this may lead to a strong policy 
myopia in which the importance of local R&D issues, the existence of local 
strengths and the search for local solutions are ignored. Excessive reliance on 
the EU policy shelf and ignorance of local issues risks reducing the pressures to 
develop policy as a ‘discovery process’ carried out in support of local interests.  
 
Europeanization of the research system 
 
A common feature in most of the NMS is that improvements in their national 
innovation systems (NIS) are considered largely in the context of research 
(rather than innovation) and reflected in publishing activities (rather than 
economic growth). This trend is likely to strengthen through the 
Europeanization of their R&D systems, which will plug these countries’ 
research efforts into the best EU R&D groups and networks. We can expect 
improvements in terms of a better balance between incentives (selection 
through project funding) and stability (share of institutional funding). However, 
the bottleneck – weak domestic demand for R&D and a weak business 
enterprise sector (BES) able to capitalize upon the resources available – is 
likely to remain a major structural weakness. 
 
Overall, improvements in NMS have been made by introducing peer-review 
based funding mechanisms that are geared towards scientific excellence. 
However, the exclusive use of excellence criteria may actually ‘freeze’ science 
specialisation. Funding systems are still inadequate in terms of ensuring 
industry and social relevance. This would require a much stronger involvement 
of users in evaluation and funding, and better policies for developing applied 
research institutions and RTOs. 
 
Crucially important, moreover, is that the distribution of funds needs to be 
designed so as to appreciate pluralism, niche-strategies, development potential 
and renewal. Resources are not to flow in a uni-dimensional manner to what is 
already established, thereby concentrating on past excellence rather than future 
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needs. Inherent here is the difficulties faced by an established scientific 
community in appreciating what may come ahead. 
  
However, these effects by themselves will not ensure the relevance of these 
countries’ R&D systems to their local economies. As the best R&D groups 
become integrated into EU networks, the gap between them and the local 
business sectors may widen. The situation of NMS may resemble the situation 
in Greece where a competent R&D system has relatively limited links to the 
domestic business sector. It is essential that the EU and NMS analyse how to 
avoid replication and multiplication of the Greek scenario to NMS. 
 
The weakness of horizontal linkages 
 
Two major channels of knowledge inflow in NMS are in upstream areas of 
R&D through the Framework Programme and in downstream areas through 
knowledge transfer via foreign direct investment (FDI) and industrial networks.   
 
So far, FDI and industrial networks have provided the main channels for 
productivity improvements and knowledge inflows in NMS.  Econometric 
research on FDI in NMS points to the importance of vertical backward linkages 
as the major channel for positive spillovers and the relative weaknesses of 
horizontal linkages resulting in non-existent or negative horizontal spillovers. In 
upstream areas, the NMS are either already integrated into the EU R&D system 
through research networks (Slovenia, Estonia) or are on the way to be 
integrated through their participation in EU R&D programmes (Romania, 
Poland). This increases competition, funding, and the attractiveness and 
excellence of their R&D systems. However, integration of the NMS through 
vertical R&D and FDI knowledge flows may lead to fragmentation of their 
innovation system (Figure 5.1). 
 
EU Centers of excellence MNCs: parents and other subsidaries
weak horizontal linkages
National centres of excellence Local FDI subsidaries
 
 
Figure 5.1 Vertical R&D and FDI knowledge flows in NMS 
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Outcome 
• Vertical integration; horizontal fragmentation 
Policy focus 
• Support to the weakest agent: local business R&D 
• Transfer function on supply side (R&D) 
• Transfer function on demand side (FDI/local firms) 
 
The major channels for improvements in NIS should be horizontal linkages 
between public R&D (supply side) and FDI with domestic suppliers and buyers 
(demand side). (Horizontal) linkages between the supply and demand sides of 
R&D are important for building the national innovation system (NSI).  
 
A strong local business enterprise sector is the key actor in coupling demand 
and supply of R&D, and its international integration.  The paucity of BES R&D 
and its weak links to domestic sources of knowledge is at the heart of the weak 
innovation systems in the NMS.  Furthermore, a conscious policy of building 
EU centres of excellence in NMS may not necessarily lead to positive outcomes 
but could instead crowd out spontaneous innovation activities. 
 
Summing up 
 
Summing up, it is unlikely that ERA can, in itself, produce beneficial effects in 
all regions. Positive local effects are not guaranteed, due to strong 
interdependencies between places and other direct and indirect effects. The 
underlying principle of ERA - Fifth freedom – will be “spatially-blind” unless it 
accounts for local efficiency effects in individual member states.  Ignoring these 
local effects can lead to a number of unintended negative consequences, 
including local irrelevance: investment may be favoured in activities which are 
inappropriate and not in line with either actual or potential comparative 
advantage of regions/places.  This trade off between excellence and cohesion is 
context specific and can be only addressed by taking local relevance into 
account.  
 
Recently a number of high-level concepts have been introduced or rediscovered 
in the policy debate at European level, which are extremely relevant in order to 
design a better policy trade-off. They are: 
• place-based policies 
• smart specialization 
• conditionality. 
We review them in turn and try to derive a number of implications at the end of 
this Chapter. 
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5.3 Combining merit-based and place-based policies 
 
The Barca report (2009)91 sees innovation as one of core priorities within its 
place-based approach to EU cohesion. Place-based interventions are proposed 
as complementary to developing a European Research Area, by selecting in 
each region a limited number of sectors in which innovation can most readily 
occur and a knowledge base built up. 
 
The Report argues that policy effectiveness has been achieved ‘when cohesion 
policy has been implemented as a coherent part of a national development 
strategy (p. 106). Indeed, this is quite compatible to historical experience that 
growth and catching up is usually complement between national development 
strategy and foreign knowledge imported in different forms (FDI, capital 
equipment, skills flows, trade, etc). The novelty of the Barca Report approach is 
that it recognises the limits of an endogenous only approach to development. 
The argument is that the massive injections of EU funds in regional knowledge 
economies are not nearly enough by themselves, but could even be detrimental. 
For example, it observes serious limitations to actions like RIS.  
 
‘For whatever reason, the interventions in this area in the 2000-2006 
programming period have not lived up the expectations. The capacity to build, 
place by place, a policy tailored to regional innovative potential was often 
inadequate. Efforts to improve policy-making, strategy development and 
evaluation, including coordination between national and regional policy-
making, were limited. Financial allocations to innovation planned in 2000 had 
to be reduced at the mid-term point in several Member States due to 
implementation difficulties arising from the design of the new measures and the 
weak demand from enterprises’ (Barca, 2009, p. 311). 
 
Instead, Barca (2009) pleads for combined exogenous and endogenous push. 
The report sees the main purpose of cohesion policy not in redistribution but to 
trigger institutional change and to break inefficiencies and social exclusion 
traps through the provision of public goods and services. (p. xiii). This 
triggering of institutional change can come only through ‘an exogenous public 
intervention (which) can improve things by upsetting the existing balance. But 
for this intervention to be effective, it needs to be accompanied by increased 
local involvement. ‘This is the condition for eliciting the information on 
                                                 
91 Barca (2009) An Agenda For a Reformed Cohesion Policy. A place-based approach to 
meeting European Union challenges and expectations. Independent Report prepared at the 
request of Danuta Hübner, Commissioner for Regional Policy by Fabrizio Barca, April 2009 
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preferences and the local knowledge needed to tailor interventions to places and 
to reap the advantages of closer citizen control’ (p. 40). 
 
Sufficient local involvement can only be achieved though locally relevant 
activities. For example, the New Member States need to find ways of increasing 
the industrial relevance of their science base by linking Centres of excellence in 
science to areas of industrial strength.  In addition, policies need to differentiate 
between research and non-research based activities as the latter are quite 
relevant for catching up countries. In general, there is very little implementation 
of policies that differentiate in any operational way between non-research-based 
activities that lead to innovation, and research based activities – in particular 
R&D – that do lead to innovation (EW, 2006)92. 
 
A further integration of domestic R&D into the EU R&D networks will lead to 
an improved R&D system in terms of quality and international excellence, but 
not necessarily in terms of local relevance. (In fact, the gap between supply and 
demand in terms of local R&D may widen.) However, we can expect that 
NMS’ R&D systems will be highly integrated into the ERA. This should have 
positive effects in terms of dynamism and excellence in R&D, as many 
countries’ R&D groups will be ‘plugged’ into the EU R&D networks. In the 
long-term this should have similarly positive effects on education systems 
through the reorganization of universities, and increased R&D levels which in 
turn should lead to higher quality teaching.  The Expert Group’s main argument 
is that such gains can only be achieved through policies that extend far beyond 
ERA. 
 
 
5.4 (Smart) specialization  
 
The expert group on Knowledge for growth chaired by Dominique Foray has 
raised the attention on the lack of specialisation at national and regional level as 
an important factor, launching the notion of “smart specialisation” (Foray, 
2008; David, Foray and Hall, 2009). The argument goes as follows: if all 
countries and regions in Europe fight to reach the frontier of science and 
innovation, the majority will miss the goal. To reach the frontier there are 
extremely severe conditions in terms of scale, scope and critical mass. As an 
                                                 
92 EW (2006) Technical Report concerning information collection and analysis on R&D 
specialisation in Europe For the Specific Contract: Future data requirements of the 
ERAWATCH Baseload inventory: Feasibility study on R&D specialisation. Submitted to the 
IPTS by the ERAWATCH NETWORK ASBL, Prepared by: Joanneum Research, Logotech, 
NIFU-STEP, SPRU – University of Sussex, ISI Fraunhofer, Vol 1, Brussels, October 2006 
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example, only four US universities account for 15% of the overall career 
mobility of top worldwide 1000 scientists in computer science. 
 
For countries, regions and institutions that cannot play this game, it would be 
better to search for a suitable specialisation in the global competitive landscape. 
It is most likely that this specialisation will take place along applications, 
exploiting business segments, niches, or markets that require adaptation of 
general technologies to specific user needs. 
 
The specific properties of General Purpose Technologies (GPTs) define a 
framework that helps to clarify the logic of Smart Specialisation (SS). While 
major innovations often result from the commercialization of a core GPT 
invention, and its successive technological elaborations – such as the double-
condensing steam engine, the electric dynamo, the internal combustion engine, 
or the micro-processor, there myriads of economically important innovations 
that result from the « co-invention » of applications (steam-ships and 
locomotives, arc-lamps and AC motors, etc.) In fact, the characteristics of a 
GPT are horizontal propagation throughout the economy and complementarity 
between invention and application development. Expressed in the words of an 
economist, invention of a GPT extends the frontier of invention possibilities for 
the whole economy, while application development changes the production 
function of a particular sector. The basic inventions generate new opportunities 
for developing applications in particular sectors. Reciprocally, application co-
invention increases the size of the general technology market and improves the 
economic return on invention activities relating to it. There are therefore 
dynamic feedback loops in accordance with which inventions give rise to the 
co-invention of applications, which in their turn increase the return on 
subsequent inventions. When things evolve favourably, a long-term dynamic 
develops, consisting of large-scale investments in research and innovation 
whose social and private marginal rates of return attain high levels. This 
dynamic may be spatially distributed between regions specialised in the basic 
inventions and regions investing in specific application domains. 
  
This framework suggests strategies that can be pursued with advantage both by 
regions that are at the scientific and technological frontier and by those that are 
less advanced. While the leader regions93 invest in the invention of a General 
Purpose technology (GPT) or the combination of different GPTs 
                                                 
93 In the Knowledge for Growth contributions, a distinction is drawn between "leader regions" 
that master the technological frontier, follower regions that are able to catch up to a leader 
region and laggards who struggle to build up absorptive capacities to apply advanced 
technologies (see Policy Brief N° 5 on catching-up countries). 
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(bioinformatics), follower regions often are better advised to invest in the « co-
invention of applications » - that is – the development of the applications of a 
GPT in one or several important domains of the regional economy. Some 
examples would be biotechnology applied to the exploitation of maritime 
resources; nanotechnology applied to the wine quality control, fishing, cheese 
and olive oil industries; information technology applied to the management of 
knowledge about and the maintenance of archaeological and historical 
patrimonies. By so doing, the follower regions and the firms within them 
become part of a realistic and practicable competitive environment -- defining 
an arena of competition in which the players are more symmetrically endowed, 
and a viable market niche can be created that will not be quickly exposed to the 
entry of  larger external competitors. The human capacities and resources 
formed by the region, thanks in particular to its higher education, professional 
training and research programmes, will constitute « co-specialised assets » – in 
other words the regions and their assets have mutual needs and attraction for 
one other – which accordingly reduces the risk of seeing these resources go 
elsewhere. 
  
Using the GPT framework, we hope to make clear that smart specialization 
should not be associated with a strategy of specialization of region X for 
instance in tourism. What smart specialisation suggests for region X is to 
specialize in the co-invention of ICTs application in the sector of tourism, for 
instance to improve the quality of some services. Smart specialization deals 
with R&D and innovation specialisation. 
 
Experts and policy makers are increasingly thinking that the question of “how 
to specialize or what specialization (for this country or this region)?” 
relevancies becoming more relevant as the European Research Area is 
advancing, particularly in those regions/countries that are not leading in any 
science and technology fields. These regions/countries have in any case to 
increase their intensity of knowledge investments and intangible capital in the 
form of high education and vocational training, public and private R&D, other 
innovation activities assets. The question is whether there is something better to 
do than investing a bit in biotechnology, a bit in information technology, a bit in 
nanotechnology. Is there not a better strategy for them than being subcritical 
and inefficient in allocating resources to those fields in which they will always 
be laggards? So a policy question of great relevance for any (or almost any) 
region/country in Europe is now: how should it position itself in the knowledge 
economy? 
 
For Europe, with its multitude of still highly fragmented layers of governance 
and sub-critical institutions, it will be crucial that the ongoing process of 
 190 
knowledge accumulation leads to regional smart specialization, a process which 
avoids the problems of “locational tournament” competition amongst regions in 
developing many, similar knowledge peaks. At the same time, the basis of such 
regional peaks should be sufficiently large and locally “deeply” integrated 
(Veugelers and Mrak, 2009).  Smart specialization, which is an entrepreneurial 
and decentralized process of search and discovery, is considered as a conceptual 
response to this challenge.  In this entrepreneurial process the new knowledge 
produced is closely linked to the particular specialisations of a region. 
Therefore the social value is high as the new knowledge generation is intended 
to guide the development of that region’s economy. 
 
One of rationales for the ERA is that it should avoid unwarranted duplication of 
research, and instead aim to achieve economies of scale and regional 
specialization. The EW (2006) report on R&D specialization points out that 
duplication becomes a problem ‘when there is a massive duplication of research 
efforts often followed by non-original research which neither contributes to the 
advancement of the frontiers of knowledge organically nor serves any particular 
regional or national innovation needs. Such research does not contribute to 
national or regional absorptive capacity; neither does it advance the S&T 
frontier’. So, the real issue is not duplication as such but whether activities are 
of sufficient quality and local relevance. If research was at the world level of 
quality, duplication would simply reflect a diversity of approaches. Instead, 
when the research is of mediocre quality and locally irrelevant, it becomes 
redundant.  
 
However, before we address the issue of specialization (or the lack thereof, i.e. 
duplication) it is necessary to establish whether there is actually a lack of 
specialization in R&D in EU. We draw on the EW (2006) report which is the 
first (though still pilot) systematic effort to look at this issue across the EU. 
Major stylized facts which emerge from this preliminary work are: 
• There is not a lack of specialization of R&D profiles in EU27. Overall, 
there is a great deal of differentiation amongst the EU countries in terms 
of their R&D specialisation profiles94.  
• Countries tend to be more specialised in terms of technology and 
economy than in terms of science. The scientific profiles of the three 
regions – the EU-15, Japan and the USA – are more homogeneous (with 
fewer specialisation areas) compared to BERD specialisation.  
                                                 
94 For example, only 22 of a possible 171 correlations (13%) of pairs of countries are positive 
and statistically significant; a further 10 are negative and significant. 
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• The real issue seem to be not lack of specialization, but lack of links 
between economic and science specialization. For example, the BERD 
specialisation profile in the EU-15 is correlated neither with value-added 
nor with employment specialisation profiles. Conversely, the USA 
specialisation profile is strongly and positively correlated both with 
value-added and employment specialisation profiles. 
• The striking pattern is the lack of parallelism between public and private 
sectors so far as the structure of the respective knowledge bases are 
concerned. However, this may be a mirage, as public R&D 
organisations ‘may be more geared to scientific ways of structuring 
content, based on academic disciplines while firms in the private sector, 
on the other hand, structure themselves according to the pattern of 
industry and consumer demands, which may constitute quite a different 
structural ‘map’ (EW, 2006).  
• There is not lack of specialization in terms of BERD specialization 
profiles in EU. Overall, there are large differences between the EU 
countries in terms of business R&D specialisation profiles. The EU 
countries business R&D specialisation profiles are more varied than 
their profiles in terms of economic, technological and scientific 
specialisations. 
• A variation in business R&D is largely due to differences in many non-
manufacturing sectors like mining, retail/wholesale trade, R&D services 
telecommunications services and agriculture than manufacturing sectors. 
In contrast, many of the manufacturing sectors display the same level of 
variation in both economic and R&D specialisations. 
 
One of conclusions of this report is that policy makers should pay more 
attention to how and why BERD is so weakly correlated with economic 
specialisation and how this relates to activities in their public R&D bases. For 
example, ‘the comparison of Estonian and Finnish wood sectors reveals that in 
Estonia the public R&D base is extremely weak and not aligned with the 
sectors under discussion. While the absorptive capacities of firms in Estonian 
wood sectors are increasing, the lack of relevant domestic research institutions 
may become an impediment to the future development of the wood sector as a 
whole. Additionally, public measures for domestic IT and biotechnology 
sectors to specialise in wood-related technologies would be desirable’ (EW, 
2006).  
 
The issue of specialization is often reduced to the choice between high or low 
tech. A policy issue has been defined as a choice of the EU between focus on 
high-technology and science-based industries as drivers of growth and 
employment problems, or whether it should look to the growth prospects within 
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the low-tech and medium–low-tech industries on which the European economy 
is actually based. An important result of the PILOT project is the recognition 
that the policy issue is not a choice between these apparent alternatives as low 
and medium tech sectors are significant users of the output from high-tech 
sectors (Robertson and Patel 2007). The PILOT project has showed that 
knowledge generation appears throughout the industrial system independently 
of the high-tech sectors. (…) technology flows are complex and the tendency for 
policy-makers to focus on flows within the high-tech sector are seriously 
misjudged (…) These findings underpin the basic argument of the study, that 
technology flows are complex and the tendency for policy-makers to focus on 
flows within the high-tech sector are seriously misjudged (EW, 2006). 
 
The idea of smart specialization has already been developed in policy studies 
although under different labels95. One alternative label is ‘new industrial policy’ 
which has been developed by the World Bank Institute group to formulate 
policies for technology catch-up taking into account the latest understanding of 
the nature of knowledge, technology and growth96. The key features of this 
approach are that97: 
 
• industrial policy is a process for fostering restructuring and 
technological dynamism. It offers solutions that go beyond the 
traditional focus on background conditions and improvements in the 
investment climate; 
• from an innovation perspective, it is important to understand the policy 
implications of a ‘binding constraints’ view of economic growth98; 
• policy should rely on the ‘islands of excellence’ that exist in (almost) 
every country to reform less successful areas; 
•  unlike the old ‘picking winners’ industrial policy, the key assumption in 
the new industrial policy is that no one, government included, can have  
a panoramic view of the economy—all views are necessarily partial; 
• mechanisms for creating new opportunities are search networks—
private-public partnerships and programmes that should bring together 
the better performing segments of the public sector and the better 
performing segments of the productive sector in an attempt to relax and 
unblock binding constraints; 
                                                 
95 This section draws also on Radosevic (2009). 
96 For the purposes of this report we consider differences between concepts of industrial and 
innovation policy to be non-significant.  
97 http://go.worldbank.org/BVKEUGB840.  
98 The ‘binding constraints’ view of growth is an idea of Rodrik’s, which was fully taken on 
board in the World Bank (2005) study. This is a targeted approach which requires an in-depth 
understanding of country specificities, rather than the application of best practice solutions.  
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• the focus of policy is on missing connections, which, when established, 
should have synergistic and increasing effects99. 
 
This new perspective recognizes that growth constraints are never general and 
generic, but are most often specific. This thinking resonates very well with the 
Barca Report (2009) which argues that ‘design of integrated interventions must 
be tailored to places, since it largely depends on the knowledge and preferences 
of people living in it (p. 6).  
 
 
5.5 Conditionality 
 
Clearly, if binding constraints are local and require a specific approach, the 
policy must focus on local knowledge. A key objective of this process is to 
identify constraints and establishing mechanisms for overcoming them.  
 
The Barca report (2009) argues that ‘the place-based concept does not assume 
that the exogenous State knows better. Instead, it allows for information being 
incomplete and designs a method for reducing the degree of incompleteness. It 
requires local knowledge to be “elicited and aggregated” and then combined 
with global knowledge (the routines and engineering know-how embodied in 
the provision of any public good or service). (..) in order to get local actors to 
reveal information and their preferences (regardless of whether they are 
members of the elite or not), the exogenous intervention must encourage their 
active involvement’. 
 
Going into more detail of how such an approach could work, we firstly note 
that a major implication is that the actual implementation is more critical than 
ex ante rational design of policies. Because of the need to learn from specific 
and local conditions “there is a strong element of indeterminacy in strategic 
policies, by definition, in contrast to market failure policies which, ideally, 
should be able to calculate the welfare effects of each intervention. As the 
outcome is not known in advance - only the strategic objectives - the 
implementation is more important than the initial design. The policy process 
becomes a learning activity in itself” (Radosevic, 1997: 192). An alternative is 
to go beyond the old ‘picking winners’ industrial policy by focusing on an 
entrepreneurial and decentralized process of search and discovery, which is 
compatible with the idea of research and innovation networks - private-public 
partnerships and programmes that should bring together the public and private 
                                                 
99 In that respect, the New Industrial Policy is quite similar to the so-called second generation 
innovation policies (see EU, 2002). 
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sector in attempt to discover economically attractive specializations. When 
industrial policy is approached as a process, what matters much more is the 
establishment of ‘search networks’, i.e. cooperative public and private sector 
efforts that anticipate technological change and its effects rather then a priori 
defined targets (Sabel, 2005; Wilson and Furtado, 2006; Kuznetsov and Sabel, 
2006). It is more important to ensure the ability to learn from mistakes than to 
design policies that try to avoid any mistakes. 
 
Secondly, there is prioritising of the institutional basis of industrial (innovation) 
policy over specific interventions.  This idea is related to Peter Evans’ (1995) 
idea of ‘embedded autonomy’. Evans points to a paradox between autonomy 
and embeddedness which the State must resolve. State autonomy is necessary, 
but not sufficient. It needs to be complemented by an intimate understanding of 
specific industry situations, which is possible only through close links with 
business. Successful developmental States have managed to establish close ties 
and networks with the agents of modernization while at the same time retaining 
their autonomy, i.e. the capacity to avoid State capture. 
 
Third, these policy goals are better implemented if the principle of 
conditionality is adopted on a large scale. By conditionality we mean a policy 
framework and several policy tools that make financial support from the 
European Union conditional on a number of achievements on the part of those 
receiving the resources.100 The basic idea is that, in order to build on learning 
about local conditions for growth, it is essential that actors share the risk of 
policies. Research and innovation policies are by nature subject to uncertainty 
and risk. Actors accumulate learning and local expertise, but this can result in 
information asymmetries with respect to policy makers, that can be exploited to 
carry out inefficient policies or to benefit from rents. Policy makers can 
overcome this situation by defining policies not on overall goals, but by 
conditioning funding on intermediate or final outcomes. In doing so, a policy 
maker provides strong incentives to those actors that have the best available 
knowledge on how to reach results, while discouraging opportunism and rent 
extraction. In this way the burden of risk is placed on the shoulders of those that 
have the best local knowledge, combined with the best global or “engineering” 
knowledge on implementation of policies. 
 
Conditionality exists on two main levels: macro-level and micro-level.  
 
                                                 
100 The idea of conditionality is traces its origin to the idea of performance requirements as 
exemplified in development economics through analysis of Korean industrial policy by Chang 
(1993) and by World Bank in its East Asian Miracle study (1993). At the European level it has 
been taken on board by the Barca Report on the basis of a contribution by Bonaccorsi (2009). 
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At macro-level the European Commission might apply conditionality in the 
planning phase, in the relations with national and regional governments over 
Structural Funds. The object of conditionality should be focused on 
specialisation. Countries and regions should give evidence of a strategic process 
in which they have the ability to identify areas in which the goal to compete at 
international level is realistic and feasible, although with risks.  
 
At micro-level national and regional governments may apply extensively policy 
tools based on conditionality on intermediate and final results. This means: 
- for those innovation processes for which there is a state of the art in 
international practice, so that the main activities and skills are well 
known and somewhat standardized, apply complete contracting 
strategies, e.g. conditionality of financial support on output indicators; 
- for those research and innovation activities for which uncertainty 
precludes complete contracting, adopt a two-stage policy, as follows: (a) 
in stage I there must be an open call in which actors self-select projects 
and define autonomously intermediate results to be monitored in due 
time; (b) in stage II projects are selected and funded, but subsequent 
funding is conditional on the achievement of intermediate results 
commonly agreed, as monitored by independent parties; 
- in the latter case, leave open the room for renegotiation of contracts, but 
subject to third-party monitoring, in order to define flexibly the 
adaptations needed. 
 
Conditionality is a powerful tool for supporting policy learning because it helps 
to build up the causal relations that can be replicated, taking into account all 
differences in context. This is particularly true at the micro-level. 
 
 
5.6 The role of relevant knowledge 
 
The Framework Programme’s focus on research and on its intermediate outputs 
(designs, pilots) without sufficient attention on how to get the results 
implemented may lead to new gaps. The structuring effect of the ERA will be 
the biggest in NMS. As discussed in this Chapter, while this can have very 
positive effects, there are also likely to be negative effects for which there need 
to be counteracting policies in place. Such policies should firstly prioritise 
locally relevant but internationally excellent R&D (Table 5.1).  As this may not 
be possible in many areas, NMS would then tend to give priority to the second 
best area, to islands of excellence but locally not necessarily relevant research. 
Areas that are locally relevant but are of poor international quality constitute 
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cases of ‘policy myopia’, i.e. opportunities for comparative advantage which 
are not addressed by policy.   
 
 Locally relevant Locally irrelevant 
Excellence (1) First best/  
Virtuous cycle 
 
(2) Second best/ 
Islands of excellence but not 
relevant locally 
Non-
excellence 
(3) Third best/  
Locally relevant but 
mediocre R&D 
(4) Bad strategic option/  
Locally irrelevant and mediocre in 
terms of quality/ Vicious cycle 
 
Table 5.1: A taxonomy of public policies funding research  
 
Public policy should avoid funding research that is locally irrelevant and 
internationally uncompetitive. However, this probably constitutes a major part 
of current funding. For example, after many years of effort designed to root out 
such problems, the 2008 UK Research Assessment Exercise shows that 36% of 
research activity in UK is internationally recognised but not internationally 
excellent, or is of national quality only.  We can imagine that the situation in 
some countries is likely to be much worse. One impact of ERA and Fifth 
freedom policies will be to reduce fourth quadrant effort in favour of second 
quadrant. However, it is less certain what will be the effects on the first and 
third quadrant. 
 
Secondly, R&D policy should prioritize locally relevant R&D by requiring that 
domestic users play a bigger role. However, problems related to the 
participation of the business sector in FP programs will be further magnified in 
the case of the NMS. Research capacities should be linked to firm level demand 
through an increased share of co-funding mechanisms involving the business 
enterprise sector. In this way co-funding schemes should become important for 
connecting pockets of scientific excellence with the business sector, compared 
to relatively extensive support for science parks, high-tech incubators and other 
similar initiatives. Building research capacities in the public sector that support 
technology absorption and technology development in close cooperation with 
commercial enterprises, should enhance knowledge diffusion and the capability 
formation.   
 
Third, at national level, responsibilities for innovation policy tend to be 
confined to either the science or the economy ministry. The increased 
importance of policies closely related to innovation like education, environment 
and economy call for establishment of better coordination mechanisms at the 
top level to drive through change. A much improved coordination in the NMS 
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is required to realize potentially positive structuring effects of ERA but also to 
counteract negative effects of horizontal fragmentation. 
 
Fourth, a better coordination between Cohesion, Structural Funds and the 
Research Framework programmes policies is warranted. However, it is not 
clear whether better connection between Structural Funds and FP will lead to 
anything other than the introduction of new RTD capacities which are not 
necessarily relevant to the local economy. In other words, better coordination of 
RTD may not by itself really solve the issue of local relevance unless the 
approach to Structural Funds is re-examined. There is evidence that the 
incentives provided by the structural funds primarily stimulate financial 
absorption rather than ensuring long-term effects. The cumbersome procedures 
involved are often further complicated by the rules of national administrations 
and are not leveraging national innovation capacities. An overall re-evaluation 
is needed to assess the role of SF in building firm and industry specific 
infrastructures with strong linkages to public research systems, as a means of 
attracting additional or embedding existing foreign direct investment (FDI). 
This evaluation should be approached from the perspective of growth, rather 
than redistribution. 
  
Fifth and finally, Structural Funds (SF) are widely used a substitute for national 
funding in RTD in NMS. There are serious limits to this substitutive role and 
they should be re-converted into complementary funding as this is the best way 
to ensure local relevance and achieve broader support. In addition, while the 
Framework Programme may make a major contribution to R&D quality in 
NMS but increased FP participation will not necessarily lead to increased 
funding effort at the national level. In both cases, the complementary national 
funding will be easier to realize if there is a conscious push to ensure local 
relevance and to link RTD policies with broader economic development. This 
may lead to smaller financial benefits for NMS but will ensure higher local 
relevance of funded RTD activities. 
 
 
5.7 From a principle of subsidiarity to principle of shared 
responsibility 
 
A new policy coordination arena is only possible when there is an institutional 
context for its implementation. Whether a much stronger coordination between 
DG Research, DG Enterprise, DG Information Society and DG Regio is a 
solution to this challenge is an issue for further discussion. Whether the new 
policy coordination arena can be developed within the EU which still operates 
based on the principle of subsidiarity is also an issue for further discussion. 
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While the Expert Group can see merit in both perspectives, it sees the major 
challenges in terms of coordination of EU and national policies. 
 
The Barca report (2009) is fully aware of this challenge and tries to find 
answers within the EU innovation policy as a multi-level governance activity. 
By adopting the place-based approach that goes beyond the traditional dilemma 
of fiscal federalism of whether to decentralise or centralise any given public 
function, it argues that the responsibility for policy design and implementation 
should be allocated among different levels of government. 
 
‘More specifically, the authority governing the exogenous intervention sets the 
priorities, rules and general objectives for using the funding provided, leaving 
it to lower levels of government to implement these principles according to the 
context as they see fit’ (Barca, 2009, p. xi). 
 
A key ingredient of the place-based approach is that development is ‘promoted 
from outside the place by a system of multilevel governance where grants 
subject to conditionalities on both objectives and institutions are transferred 
from higher to lower levels of government’ (p. 5). On that basis, the report 
regards the issue to be how to design governance arrangements under which the 
two levels of government share responsibility for each public good and service. 
Instead of allocating to each of them a certain number of services, each of them 
can be allocated a certain number of tasks in the provision of services of all 
kinds (ibid) (p. 41). 
 
This shift from a separation of responsibilities in terms of types of services to 
one in terms of tasks in their provision is justified by the concept of 
subsidiarity. Barca’s argument is that ‘in the context of place-based policies, 
subsidiarity needs to be interpreted with reference to responsibility not for 
whole sectors, but for whole tasks’.  
 
As the Report has shown, the multilevel governance that runs place-based 
development policies must appropriately ‘combine conditionality and 
subsidiarity. In particular, it must allow the level of government responsible for 
the exogenous action to set priorities and to shape criteria for interventions 
(conditionalities), while at the same time allowing and promoting the freedom 
of the private and public actors at lower level of government to “advance ends 
as they see fit” on the basis of their knowledge and preferences (subsidiarity)’. 
 
The concept of conditionality requires different rationales which may contradict 
the absolute principle of subsidiarity if applied through its traditional criteria. 
For example, there may be conflicts between EU and national views regarding 
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mobility policies for research scientists and engineers. From the EU 
perspective, mobility of personnel should be encouraged and is an essential part 
of ERA while from a national perspective embedding research personnel should 
be seen as a priority.  A subsidiarity principle does not recognise the need for 
vertical policy cooperation. It assumes that there is one optimal policy level 
while in practice there is an increasing scope and need for multi-level policy 
action. However, it does not follow from this that any multi-level policy 
cooperation is good. A case for multi-level policy action must be justified in 
similar manner as the case for subsidiarity based policy action is justified.  
 
We suggest shifting the emphasis away from a principle of subsidiarity in 
favour of a principle of shared responsibility. This principle has been developed 
in a recent EU funded study (Radosevic et al, 2008). There, a methodology was 
developed, which enables an assessment of which measures firstly meet the 
criteria of (a) shared responsibility, i.e. by which it is beneficial for a policy 
instrument to be used at several policy levels; and (b) beneficial alignment 
between different policy levels. The first step is to check economies of scale, 
heterogeneity, cross-border spill-overs, and frequency of use of the instrument 
to evaluate whether there is a case for shared or coordinated responsibilities in 
innovation policy. The second step establishes what the potential for 
complementarities (network alignment potential) is, which depends largely on 
whether stakeholders have complementary objectives.  The questions which 
need to be answered in this step are: Who are the stakeholders? How do they 
interact? And, What are their respective roles and interests? 
 
An analysis of 10 innovation policy instruments from the perspective of their 
potential to promote EU-wide trans-national cooperation has shown the 
following: 
a) There is not a general case for EU-wide trans-national (vertical) cooperation 
potential. This potential has to be demonstrated in each individual case and 
would require some prior analytical work and be applied to a very specific and 
elaborated policy proposal. Vertical complementarities are most often quite 
specific and rarely general i.e. applicable across broad policy areas. 
 
b) Within policy areas where potential for vertical complementarities may seem 
quite limited there are selective EU-wide areas with great potential for 
alignment or promotion of ERA. For example, the recruitment of skilled 
personnel in enterprises has in general a moderate potential for trans-national 
collaboration but in some selected areas, especially in those where the EU is 
deficient on a large scale, this potential may be quite significant.  Moderate 
alignment potential of programmes for risk capital could be significantly 
changed by EU legislation in this area. Potential for trans-European cooperation 
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in service innovation and public procurement is possible in sectoral 
partnerships at the EU level. In the case of innovative start-ups, the potential for 
vertical complementarities may be improved provided that we better understand 
the mechanisms and processes of firms’ growth especially in areas of high-tech 
and in segments where gazelle-type companies operate. This further reinforces 
our first conclusion that the assessment would have to be as specific as possible 
to the individual policy instrument. 
 
c) Among policy instruments assessed by our methodology the greatest 
potential for vertical alignment or trans-national /regional cooperation is present 
in the case of risk capital promotion measures, which is followed by R&D 
cooperation measures. Moderate overall but very strong potential for vertical 
trans-European cooperation is present in specific sectors of service innovation, 
public procurement and IPR support.  Lower and similar potential for vertical 
cooperation is present in the case of R&D grants, sectoral innovation programs, 
start-ups, regional clusters and recruitment of RSE in enterprises.  
 
d) An assessment of the potential for vertical policy cooperation should not take 
interests and motivations of existing stakeholders as given. In fact, very often 
the potential for vertical cooperation is hindered because a key stakeholder is 
either ‘weak’ (undeveloped) or missing.  From our perspective, a key policy 
objective would be to enhance or assist the growth of the ‘weakest link’ i.e. a 
stakeholder that is essential to the process of strategic vertical interaction but 
which is either not developed or not oriented towards ERA objectives. Our pilot 
assessments have identified several of the actors who could be considered as 
‘the weakest link’ and accordingly policy to address these issues could be 
described as ‘supporting or re-orienting the weakest link’.  For example, 
vertical cooperation in support of regional clusters has limited potential largely 
due to weak intermediary organisation for collaborative actions of regions.  
R&D grants and loans have moderate potential for vertical cooperation due to 
the limited role of EIB and absence of national governments in funding joint 
programs in this area.  Similarly, vertical policy cooperation in programs of 
R&D cooperation is limited due to the orientation of national governments 
exclusively towards national programs. 
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Appendix 5.1: Open Method of Cooperation and INNO-Nets in 
support of vertical European trans-national cooperation 
 
The Open Method of Coordination (OMC) has mainly been applied as a tool for 
horizontal coordination of activities of member states. As pointed out by Edler 
and Kuhlman (2005): ‘For the time being the OMC means integration of 
methodological approaches, discursive practices and normative orientations in 
policymaking administrations rather than integration of policy-making itself’ 
(p. 63).  
 
The task of enhancing vertical complementarities represents a new challenge 
for the OMC method. ERA-Net is a good example of horizontal integration 
facilitated by the EU. INNO-nets also represent a new initiative to enhance 
horizontal collaboration in area of innovation policy with the aim to go beyond 
policy learning and towards joint design and implementation. However, a brief 
overview of INNO-Nets projects suggests that the balance is still too much 
skewed towards learning and diffusion of best practise and much less towards 
supporting joint pilot projects.  In addition, there is strong need to enhance 
vertical cooperation in innovation policy, especially through jointly 
implemented projects supported by EU, country and regions.  
A stronger emphasis on vertical synergies would mean that diversities should 
be considered not only between countries (horizontal synergies) but also 
between regions, countries and Community level. A vertical coordination 
should facilitate integration of policy making itself. In that respect, OMC seems 
to be only the first step in the process in order to identify areas which lend itself 
to EU-wide vertical cooperation.   
 
How OMC/INNO-Nets could be used in promoting ERA, especially in 
promoting vertical policy cooperation i.e., cooperation between EU, national 
governments and regions? So far, OMC/INNO-Nets have been primarily used 
as an instrument for promoting cooperation between national governments. In 
view of this study, OMC/INNO-Nets could be used also as an instrument for 
promoting dialogue between stakeholders at different policy levels (national, 
regional and EU). INNO-Nets should be designed with a much higher share of 
joint pilot projects which include different organisations at different levels. 
However, there are two major differences when compared to established OMC 
which follow from our assessment of potential for trans-national cooperation or 
vertical integration of the 10 policy areas. First, vertically focused OMC should 
be confined on very specific policy areas and instruments where it is possible to 
identify complementarities of interests between different stakeholders. Second, 
the exact profile of stakeholders should be specific to each very specific policy 
area.  Both of these requirements could be satisfied after an in-depth 
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assessment of potential for vertical complementarities as outlined in this study 
(Radosevic et al, 2008). 
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